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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
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ABSTRACT: This dissertation investigates the psychological and rational factors that undergird 
American presidents’ foreign intervention decisions. While conventional international relations 
scholarship generally overlooks micro-level variables, decades of psychologically-based research 
into leaders’ foreign policy decision-making has proven a rich area of study. Even though the 
psychological approach has enriched International Relations scholarship, it often does so without 
considering the rational factors that also affect decision-making. This dissertation seeks to bridge 
that divide by exploring the psychological and rational dynamics within a “foreign policy team,” 
comprised of an American president and his/her chosen advisors, that influence a president’s 
decisions of whether and how to intervene in foreign crises. I introduce a new theory which 
forwards that intervention decisions emerge from the interactions between a president’s beliefs 
about a particular intervention and a foreign policy team’s relevant expertise and their ability to 
learn from and adapt to a conflict as it evolves. In pursuit I conduct a quantitative study of 
 iii 
president’s predilections towards conflict initiation based on their personal experiences of wars 
and two qualitative comparative case studies which examine Presidents George H.W. Bush and 
William J. Clinton’s handling the civil war in Bosnia and humanitarian intervention in Somalia. 
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Introduction: This dissertation investigates the psychological and rational factors that undergird 
American presidents’ foreign intervention decisions. While conventional international relations 
scholarship generally overlooks micro-level variables, decades of psychologically-based research 
into social and cognitive biases and the ideational drivers of leaders’ foreign policy decisions 
have proven a rich area of study. Even though the psychological approach has enriched 
International relations (IR) scholarship, it often does so without considering the rational factors 
that also affect decision-making.1 This dissertation seeks to bridge that divide by exploring the 
psychological and rational dynamics within a “foreign policy team,” comprised of an American 
president and his/her chosen advisors, that influence a president’s decisions of whether and how 
to intervene in foreign crises. I argue that intervention decisions emerge from the interactions 
between a president’s beliefs about a particular intervention and a foreign policy team’s relevant 
expertise and their ability to learn from and adapt to a conflict as it evolves. 
 
Why Investigate American Presidents? 
Much of IR is rooted in the causes and effects of individual and group decisions.2 And 
within the international system, modern American presidents have outsized power and 
remarkable latitude to in choosing whether and how to wield it.3 As evidence, consider that since 
                                                      
1 Waltz (1959 and 2010) notably gives leaders short shrift in his seminal works (Man, the State, and War: A 
Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press and Theory of International Politics, Long Grove: Waveland 
Press). For broad overviews of psychological and individual-level approaches, see Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001) and 
Kertzer and Tingley (2018) in the Annual Review of Political Science. 
2 Valerie M. Hudson. 2005. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of  
International Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1): 1–30. 
3 Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency. 1973. Houghton Mifflin Company; William G. Howell, and Jon C. 
Pevehouse. 2007. "Trends in Military Deployments" in While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on 
Presidential War Powers: pp. 53-74.; Richard N. Haass. 2009. War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two 
Iraq Wars. Simon and Schuster.; Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2011. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military 
Interventions. Cornell University Press.; Paul E. Peterson. 1994. "The President's Dominance in Foreign Policy 
Making." Political Science Quarterly 109(2): 215-234. 
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World War II, Presidents of the United States have unilaterally pursued intervention policies that 
include, but are not limited to: undeclared wars, aid delivery, covert operations, peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, regime change, counterinsurgency, nation building, and many forms of 
diplomacy.4 Similarly, they have acted unilaterally in deciding to abstain from American 
involvement in numerous potential interventions.5 They have helped create and lead international 
organizations and institutions and acted through and with them when advantageous and 
circumvented them when disadvantageous.6  
 
Why do Presidents’ Beliefs Matter? 
 
These dynamics, vis-à-vis presidential power, naturally elicit the following question: 
‘What drives their intervention decisions?’ The theoretical chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 
1) reviews the broad scope of the literature that has investigated this question. While scholars 
have considered numerous rational and psychological inducers and constraints surrounding such 
decisions, American presidents’ tremendous power and autonomy suggests that their choices are 
at least in part affected by their intervention beliefs. When deliberating intervention (in-)action, 
leaders’ beliefs serve as both a guide and gauge about the nature of the relevant conflict and the 
causes and effects of various (non-)intervention options.7 There is historical evidence to suggest 
                                                      
4 Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed. 2014. "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military 
Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Louis 
Fisher. 1995. "The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?" American Journal of International Law 
89(1): 21-39; Garance Franke-Ruta, “All the Previous Declarations of War,” The Atlantic Monthly, August 31, 2013, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/all-the-previous-declarations-of-war/279246/. 
5 For example, Chapter 4 of this dissertation addresses President George H.W. Bush’s decision not to intervene in 
the Yugoslav Civil or the genocide in Bosnia during the latter half of his term in office. 
6 John G. Ikenberry. 2003. "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" Perspectives on Politics 1(3): 533-550; Also, 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation discusses why George H.W. Bush chose to act alongside but not with the United 
Nations in delivering aid to Somalia in 1992. 
7 Nathan C. Leites. 1951. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill.; Alexander L. George. 
1969. “The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making.” 
International Studies Quarterly 23:190-222.; Alexander L. George. 1980. Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign 
Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Westview Press; Robert Jervis. 2006. “Understanding Beliefs,” 
Political Psychology 27(5): 641-663. 
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that beliefs vary by intervention as there is no such thing as a constantly interventionist/hawkish 
or noninterventionist/dovish president.8 In practice, the articulation of a president’s intervention 
beliefs has an important agenda setting function for the foreign policy team. Given that 
presidents are the ultimate decision makers, their beliefs set boundaries on what policies advisors 
will consider. Presidents’ intervention beliefs can change, however, as a conflict evolves and a 
team learns from it. 
 
Experiences of War as a Driver of Intervention Beliefs 
 
When making interventions decisions, presidents’ may be influenced by beliefs derived 
from their previous experiences.9 Jervis (1976) identifies four critical variables that “influence 
the degree to which an event affects later perceptual predispositions.” They are: 1) “whether or 
not the person experienced the event firsthand; 2) whether it occurred early in his adult life or 
career; 3) whether it had important consequences for him or his nation; and 4) whether he is 
familiar with a range of international events that facilitate alternative perceptions.”10 Such events 
can include the salient experiences of the most recent war or intervention, a generation’s 
experience with a prominent foreign policy event (e.g. the Vietnam War or the attacks of 
September 11, 2001), and a leader’s most-recent foreign policy success amongst others. Jervis 
specifically discusses the experience of war—in participant or observational capacities—as a 
particularly impactful event. He writes, “Some events— like wars— leave such an impression 
that equally dramatic developments are required to displace them.”11 
                                                      
8 For example, President George W. Bush is considered an interventionist president because of his initiation of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But he did not intervene in North Korea despite the burgeoning nuclear threat there. 
9 For example, Chapter 6 of Robert Jervis. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton 
University Press. 
10 Jervis. 1976. pp. 239. 
11 Ibid, pp. 217. 
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Following Jervis, a president’s prior war experience (whether in combat, non-combat, 
and non-serving capacities) may be influential when making intervention decisions because of 
the potential connection between the lessons a leader may have learned and the prospects of 
deploying American troops into potential danger.12 For example, Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, 
forward that leaders with combat experience, having lived the horrors of war, are less likely to 
initiate militarized disputes than their non-combat counterparts.13 However, there has not been 
empirical investigation of this potential correlation vis-à-vis American presidents.14 Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation employs quantitative analysis to explore the relationship between presidents’ 
experiences of war in combat, non-combat, and non-serving capacities and finds no clear 
connection. This negative finding suggests that presidents’ foreign policy beliefs about 
interventions may be related to their personal experiences of wars, but are not fully explained by 
it. Theories connecting these experiences with intervention decisions must incorporate other 
beliefs and the impact of the decision-making process. 
 
Advisors, Expertise, Learning, and the Decision-Making Process: 
When deliberating intervention policies, a foreign policy team enters into a dynamic, 
deliberative process that eventually yields a policy choice. This process has three governing 
factors: a president’s extant foreign policy beliefs, a team’s overall expertise, and its ability to 
learn from conflict as it evolves and integrate new conflict information into their deliberations.  
Advisors serve a vital support role for presidents. Presidents choose their advisors, who 
in turn provide a commander in chief with relevant information as well as emotional and 
                                                      
12 Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. Why Leaders Fight. Cambridge University Press. 
pp. 134-140. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation explores the ideational and war experience literature. 
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logistical support. They must calibrate their advisory role to ensure that the decision a president 
makes should increase political legitimacy domestically and abroad. Similarly, they must adjust 
their advice and support to a president’s needs and intervention beliefs as they might change. 
 Just as a president may be guided past experiences, members of a foreign policy team are 
guided by their relevant prior experiences. Presidents and advisors with prior intervention 
management experience are more likely to avoid cognitive biases and exhibit rational decision 
making. Experienced presidents are also better personnel managers and are better able to 
compensate for advisors’ biases. However, experienced advisors may be unable to compensate 
for the errors in judgement an inexperienced president is likely to make. Even though expertise 
lends itself to a more rational process, experts do not necessarily hold an advantage in 
predictions and forecasting. Similarly, over-reliance on prior experience can lead to insufficient 
engagement with information about a conflict and inadequate learning. Learning represents acts 
of engagement with a conflict as it changes. Good learning is demonstrated by testing 
intervention beliefs and their justifications and underlying assumptions against that new 
information. Teams that do not engage in the learning process, are more likely to favor policy 
options that will decrease political legitimacy. 
 
The Puzzle and Plan of the Dissertation: 
This study asks two central questions: 1) What are the intra-administration factors that 
shape presidential decisions about foreign interventions? 2) How are a president’s psychological 
propensities and intervention beliefs mediated by advisers during the intervention management 
and decision-making process? In pursuit of these questions, the dissertation proceeds as follows. 
 6 
In Chapter 1, I draw from political science and psychology literature to forward my 
theory of intra-administration intervention decision-making. In Chapter 2, following extant 
theories on military experience and inclinations towards conflict, I calculate the proportion of 
military disputes initiated during president’s tenure that involve troop deployment with the intent 
to use force and abstention from acting. Finding no clear relationship between any different 
category of war experience and predilections towards dispute initiation furthers Chapter 1’s 
argument about the intervening role of the decision-making process. In Chapters 3 and 4, I 
conduct two comparative case studies of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s 
handling the civil war in Bosnia and humanitarian intervention in Somalia. I have selected these 
cases for four reasons:  
1. These cases occurred in the period between the end of the Cold War and before the 
global war on terror. This period should, theoretically, have offered president’s 
maximum latitude in exercising their intervention beliefs; 
2. They offer a direct comparison of foreign policy teams’ expertise. Bush and his team 
were very experienced and Clinton and his team were not; 
3. The differences in expertise allow for clear examination of the teams’ engagement 
with and learning from the two conflicts; 
4. Only recently have declassified intra-administration national security documents 
become declassified.  
 
In pursuit of this qualitative analysis, I employ Alexander George’s method of process tracing 
(1979) as outlined in Marc Trachtenberg’s The Craft of International History (2006) and 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. I utilize declassified national security documents, contemporary journalistic accounts, 
an elite interview, and scholarly assessments to track both presidents’ foreign policy teams’ 
handlings of the two crises.15 
                                                      
15 Alexander George. 1979. “The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making Behavior: The 
'Operational Code' Belief System.” In L. Falkowski (Ed.). Psychological Models in International Politics (pp. 95-
124). Boulder: Westview Press; Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory 
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Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of American Presidential Intervention Decision-Making 
 
“As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in 
practice, you see the difference personalities make.” 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (1974)16 
 
 
 
What are the intra-administration factors that shape presidential decisions about foreign 
interventions? How are a president’s psychological propensities and intervention beliefs 
mediated by advisers during the intervention management and decision-making process? 
 
Introduction: 
Before 1945, the United States of America largely practiced nonintervention in other 
countries’ crises.17 By contrast, the period following World War II (WWII) saw corresponding 
increases in both American involvement in foreign interventions as well as presidential 
prerogative in managing those interventions.18 These changes have made presidential 
management of foreign interventions central to modern American foreign policy. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in combat troop deployment. Since 1945, presidents have sent hundreds of 
thousands of combat troops into dozens of interventions without a single declaration of war and 
just 11 Congressional authorizations to use force.19 The expansion of presidential power is 
                                                      
Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press; Trachtenberg, Marc. 2006. The Craft of International History 
Princeton University Press 
16 Walter Issacson, "Kissinger."(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 13. 
17 Evidential of noninterventionism’s centrality to American foreign policy, President Lincoln’s Secretary of States 
William H. Seward called it, “…straight [and] absolute,” adding it, “has thus become a traditional one which could 
not be abandoned without the most urgent occasion, amounting to a manifest necessity.” Cited in John W. Davis, 
"The Permanent Bases of American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 10, no. 1 (1931): 1-12. Davis (193) further 
illustrates the centrality of nonintervention. 
18 See Arthur Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973; William G. Howell, and Jon C. 
Pevehouse, "Trends in Military Deployments" in While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential 
War Powers, pp. 53-74. Princeton University Press, 2007, and Lindsay, James M. "Congress and foreign policy: 
Why the Hill matters." Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 4 (1992): 607-628 
19 Jennifer K. Elsea and Matthew C. Weed, "Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: 
Historical Background and Legal Implications," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2014; Louis 
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further evidenced by the panoply of intervention policies they pursued that are short of what are 
commonly considered war. A non-exhaustive and nonexclusive list includes unilateral and 
multilateral aid, covert operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, regime change, 
counterinsurgency, nation building, and many forms of diplomacy amongst others. Presidential 
prerogative and power are similarly demonstrated by the numerous decision points at which they 
chose nonintervention.20 
Presidential (non-) intervention decisions, however, do not emanate out of isolation. 
Rather, presidents consider interventions already psychologically-influenced by their salient life 
experiences and extant beliefs about interventions. Notably, when weighing decisions to send 
troops abroad, presidents draw on their own experiences of interventions which originate out of 
their experience of interventions as either soldiers or civilians.21 Given the variability in how 
they might have been impacted by interventions prior to ascending to the presidency, the lessons 
learned and policy preferences arising from those experiences vary at the individual level. More 
broadly, the experience-effect speaks to presidents’ extant beliefs about interventions prior to 
managing interventions.22 These beliefs, manifested as policy preferences vary by predilections 
                                                      
Fisher, "The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?" American Journal of International Law 89, no. 1 
(1995): 21-39. Garance Franke-Ruta, “All the Previous Declarations of War,” The Atlantic Monthly, August 31, 
2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/all-the-previous-declarations-of-war/279246/ 
20 For a comprehensive list of American troop deployments abroad see: Barbara Salazar Torreon, 2016, “Instances 
of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798 2016” R42738, Congressional Research Service. 
21 On military experience see, for example, Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. Why Leaders 
Fight. Cambridge University Press, 2015. On lessons of wars, see Chapter 6 of Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, 1976 and Roskin, Michael. "From Pearl Harbor 
to Vietnam: Shifting generational paradigms and foreign policy." Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 3 (1974): 563-
588.” 
22 See Alexander L. George, "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The 
‘Operational Code’Belief System." Psychological models in international politics (1979): 95-124 and Elizabeth N. 
Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions, 2011, Cornell University Press. 
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towards nonintervention/intervention and on how to intervene, serve the vital function of setting 
an initial agenda of intervention policies to be considered.23 
Once the agenda is set, a president’s and his/her advisors enter into a dynamic process of 
information gathering and debate to gauge the viability and implications of a president’s initial 
policy preference. Advisors give the president information, advice, and support. In this way, they 
serve an executive’s psychological and rational-informational needs throughout the decision-
making process.24 This process may or may not yield a policy decision that is different from the 
president’s initial policy preference. 
Broadly speaking, political scientists treat psychological and organizational approaches to 
decision-making described above as mutually exclusive. Those taking the psychological 
approach tend to treat decisions as the president’s alone while disagreeing on their causal factors. 
Those taking the organizational approach tend to adopt the view that “personnel is policy” and 
view advisors as the central actors who shape processes and decisions to their preferences.25 
Thus, they view policy outcomes not as presidents’ choices, but as those of his/her most-
influential advisor(s). Rather than treating the two approaches as parallel, I view them as 
complementary and contend that they ought to be viewed together as both needed to offer a more 
precise theory of intervention decision-making.  
 
The Argument: 
                                                      
23 Jentelson calls this agenda setting “an administration’s basic propensities.” Bruce W. Jentelson, "Discrepant 
responses to falling dictators: Presidential belief systems and the mediating effects of the senior advisory 
process." Political Psychology (1990) pp.: 354. 
24 Alexander L. George, 1980. Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use   of Information 
and Advice. Westview Press, pp. 81. 
25 See, for example, David E. Lewis, "Personnel is Policy: George W. Bush’s Managerial Presidency." In President 
George W. Bush’s Influence over Bureaucracy and Policy, pp. 19-40. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009. 
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I argue that intervention decisions emerge from presidents’ psychological propensities 
which manifest as initial intervention policy preferences. Those preferences are informed by a 
president’s salient experiences, like military service or lack thereof, and his/her beliefs about 
intervention. Intervention beliefs can be informed by a number of factors (e.g. those salient 
experiences, domestic politics, or generational paradigms vis-à-vis (non-) intervention).26 
Presidents’ psychological propensities are based on their salient experiences of interventions and 
extant intervention beliefs. Both propensities vary by individual-president and, by extentsion, 
intervention. Preferred policies may be mediated by deliberations within a foreign policy team, 
comprised of a president and his/her chosen senior advisors. A team’s decision-making process 
is dictated by its overall capacities of expertise (prior intervention management experience) and 
learning (ability to integrate relevant information into deliberations as an intervention evolves).27 
In this way, the dependent variable (presidential intervention decisions) is explained by the 
independent variable (a president’s psychological propensities) but can be mediated by an 
intervening variable (the decision-making process, which governed by expertise and learning).  
The corresponding hypotheses are as follows: (H1) In the high-capacities foreign policy 
team scenario, the mediating effect will be weak, (H2) in the low-capacity foreign policy team 
scenario, the mediating effect will be strong and the key decisions will be at variance from what 
would have been predicted based strictly on a president’s initial policy preferences. The 
magnitude of mediation is explained foremost by the viability of a president’s preferred policy. 
Experienced foreign policy presidents are more likely to have viable initial policy preferences. 
                                                      
26 For a review of domestic influences on foreign policy see Fearon, James D. "Domestic politics, foreign policy, 
and theories of international relations." Annual Review of Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998): 289-313. For foreign 
policy choices made because of the generational foreign intervention paradigm of the time see, “Roskin, Michael. 
"From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting generational paradigms and foreign policy." Political Science 
Quarterly 89, no. 3 (1974): 563-588.” 
27 Jentelson (1990) takes a similar approach but views the mediating variable as advisor’s (dis-) unity. 
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More broadly, experienced foreign policy teams are already familiar with extant intervention 
apparatuses and their capabilities and limitations better-equipped to gauge the viability of a 
president’s initial policy preferences. In contrast, inexperienced teams have to gain these 
competencies and are less capable of mitigating inviable policy options. If advisors have an 
experience and informational advantage over a president, the mediation effect is likely to be 
great unless the president has not already selected a policy that advisors support. 
Expertise alone does not fully explain mediating effects as (potential) foreign 
interventions are dynamic events which demand policy assessment prior to and during their 
implementation. Therefore, good-functioning teams demonstrate effective learning through close 
monitoring of an intervention, including consistent policy (re-)evaluation. Teams do this by 
testing potential policies (including the president’s initial preferred policy) against historical 
lessons and integrating new and relevant information into policy deliberations as the team gains a 
greater understanding of what an intervention is and what it might become. Relevant information 
includes public opinion polling, popular news stories, prominent opinion pieces, intelligence 
reports, military assessment, diplomatic reports and communiques, think tank reports, and 
academic assessments amongst others. 
High capacity teams, those that demonstrate learning through effective information 
integration into the assessment process and have extensive intervention expertise, are more 
effective because of their ability to morph to a president’s needs as an advisory structure and a 
(potential) intervention change.28 Low capacity teams are inclined towards considering, 
implementing, and inconsistent managing of inviable policies and will demonstrate inconsistent 
policy commitment issues. 
                                                      
28 Roger B. Porter, “Advising the President,” PS: Political Science & Politics 19(4) (1986): 867-869. 
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In the sections that follow, I review relevant scholarly literature and further explicate my 
theory of presidential intervention management. 
 
Rational and Psychological Approaches to Presidential Foreign Policy Decision Making: 
As presidential management of international crises became a central feature of modern 
American foreign policy, scholars followed suit in their investigation of the influences on 
presidents’ intervention decisions. Broadly, scholars taking up this research agenda can be 
divided into those taking rational and psychological approaches. Rationalists can be further 
subdivided into two groups: those that investigate extra-White House forces on the President and 
those that examine intra-White House systems and activities. 
Those examining extra-White House forces considered the roles of Congress, the 
legislative bargaining process, public opinion, repercussions for leaders when they back down 
from intervention-commitments (audience costs), and bureaucratic politics within and without 
the executive branch amongst others.29 In general, this approach offers important insights into 
domestic constraints, consequences, and structural factors that, under certain circumstances, 
might affect a President’s policy choices. However, this approach does little illuminate policy 
ideation. 
                                                      
29 While initially focused on the extra-White House bureaucratic factors, newer literature has expanded its focus to 
include study of the influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s influence, often within executive branch deliberations. 
For Congress’s role in the foreign policy making process see James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US 
Foreign Policy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994 and Howell and Pevehouse, 2007. For the 
role of public opinion see: John E. Meuller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, New York: Wiley, 1973, and John 
R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press, 1992. For audience costs, see 
James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political 
Science Review, 88 (3), 1994: 577-592. For bureaucratic politics, see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin. 
"Bureaucratic politics: A paradigm and some policy implications," World politics 24(S1): 40-79, 1972, Morton H. 
Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution Press, 2007, and 
Pfiffner, James P. 2005. The modern presidency. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
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Those examining intra-White House processes investigate factors like advisors’ group 
behavior and groupthink, leadership style, leaders’ personalities’ effects on decision-making 
processes, advisory systems and their structures, and presidents’ personal effectiveness amongst 
others.30 Still, other rationalists take up examination of single-conflict case studies.31 As Lowi 
notes this approach minimizes the role of a president’s psychology writing, “this rationalist-
intuitionalist approach does not deny the relevance of individual psychology but treats it as 
marginal in the context of the tremendous historical forces lodged in the laws, traditions, and 
commitments of institution.”32 
Scholars taking a psychological approach have pursued a rich and varied research 
agenda, often focusing on micro-level analysis. A brief and broad overview of this scholarship 
includes the study of leaders’ operational codes, perception and misperception, personalities, 
resolve, personal characteristics,33 cognitive biases and prospect theory, shame and humiliation, 
leaders’ age, prospects for losing office, views of foreign threats, and even birth order within 
leaders’ families.34 Among those examining correlations between leaders’ biographical elements 
                                                      
30 Note: Topically, there is some overlap here with scholars who take a psychological approach. For groupthink see 
Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Houghton 
Mifflin: Boston, Mass., 1972; For leadership style and group behavior see Schafer, Mark, and Scott Crichlow, 
"Antecedents of Groupthink: A Quantitative Study." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 3 (1996): 415-35. 
For leaders’ personalities and a comparative analysis of good and bad processes see Mark Schafer and Scott 
Crichlow, Groupthink Versus High-quality Decision Making in International Relations, Columbia University Press, 
2010. For advisory systems, see George, Alexander L. 1972, “The case for multiple advocacy in making foreign 
policy,” American Political Science Review 66(3): 751‐85 and George, Alexander L. 1980. Presidential decision 
making in foreign policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. For advisory systems’ structures see Richard Tanner 
Johnson, 1974, Managing the White House, New York: Harper and Row. For presidents’ power and personal 
effectiveness, see Neustadt, Richard, 1990, Presidential power and the modern presidents, New York: Free Press. 
31 For example, Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. 
Vol. 327, no. 729.1. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 
32 Lowi, Theodore J. The personal president: Power invested, promise unfulfilled. Cornell University Press, 1986. 
33 These include a leader’s beliefs, motive, decision style, and interpersonal style. 
34 For operational codes, see Nathan C. Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, 1951, New York: McGraw-
Hill, and Alexander L George. “The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and 
Decision-making.” International Studies Quarterly 23: 190-222, 1969. For perception and misperception, see Robert 
Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, 1976.; For leaders’ 
personalities, see Margaret G. Hermann, A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, 1977, New York: Free 
Press; For leaders’ resolve, see Lloyd S. Etheredge, A World of Men: The Private Sources of American Foreign 
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and their foreign policy decision-making, the role of intervention-experience through military 
experience (or lack thereof) emerged as a valuable area of study that brings together the 
psychological, rational, and historical. 
 
Military Experience and Combined Rational-Psychological approaches: 
Throughout the history of the United States, veterans have featured prominently amongst 
its presidents. Of the 45 American Presidents, 31 had military experience and 18 of those saw 
combat (Appendix A—Table 1). The 2012 American presidential election was the first one in the 
post-World War II era in which neither major political party nominated a candidate who had any 
prior military experience.35 Until that election, in just 7 of the 57 US presidential elections did all 
major parties nominate non-veterans and all of those occurred between 1884-1944.36  
Despite their political prominence, evidence linking military service and intervention 
policy preferences is mixed. Research into the role of veteran-legislators in foreign policy 
                                                      
Policy. MIT Press, 1978.; For personal characteristics, see Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy 
Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders." International Studies Quarterly 24(1): 7-46, 
1980; For cognitive biases, see Deborah W. Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation, 
Princeton University Press, 1985, and Deborah W. Larson, “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making,” Political Psychology, 15(1), 17-33, 1994; For prospect theory, see: Rose McDermott, 
Risk-taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy, Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. For shame and humiliation, see: Blema S. Steinberg, Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision 
Making on Vietnam, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996; For leaders’ age, see: Michael Horowitz, Rose 
McDermott, and Allan C. Stam. "Leader age, regime type, and violent international relations." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49(5), 2005 (pp: 661-685); For prospects of leaders losing power, see Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Erich 
Goemans, Leaders and international Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2011; For American presidents’ threat 
perception, see Elizabeth N. Saunders, Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions, 2011, Cornell 
University Press; For birth order, see Louis Stewart, “Birth Order and Political Leadership,” In M. G. Hermann 
(Ed.), A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders (pp. 205-236). 1977 New York: Free Press and Rudy B. 
Andeweg and Steef B. Berg. 2003. “Linking Birth Order to Political Leadership: the Impact of Parents or Sibling 
Interaction?” Political Psychology 24(3): 605-623.   
35 Harbaugh, Ken. “There Should Be a Veteran Running for President.” TIME Magazine. 18 Mar 2015.    
36 Those election years are 1884, 1908, 1920, 1924, 1928, 1932, and 1944. 1884 is somewhat anomalous because 
Grover Cleveland avoided military service by legally paying a substitute $300 to take his place, earning himself the 
reputation as a “slacker”—a reputation that was difficult to overcome (Miller Center). The other elections suggest a 
cohort effect. Specifically, that the decreasing population of soldiers within the general population between the Civil 
War and World War I led to a corresponding representation drop of veterans in the presidency (Appendix A: Table 1 
& Figure 2).  
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formulation shows that representatives’ vote choices do not vary significantly from non-veteran 
representatives.37 This research agenda, however, like most political scientists treat all military 
experience uniformly, without any qualitative disaggregation.38 In Why Leaders Fight (2015), 
Horowitz, Stam and Ellis, performed a quantitative study of every nations’ head of government 
(1875-2004) to uncover relationships between leaders’ military service (combat, non-combat, 
and no-service) and conflict initiation predilections. The authors forward that noncombat 
veterans are more likely to initiate conflicts than either combat veteran or non-serving leaders 
because noncombat veterans seek to remedy a perceived gallantry-deficit in their military service 
through successful conflict leadership. Additionally, they forward that combat veteran leaders, 
having seen war’s horrors firsthand, are more reluctant to commit troops to existential danger.39  
Following Why Leaders Fight, Chatterjee (2017 and Chapter 1 of this dissertation), 
undertook a quantitative study of military experience and American presidents conflict initiation 
predilections. Using the same statistical method but extending out the population of interest to 
include all presidents and American conflicts from 1816-2010, Chatterjee found little difference 
in presidents’ propensity for armed conflict relative to noncombat, combat, and no military 
service. Chatterjee also found inconclusive results when examining presidential predilections to 
choose no militarized response based on military service. 
                                                      
37 Bianco, William T., and Jamie Markham. 2001. “The Vanishing Veterans.” In Soldiers and   Civilians, ed. Peter 
D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Lupton, Danielle. "Military Experience and 
Congressional Oversight of the Iraq War:   Does Military Service Matter?" Presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, Washington DC.   
38 Holsti, Ole. 1998. "A Widening Gap between the Us Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96." 
International Security 23(3): 5-42; Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn. 2000. “The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians, and 
Their Mutual Misunderstanding.” The National Interest (Fall):29–37; Gelpi, Christopher and Peter Feaver. 2004. 
Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. Princeton University Press.   
39 Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis, Why Leaders Fight. Cambridge University Press, 2015, 
pp. 134-140. 
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Other scholars examining the relationship between experiences of the Vietnam War and 
intervention preferences also found conflicting results. In a twin study in which one sibling saw 
combat in Vietnam and the other did not serve, Koenen et al (2003) found combat veteran twins 
were showed a greater proclivity for acts of violence.40 Jennings, Markus, and Niemi (1991), 
comparing attitudes towards military intervention, found that Vietnam veterans were more 
hesitant about interventions than soldiers deployed in other interventions. Their findings suggest 
that it is not the type of service but rather the conflict in which a soldier was deployed that 
affects intervention preferences.41 DiCicco and Fordham (2018), examining the (non-) 
intervention preferences of Vietnam veterans who became foreign policy elites, find that 
skepticism about the efficacy of American interventions faded after the end of the Cold War.42 
These findings suggest that elite’s military experience-based intervention preferences are viewed 
not in any psychologically, but rather viewed more broadly and are placed given rational 
assessment within the context of American foreign policy goals. Thus, DiCicco and Fordham’s 
findings run counter to Roskin (1974) who argues that intervention-nonintervention preferences 
stem from the salient generational intervention experience (i.e. the WWII/Pearl Harbor 
generation was interventionst and the Vietnam generation was noninterventionist).43 
                                                      
40 Koenen, Karestan C., Michael J. Lyons, Jack Goldberg, John Simpson, Wesley M. Williams, Rosemary Toomey, 
Seth A. Eisen, William True, and Ming T. Tsuang. 2003. "Co‐twin control study of relationships among combat 
exposure, combat‐related PTSD, and other mental disorders." Journal of Traumatic Stress 16(5): 433-438. 
41 M. Kent Jennings, Gregory B. Markus, and Richard G. Niemi. 1991. Youth-parent Socialization Panel Study, 
1965-1982: Three Waves Combined. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political Social Research. 
42 Jonathan M. DiCicco, and Benjamin O. Fordham. "The Things They Carried: Generational Effects of the Vietnam 
War on Elite Opinion." International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1 (2018): 131-144. 
43 On military experience see, for example, Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. Why Leaders 
Fight. Cambridge University Press, 2015. On lessons of wars, see Chapter 6 of Robert Jervis, Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, 1976 and Roskin, Michael. "From Pearl Harbor 
to Vietnam: Shifting generational paradigms and foreign policy." Political Science Quarterly 89, no. 3 (1974): 563-
588.” 
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In Chapter 6 of Perception and Misperception in International Politics, entitled “How 
Decision-Makers Learn from History,” Jervis makes a comprehensive case for the psychological 
impact a nation’s military interventions can have on leaders.44 He argues that wars, especially 
when experienced firsthand, can have several lasting impacts on leaders including making them 
impervious to new information, leaving disproportionate impressions, and creating 
predispositions that can lead to misperceptions.45 Jervis cites Churchill’s mishandling of naval 
operations in World War II because he could only view battle through the lens of his combat 
experience as a soldier in land wars. In addition to military experience, Jervis cites war-
experiences in early adulthood, generational effects, and events important to one’s state as events 
that psychologically impact leaders’ perceptions of wars.46 The variety of ways in which the 
many experiences of war can affect leaders’ beliefs about interventions suggest a salient, charged 
psychological effect but not necessarily a uniform one. Beliefs can be informed by a number of 
factors including those salient life experiences, domestic politics, and generational paradigms 
amongst others. 
 
Leaders Beliefs: 
Politics is largely grounded in the causes and effects of leaders’ decisions.47 As such 
leaders’ beliefs, as an influence on those decisions, have long been a driver of scholarly inquiry. 
Among political scientists influenced by and employing social and cognitive psychological 
theories, Leites (1951) and George (1969) are notable forerunners in this field for their work on 
                                                      
44 Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press. 
45 Hudson, Valerie M. 2005, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of  
International Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1): 1–30.; Jervis, 1976, pp. 218, 240, & 244. 
46 Jervis, 1976, pp. 252. 
47 Valerie M. Hudson. 2005. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of   International 
Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1): 1–30.   
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operational codes.48 George, summarizing, decontextualizing, and generalizing Leites, defines 
the operational code as, “…a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the 
flow of political events, his definitions, and estimates of particular situations.”49 George 
highlights the importance of beliefs in an individuals’ diagnostic and choice propensities saying, 
“[beliefs] provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy 
and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.” Despite beliefs’ 
importance in a leaders’ foreign policy decision making process, George stresses that beliefs are 
not a decision’s sole determinant.50 Later, George (1980) argues that international relations are 
shaped by, “[leaders’] beliefs about the nature of conflict within the international system.”51 
Jervis (2006), concurring on beliefs’ importance, instead frames them as, “the sense of 
what people think about causes and effects.”52 In explicating this definition further, Jervis points 
to beliefs’ multiple meanings as evidence of, “...the inextricable role of emotion in sensible 
thought.”53 Jervis says that beliefs, “can refer to inner states as well as outer realities” and beliefs 
and belief systems tend to be durable because they have, “a strong element of commitment and 
faith.”54 Their resilience and general stability speak to their observability and value as a variable 
for analysis. Similarly, Renshon (2008) argues that in order to maintain internal cognitive 
consistency, leaders, like all individuals, “tend to filter new information through their pre-
                                                      
48 Leites, Nathan C. 1951. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill.; George, Alexander L. 
1969. The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making. 
International Studies Quarterly 23: 190-222. 
49 George, 1969, pp.191. 
50 Ibid. 
51 George, Alexander L. 1980. Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information 
and Advice. Westview Press, pp. 55. 
52 Robert Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27(5), 2006: 641-663, pp: 642. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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existing beliefs in such a manner as to maintain the consistency of their beliefs.”55 In this way, 
leaders operate in “an objective reality but to a subjective reality that is filtered through their 
belief system.”56 
Saunders (2011), examining when and how Presidents of the United States choose to 
intervene in international crises, views the critical variable as, “the degree to which [Presidents] 
believe that the internal…characteristics of other states are the ultimate source of threats.”57 
Thus, Saunders divides presidents into “internally focused types” who are more likely to 
intervene militarily in a target country if they believe a threat originates from its domestic 
social/political composition and “externally focused types” who diagnose foreign threats based 
on a target state’s foreign policy.58 Internally focused types are more inclined towards 
“transformative” interventions, in which the American goal is to reorder the state’s domestic 
order and institutions.59 Externally focused types are more inclined towards “nontransformative” 
interventions, in which the United States “aims to resolve an international or civil conflict or 
crisis, or restrain or roll back a foreign policy action, without the explicit intention to alter 
domestic institutions within the target states.”60  
While Saunders follows the work of Leites, George, and Jervis in forwarding the 
importance and psychological charge associated with a president’s foreign policy beliefs, there 
are ambiguities in her definitions and categorizations and, by extension, their connection 
between to leaders’ beliefs and policy choices. Saunders concedes that any military intervention 
                                                      
55 Jonathan Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush," Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (2008): 820-849, pp: 822. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Saunders, Elizabeth N. 2011. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions. Cornell University 
Press, pp. 3. 
58 Ibid, 
59 Ibid, pp. 23. 
60 Ibid, pp. 22.  
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taking place in a target state will likely have serious domestic consequences which may result in 
massive changes in a target state’s internal politics. This allows for the real effect that 
nontransformative interventions within a target state may have massive transformative effects. In 
effect then, the crucial distinction between her dependent variables (transformative and 
nontransformative interventions) resides in a president’s a priori declaration of intention to 
change regime as a goal of the intervention and a post hoc assessment of the changes on a target 
state’s internal political composition. Furthermore, many of the presidents (Truman, H.W. Bush, 
and Clinton) Saunders considers sought both transformative and nontransformative interventions. 
Additionally, there is ambiguity between her independent variables (internally focused 
and external focused types) in the case of Eisenhower and Johnson in Indochina/Vietnam. 
Saunders cites both Eisenhower and Johnson as externally focused types and categorizes their 
approaches to Indochina/Vietnam as nonintervention and nontransformative intervention 
respectively.61 Beschloss (discussed below) shows that Eisenhower wanted to intervene to help 
the French maintain the political order in Indochina/Vietnam but was restrained by American 
domestic political forces. This means that Eisenhower’s beliefs were reflective of an internally-
focused type and was interventionist. In Johnson’s case, he did not want to intervene but was 
ultimately compelled to do so by American domestic political pressures, not perceived external 
threat that could have emerged from the Vietnamese Civil War. Furthermore, it is unclear how 
the internally focused category could apply to a country in civil war whose political order had 
already dissolved. Moreover, Johnson’s public discussion of domino theories and Vietnam’s 
geostrategic value might be reasonably viewed as post hoc rationalization for a decision spurred 
by American-domestic forces. 
                                                      
61 Ibid, pp. 18. 
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 I contend that beliefs surrounding threat perception and their corresponding “types” and 
policy choices, as broadly discussed by Saunders, may affect presidents’ decisions (and the 
environment surrounding those decisions) to intervene but are ultimately subsumable under the 
rubric of presidential belief about how to intervene. Continuing to operate on the George-Jervis 
view of beliefs as durable psychological entities that influence both foreign policies-considered 
and -chosen, when a president faces an intervention decision point, his/her beliefs can vary 
according to each conflict. In other words, beliefs vary by conflict for each president.62 In this 
way, a presidents’ beliefs about how to intervene serve an agenda setting function. 
 
Connecting Intervention Experience Effects and Intervention Beliefs to Policy Preferences: 
In Presidents at War, historian Michael Beschloss draws from archival and declassified 
data sources to illuminate American Presidents’ intervention decision making processes. In 
Presidents, Beschloss shows that a president’s past military experience and intervention beliefs 
may have an effect on the starting point of the intervention management process. But, they are 
not sufficiently determinative of policy choices. 
Beschloss argues that American presidents with military backgrounds are better “war 
presidents.” For this assessment, he cites 2 reasons: 1) having lived the mortal endeavor of war, 
veteran presidents have greater empathy and practice heightened circumspection when 
considering committing to soldiers to battle and 2) veteran-presidents understand the strategic 
limits of tactical military advice in intervention management.63 As examples, Beschloss cites 
President Eisenhower as a paragon of “a good war president” for keeping the United States out 
                                                      
62 Saunders, in fact, argues this (in brief) when describing George W. Bush’s beliefs after the attacks of September 
11, 2001 
63 Preet Bharara, “Stay tuned with Preet: How to Assess a Presidency (with Michael Beschloss)," Stay Tuned with 
Preet, National Public Radio, November 15, 2018. 
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of Vietnam (1954-1961) and President Johnson as “a bad war president” for escalating the war in 
Vietnam after a staged, nonexistent attack on American ships at the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964.64 
Beschloss’s own historical investigation their Vietnam-management, however, shows that 
his view of military service’s effect is not necessarily directly observable in policy choices and 
that a president’s extant intervention beliefs and policy preferences and are insufficiently 
determinative of policy choices. According to Beschloss, in April 1954, with French control over 
Vietnam collapsing, President Eisenhower sought discretionary authority to use air and sea 
power from then-Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson and longtime Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, Senator Richard Russell.65 They denied his request, counselling 
him against American unilateral action in Vietnam out of the strong likelihood of protracted 
entanglement there. Eisenhower, having been advised and dissuaded from military intervention 
chose instead to furnish South Vietnam with military assistance and $1.65 billion in financial 
aid.66  
In November 1963, a newly sworn-in President Lyndon Johnson inherited an already-
intractable Vietnam conflict. Under combat veteran President John F. Kennedy, American 
involvement expanded to include covert operations and thousands of American military advisors. 
In December 1963, Johnson, like Eisenhower, sought out Russell’s counsel who, again, urged 
nonintervention and recalled for Johnson their conversation with President Eisenhower saying, “I 
tried my best to keep them from going into Laos and Vietnam…Said we’d never get out—be in 
                                                      
64 Similarly, Beschloss cites Presidents Polk and McKinley as examples of bad war presidents for also using 
phantom attacks to lead the country into wars (the Mexican-American War of the 1840s and the Spanish-American 
War of the 1890s respectively). All 4 presidents (1 good and 3 bad) were all veterans. Eisenhower and Polk were 
noncombat veterans and Johnson and McKinley saw combat in the WWII and the Civil War respectively. 
65 Michael Beschloss, Presidents of War, Random House Publishing, 2018, pp. 501-502. 
66 Michael E. Latham, "Redirecting the revolution? The USA and the failure of nation-building in South Vietnam." 
Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 27-41. 
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there fifty years from now.”67 Over the next 6 months, as conditions in Vietnam worsened, 
Johnson’s foreign policy advisors, led by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, pushed him 
harder and harder towards military intervention and (unbeknownst to Johnson) even prepared 
drafts of a congressional authorization to use force. In addition, Johnson’s opponent in the 1964 
presidential campaign, Senator Barry Goldwater, made the President’s Vietnam-management a 
major campaign issue, accusing Johnson of dithering.68 In June 1964, 10 years after telling 
Eisenhower to avoid American intervention in Vietnam, with pressure mounting on him from 
within and without the White House, Johnson’s position changed as did Russell’s advice for him. 
Russell told him, “I didn’t ever want to get messed up down there…But as a practical matter, 
we’re in there, and I don’t know how the hell to tell the American people you’re coming out…I 
think I’ve got to say that ‘I didn’t get you in here,’ but we’re in here by treaty, and our national 
honor’s at stake.”69 In August 1964, Johnson found Vietnam-entrée with the Gulf of Tonkin 
“attacks.” 
When viewing Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam conflict, 
we see that neither behaved as either Horowitz et al or Beschloss would have predicted. 
Horowitz et al would have expected non-combat veteran Eisenhower to escalate in Vietnam 
(which he wanted to) but ultimately did not. Both would have predicted that combat veteran 
Johnson would have exercised intervention reticence—which he did before ultimately deciding 
to escalate (under dubious circumstances). Beschloss would have expected both veteran 
presidents to avoid escalation even though Eisenhower wanted to escalate and Johnson 
ultimately did. 
                                                      
67 Quoted in Beschloss, pp. 501-502. 
68 Beschloss, pp. 492-521. 
69 Quoted in Beschloss, pp. 505. Johnson was similarly warned by other advisors that he was in serious danger of 
becoming the first president in American history to oversee an American defeat. 
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That these scholars’ behavioral expectations were not met does not eliminate the impact 
of president’s psychological predispositions. Instead, the decision-making process reveals the 
impact that advisors can have on policy choices. When viewed together, the 2 presidents’ 
Vietnam intervention management show a remarkable similarity in process. Both presidents 
came to their Vietnam-management task equipped with beliefs and policy preferences about how 
to handle the conflict. Both were given information and advice from their chosen advisors. For 
Eisenhower, the decision-making process produced information (lack of congressional 
cooperation and concern about the Vietnam quagmire) that immediately yielded a policy 
different from his original preference (military intervention). Similarly, Johnson’s Vietnam-
process yielded a policy choice different than his original policy preference. However, for 
Johnson’s the process produced a diametrical shift in policy preference (from staunch 
nonintervention to prosecutor of a massive undeclared war perpetrated under dubious 
circumstances). 
In both cases, the role of advisors was crucial variable in influencing the presidents’ 
choices. When considering advisors’ impact process alongside the findings from the ongoing 
scholarly debate on the effects of military experience, there is evidence to suggest that 
presidents’ intervention decisions may be related to their intervention experience, but are not 
fully explained by it. In this way, variance between a president’s intervention experience and 
intervention beliefs and policy decisions is explained by the interactions between a leader and 
his/her intervention beliefs and those psychological-influences. 
 
Advisors and the Foreign Policy Team: 
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William Galston, a professor of political science and advisor to President Bill Clinton 
remarked that the, “…first law of Presidencies is that every President gets the White House he 
deserves.”70 The scholarship on presidential advisors bares out Galston’s law as presidents 
choose their foreign policy advisors and influence the advice they receive and how they receive 
it. Destler (1977) writes that, “Presidents determine the range and quality of advice that they get. 
They choose their principal officials. They decide day-by-day, personally or through chosen 
aides, which of these officials will get into the Oval Office, how often, and in what context.”71 
While the president is the “decider-in-chief,” successful foreign policy depends on the positive 
relationship between leaders and their counselors.72 
George (1980) writes that presidents rely on advisors for information, advice, and 
support—all of which serve a leaders’ psychological and rational needs in the decision-making 
process. 73 Goldhamer (1978) similarly forwards that advisers can fill various roles and personal 
needs for a president and that their functions (support, expert analyst, teacher, etc.) effect 
decision making.74 Advisers satisfy a president’s cognitive needs with information, furnish a 
leader with emotional support, give a president “understanding and support” for policies under 
consideration and whatever choice she/he ultimately makes, and offer counsel that should 
increase political legitimacy domestically and abroad.75 While relationships and interactions are 
multifaceted, the team ultimately operates through “task-oriented relationships” in which 
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information and advice-processing are affected by the, “structure, internal processes, and 
management of…[those] tasks and relationships.”76 It follows then that policy creation develops 
out of the relationships and interactions within a president’s foreign policy team and that 
successful policies more likely to emerge out of a positive working environment.77 
The presidential studies and foreign policy analysis literature, however, offers conflicting 
arguments and findings about the extent to which advisors’ influence policy outcomes.78 
Mitchell (2010) argues that variation in influence is based upon the issue under consideration and 
not the structure of the advisory system.79 This is a break from traditional scholarship which 
holds that advisors and advisory systems are the key to influencing policy outcomes.  In 
reviewing the advisory system literature, Mitchell (2005) identifies 2 types of advisory systems: 
formal and collegial. The former being structured and operating on strict rules and hierarchies 
and the latter being looser with advisors operating collaboratively as equals.80 Mitchell argues 
that the collegial system has become the normative ideal because, “…of the way in which it 
allows for open discussion and the evaluation of a full range of options, both of which contribute 
to “better” policy outcomes.”81 Larson, on the other hand, identifies 4 types of presidential 
advisory systems (competitive, formal, collegial, and formal options) that vary in size, structure 
and personnel redundancies, animating philosophy on debate and advice, presidential role, and, 
by extension, advantages and disadvantages.82  
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The ongoing debate on advisors’ roles suggests that advisory system have an impact on 
decision making but that policy outcome variance might stem from the animating competencies 
within those systems. While good functioning teams tend to operate in structured environments 
with clear communication lines and designations of responsibilities, expertise and learning, more 
than structure, dictates advisors’ effectiveness for 2 reasons: (1) (Potential) interventions are 
dynamic events that can change and require monitoring, constant policy reassessment, and 
structural flexibility and (2) Advisory systems morph according to a president’s needs. As 
political scientist and presidential advisor Roger Porter noted, “[an] advisory system shapes itself 
to fit [a president’s] preferences more than he adjusts his style to fit with it.”83 
 
Foreign Policy Expertise:  
Within a foreign policy team’s decision-making environment, prior foreign policy 
experience is a constant factor in its operation. Many scholars argue that foreign policy choices 
are chiefly guided by prior experiences.84 Experienced leaders and advisors are more likely to 
avoid cognitive biases and exhibit (more-) rational decision making.85 Even though expertise 
lends itself to “cleaner” processes, experts do not necessarily hold an advantage in successful 
predications and forecasting.86 Amongst a team’s foreign policy experience, Saunders (2017), 
argues that an experienced executive is the prevailing factor. She argues that experienced leaders 
are better managers of their advisors and are therefore more-skilled at mitigating advisors’ 
                                                      
83 Roger B. Porter, “Advising the President,” PS: Political Science & Politics 19(4) (1986): 867-869. 
84 See Jervis, 1976; Michael Horowitz, Allen Stam, and Calli Ellis, Why Leaders Fight, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2015; Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael Horowitz, When Leaders Matter: Rebel Experience and Nuclear 
Proliferation, Journal of Politics 77, pp:72–87. 
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biases.87 She also forwards that a foreign policy team’s overall experience matters but that even, 
“a team of seasoned veterans cannot fully compensate for an inexperienced leader, and 
inexperience in a presidential principal may enable or underwrite risky behavior by advisers” and 
“deviations from rationality depend…[on] who is in charge.”88 
Foreign policy teams operate in an arena marked by uncertainty which requires that a 
president exercise his/her judgement. Larson (2003) writes, “Uncertainty means that reasonable 
people may differ. When the president’s advisors offer conflicting diagnoses of the interests at 
stake and recommendations for action, the president…may then have to use his own judgment in 
deciding whose advice to accept”89 Jentelson (1990) argues that when advisors are unified in 
disagreement with the president, their policy preferences will win out over the executive’s. When 
advisors are not unified, the president’s policy preferences will be enacted without mediation. It 
follows, that good functioning team’s advisors will find unity if a president’s initial chosen 
policy is sound and viable. 
Strathman (2018), argues that foreign policy-inexperienced-presidents have greater needs 
and so rely on their advisors more than their experienced peers. He writes:  
Leaders with a limited background in foreign policy ask more of their advisors. The 
demand for advice is greater for leaders without prior experience. The need for 
information and direction allows advisors to participate. Experience also insulates 
leaders from persuasion. Leaders use policy experience to question their advisors 
and push them to justify their recommendations. Experienced decision-makers have 
less need for advice and become resistant to the recommendations they receive. 
Advisors are more involved – and have a greater effect – when leaders are novices. 
90 
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Presidents, especially those with little intervention experience, may rely on the military’s 
expertise when seeking intervention guidance. This advice depends on whether an intervention is 
underway or not. Before an intervention, these former soldiers urge restraint from sending troops 
into battle (or conservatism) when compared to their non-serving counterparts.91 After an 
intervention is underway, those same veterans strongly favor military actions that will yield 
decisive victory, including large troop deployments.92 According to rationalist military 
sociologists and political scientists, this is because veterans in the American foreign policy 
bureaucracy derive wisdom from their military experience and that the military mind is, 
“conservative, realistic, and pessimistic about human nature.”93 Therefore, their perspective is 
buttressed upon interest in: 1) the lives and well-being of other soldiers, 2) maintaining their 
hard-earned positions of power, and 3) serving as a counterbalance to civilian bureaucrats who 
might express unwarranted optimistic for and under-informed visions of successful military 
actions.94 Despite differences on motivations, many scholars in this tradition see the soldiers’ 
familiarity with the horrors of war as a psychological driver for conservatism and a 
psychological justification for the expectation that veteran policymakers will think and act 
differently than their civilian colleagues.95 
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More broadly, when a leader is at an expertise disadvantage, policy outcomes can be 
overrun by more-experienced advisors. According to Preston (2010), McGeorge Bundy used his 
position as National Security Advisor and expertise-advantage over Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson to persistently push a policy of Vietnam-intervention over the executives’ reservations 
and objections.96A similar dynamic played out with President Trump and Afghanistan. Prior to 
ascending to the American presidency, political dilettante Donald Trump articulated a strong 
belief in ending American involvement in Afghanistan. He argued (forcefully) that the war there 
had gone on for too long and yielded neither a foreseeable terminus nor any benefit to the United 
States of America. Throughout his first term as president, America’s Afghanistan policy status 
quo remained.97 When asked why his Afghanistan-beliefs were not manifesting in policy, Trump 
responded, “We’re there because virtually every expert that I have and speak to say if we don’t 
go there, they’re going to be fighting over here. And I’ve heard it over and over again.”98 
 
Foreign Policy Learning: 
Expertise-advantages do not have to mean an executive’s beliefs have to be diminished. 
Boin, Hart, Stern, and Sundelius (2005) argue that, when good-functioning teams are faced with 
a potential intervention, individual team members’ various strengths/advantages are not used to 
promote their chosen agendas. Instead, good-functioning teams are cohesive and demonstrate 
responsiveness, adapting as a (potential) intervention changes in order to find an optimal policy 
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choice which might be different than the initial one. 99 Levy (1994) defines this responsiveness as 
learning, “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of 
new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of 
experience.”100 This definition allows for the constant possibility for the updating of 
intervention-beliefs predicated upon 1) the arrival of new information and 2) the active or 
passive acknowledgement and processing of this information. 
Of course, team member’s foreign policy beliefs (as resilient psychological entities) are 
not easily changed. Bar-Joseph and McDermott, in examining intelligence failures, forward a 
theory of learning that focuses on learning after failure. Their case selection for successful 
learning follows a pattern of failure followed by success and “assumes this temporal pattern is 
not accidental but perhaps causal in nature.”101 This suggests that for successful foreign policy 
learning to occur, it must be preceded by failure. If this causal relationship holds, then 
experienced and inexperienced leaders might need to fail in order to learn and update their 
beliefs. They also discuss unsuccessful cases of learning after failure. This suggests that a team’s 
capacity to learn must be present if not latent before a failure occurs. 
 
Conclusion: 
A foreign policy team’s choices emerge out of dynamic interactions between the leader’s 
beliefs and the teams’ overall capacities of expertise (experience dealing with previous 
interventions) and learning (ability to integrate new information as a it evolves). Team members, 
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in particular the president, with relevant expertise are better prepared to select and implement 
viable policy options based on their familiarity with the decision-making process and experience 
with extant foreign policy tools. For example, if a president wants to intervene with military 
action though an international organization (like NATO or the United Nations), a team with 
expertise will already be familiar with the organization’s operating processes and capabilities can 
more adeptly focus on viable policies. In contrast, an inexperienced team has to learn such 
functionalities and will likely consider a broad range of policy options that includes unfeasible 
ones, including options that are more likely to fail and decrease political legitimacy. Successful 
decision-making processes must also learn. A team that effectively integrates new information 
into policy deliberations and update its beliefs is more likely to consider and select prudent 
policies as they gain greater understanding of what it is and what it might become. Thus, 
presidential intervention decisions emerge out of a dynamic decision-making environment in 
which the psychological propensities are tempered with rational analysis.  
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Chapter 2: Warriors in the White House: The War’s Effects on American Presidents’ 
Decisions to Deploy Troops 
 
“I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its 
futility, its stupidity.”102  
—General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Speech at Canadian Club (January 10, 1946)  
 
“And any man who may be asked in this century what he did to make his life worth while, I think 
can respond with a good deal of pride and satisfaction: ‘I served in the United States Navy.’”103  
President John F. Kennedy, Naval Academy Commencement Speech (1963)  
 
“Some events—like wars—leave such an impression that equally dramatic developments are 
required to displace them. Because [statesmen] have overlearned from traumatic events, 
decision-makers often resemble bullets...in being insensitive to incoming information.”104 
—Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (1976)  
 
Introduction:  
 
In the 2012 American presidential election, voters faced an uncommon choice—neither 
major political party nominated a veteran.105 As retired Lieutenant Colonel TC John Nagl, 
United States Military Academy professor and combat veteran and counterinsurgency expert, 
wrote in The Washington Post of the choice between President Obama and Governor Romney: 
 “This is a dramatic change. The crucible of combat not only created these United 
States but has also given us many of our most successful presidents…Military 
service is not the only way to demonstrate dedication to country or capability for 
high office…Still, the choice to take the nation to war is the most important decision 
a president can make. A commander in chief who has actually served on the 
battlefield has peerless personal experience and can make that decision with greater 
empathy.”106 
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Military service has been a regular fixture of the presidency. In total, 31 of 44 presidents had 
some military experience and 17 saw combat.107 In the 58 American presidential elections, 47 
featured a major party candidate who had served.108 Military experience consistently rates as the 
“most valuable asset for a presidential candidate” and the scrutiny of candidates’ military bona 
fides (or lack thereof) has become a fixture of public debates over fitness to serve as commander-
in-chief and ability to direct foreign policy.109  
While Nagl’s contention fits within the longstanding scholarly conversation about the gap 
in civil and military relations, it also advances a delineation between different kinds of military 
experience and their effects on presidents’ views on deploying troops into an intervention.110 The 
idea that leaders would draw upon past events, especially impactful and salient ones like 
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experience in war, in assessing foreign policy choices is supported by both political science and 
psychology literature.111 However, the assertion that non-serving (e.g. Franklin Roosevelt), non-
combat veteran (e.g. President Eisenhower), and combat veteran (e.g. President Kennedy) would 
have fundamentally different approaches to conflict because of the differences in their military 
experiences (or lack thereof) is largely understudied. This proposition then invites the question: 
When faced with a potential intervention, do warrior presidents behave differently than 
presidents who served in non-combat capacities, or those who did not serve in the military? 
In this chapter, I examine conflict management through the lens of military experience 
(or lack thereof) to determine proclivities to use force amongst non-serving, non-combat, and 
combat veteran American presidents. In order to do this, I build upon the biographical 
information extracted from the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) which 
contains “information about the personal lives and experiences of over 2,000 state leaders from 
1875–2004” to include the military experiences of all presidents (1816-2016).112 Then, using the 
biographical data from Presidents Madison through Obama, I also use the Militarized Interstate 
Dispute (MID) data collection, “which provides information about conflicts in which one or 
more states threaten, display, or use force against one or more other states between 1816 and 
2010.”113 In total, I compare the military experience of 37 American presidents over 372 
militarized disputes. 
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In this chapter’s first section, I briefly review the political science and psychology 
literature on leaders in international relations, veterans in the foreign policy bureaucracy, how 
leaders learn (building upon the literature review in this dissertation’s second chapter), and 
combat’s varying effects (Posttraumatic Stress Disorder vs. Posttraumatic Growth). I use the 
chapter’s second section to define combat and discuss its importance in light of the American 
presidency. In the third section, I discuss results. In the fourth section, I discuss the implications 
of this study. 
 
Literature Review:  
 
Leaders: Politics is grounded in the causes and effects of individual and group decisions.114 
However, traditional IR scholars—those that do not take the psychological approach—have 
given only passing attention to the role of the individual (political leaders) in favor of systemic 
explanations.115 Over the last 18 years though, there has been a reemergence of literature on 
leaders.116 However, much this literature focuses on variations surrounding leaders than the 
leaders themselves.117 In focusing on the environment surrounding leaders, these authors, 
perhaps inadvertently, forward the notion that effects from variation on leadership are 
subsumable by institutional and domestic political factors. Some of the literature that does delve 
into nature and background of leaders offers limited generalizability because observations and 
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case studies are limited across time, geography, conflicts, and number of leaders.118 Other works 
avoid the above limitations by focusing on leaders’ educational background. However, such a 
focus offers little in the way of direct foreign policy relevance.119 
The notable exceptions to these limitations are Horowitz and Stam’s article, “How Prior 
Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders” (2014) and 
Horowitz, Stam and Ellis’s subsequent book Why Leaders Fight (2015).120 The authors draw 
from psychiatry, psychology, history—especially leaders’ biographies, and many political 
science subfields to create the theoretical basis for their inquiry. They then utilize a novel dataset 
(LEAD) of around 2500121 heads of state between 1875 and 2004 from every country to test 
whether certain elements of leaders’ backgrounds (e.g. age, gender, occupation prior to entering 
political life, non-serving vs. combat vs. non-combat leader) to uncover proclivities towards 
initiating militarized disputes (using the MIDs dataset, 1816- 2014). They find that non-combat 
veterans who become heads of state are more likely to initiate militarized conflicts than their 
combat veteran and non-serving counterparts—frequently using non-combat veteran Ronald 
Reagan as an exemplar—because of a need to compensate for a perceived gallantry deficit vis-à-
vis their combat veteran colleagues. They do not forward a theory or finding on non-serving 
leaders’ proclivities despite including them in their quantitative analysis. These findings as well 
as the breadth of this cross-national findings invite similar study within a single nation. 
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Veterans in the American Foreign Policy Bureaucracy:  
 
Before an intervention, former soldiers in the foreign policy bureaucracy urge restraint from 
sending troops into battle (or military conservatism) when compared to their non-serving 
counterparts.122 After an intervention is underway, those same veterans strongly favor military 
actions that will yield decisive victory, including large troop deployments.123According to 
rationalist military sociologists and political scientists, this is because veterans in the American 
foreign policy bureaucracy derive wisdom from their military experience and that the military 
mind is, “conservative, realistic, and pessimistic about human nature.”124 Therefore, their 
perspective is buttressed upon interest in: 1) the lives and well-being of other soldiers; 2) 
maintaining their hard-earned positions of power; and 3) serving as a counterbalance to civilian 
bureaucrats who might express unwarranted optimistic for and under-informed visions of 
successful military actions.125 Despite differences on motivations, some scholars in this tradition 
see the soldiers’ familiarity with the horrors of war as a psychological driver for conservatism 
and a psychological justification for the expectation that veteran policymakers will think and act 
differently than their civilian colleagues.126  
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For veteran policymakers with combat experience, it follows that this distinction would 
appear to be even stronger.127 However, studies of veterans with combat experience have yielded 
varying results. There is evidence that suggests that deployed Vietnam veterans are more likely 
to be skeptical of American foreign policy than those who were not deployed.128 However, 
DiCicco and Fordham (2018), examining the (non-) intervention preferences of Vietnam 
veterans who became foreign policy elites, find that skepticism about the efficacy of American 
interventions faded after the end of the Cold War.129At the same time, in a twin study in which 
one sibling saw combat in Vietnam and the other did not serve, Koenen et al found that twins 
who experienced combat are more likely to engage in dangerous behavior including acts of 
violence.130 While legislators face numerous constraints that affect their policy choices, instances 
of “high salience proposals,” like a veteran legislator voting on foreign policy bills, is more 
likely to, “ignore constituent demands…and vote according to other criteria.”131 In comparative 
studies, scholars have found that military experience makes legislators more responsive towards 
pro- military legislation and combat experience makes veterans more militarily hawkish.132 
These mixed results might be explained by institutional factors. Sechser (2004) discounts 
the psychological justification and instead argues that military conservatism is actually just the 
result of civilian oversight. By being accountable to civilians, military elites fear the loss of 
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institutional support and hard-earned, high-status positions if they advocate for an ultimately 
failed military action. He finds that states with weaker civilian oversight are more likely to 
initiate military actions than states with it.133 
 
How Leaders Learn:  
 
For decades, the study of individuals’ characteristics has been a thriving subfield within 
foreign policy analysis. Heavily influenced (if not entirely guided) by social and cognitive 
psychological theories, a brief overview of this research area’s catalog includes influential work 
on operational codes, perceptions and misperceptions, process-tracing, leaders’ personalities, 
leaders’ resolve, personal characteristics, cognitive biases, prospect theory, shame and 
humiliation, leaders’ age, and even birth order within a family. Even though this list is wide-
ranging, an exhaustive and comprehensive look at the entirety of the subfield would reveal very 
little work done specifically on the impactful experiences that shape politicians’ behavior—like 
combat experience’s effect on policy.134 
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One place within this literature that does address the potential policy implications of 
experiencing war is in Chapter 6 of Robert Jervis’s classic work Perception and Misperception 
in International Politics, entitled “How Decision-Makers Learn from History.” Here, Jervis 
discusses the influence that impactful and traumatic events, like wars can have on decision 
makers. He argues that these kinds of events, especially when experienced firsthand, can make 
decision-makers impervious to new information, leave disproportionate impressions, and create 
predispositions that can lead to misperceptions. Jervis cites Churchill’s mishandling of naval 
operations in the World War II because he could only see them through the lens of a soldier of 
land wars, one he acquired as a combat veteran in several colonial disputes.135 
 
Combat’s Varying Effects:  
 
Reactions to combat, as with any emotionally intense or even traumatic event, vary by 
individual. In recent years, psychological and psychiatric research has grown on the prevalence 
and effects of posttraumatic stress disorder and posttraumatic growth/resilience. This growth has 
coincided with the growing population of veterans from the Global War on Terror (GWOT).136 
The Department of Veterans Administration defines posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a, 
“mental health problem that some people develop after experiencing or witnessing a life-
threatening event, like combat, a natural disaster, a car accident, or sexual assault.”137 As with 
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Koenen et al.’s twin study, the PTSD literature indicates increased predilections towards 
aggression amongst combat veterans.138 
The prevalence and, therefore, the effects of PTSD on soldiers with combat experience 
remains an issue of ongoing debate.139 While not all those who experience life- threatening 
events develop PTSD, a 2015 web survey of 23,200 returning GWOT veterans (94.8% of which 
served in combat zones) conducted by the Wounded Warriors Project, suggests significant 
portions of returning GWOT vets demonstrated symptoms of PTSD.  
About two-thirds to about three-fourths of alumni had a military experience that 
was so frightening, horrible, or upsetting that they had not been able to escape from 
memories or the effects of it. For example, 66.4 percent had nightmares about the 
experience; 75.5 percent thought about the experience when they did not want to; 
and 76.1 percent were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled because of 
the experience...61.9 percent of alumni [reported] emotional problems interfered 
extremely, quite a bit, or moderately with normal social activities with family and 
friends.140 
 
Other surveys suggest that PTSD is only slightly higher among veterans than the general 
population. Although veterans with PTSD have higher rates of other psychiatric disorders 
relative to veterans without PTSD.141 The prevalence of post-combat PTSD remains unclear 
because only a minority of combat veterans seek diagnosis.142 
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While distress is an expected and reasonable outcome for anyone coming out of a 
traumatic event, the disorientation of these experiences can also lead to resilience.143 This 
outcome is known as post-traumatic growth (PTG) and it can result in positive changes in an 
individual’s life including a greater appreciation of life, closer relationships, identification of 
new possibilities, increased personal strength, and positive spiritual change.144 Rates of PTSD 
and PTG among veterans are difficult to ascertain because much of the research is based upon 
competing self-report surveys instead of clinical assessments. Similarly, there maybe 
diminishing effect of war’s influence over time as shown Elder and Clipp 1989’s study of 
Korean War veterans. They showed that heavy combat veterans, when compared to 
noncombatants and light combat veterans, had greater difficulties adjusting to postwar life and 
by midlife held ambivalent feelings towards military service.145 
The high variability in response to combat experience suggests that warriors who opt into 
political life are more likely to demonstrate resilience in coping with trauma than to suffer the 
most serious cases of PTSD. However, both responses suggest that trauma of war should 
influence a policymaker’s preferences. 
 
Defining Combat and the Presidency:  
 
In defining combat experience, I follow the definition laid out in the Technical Appendix for 
Why Leaders Fight.146 They define combat experience as: 
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Deployment as part of a national military in what would generally be considered a 
war zone (absent evidence of nonparticipation), deployment/general participation 
in a battle, or affirmative evidence of direct combat. Note that this does not require 
affirmative evidence of a given person firing a weapon, but instead adopts a 
definition requiring the soldier to be deployed in a war zone facing the risk of death 
in general. In general, combat was coded 0 in the absence of affirmative evidence 
that a leader who served in the military had combat experience.147 
 
Following this definition, of the 31 presidents with documented military service, 17 saw combat. 
Of the 37 presidents in this study, 13 were combat veterans, 13 were non-combat-veterans, and 
11 did not serve in the military. 
The prevalence of combat veterans in the presidency in light of the office’s vast war 
making powers suggests that combat experience may have had outsized influence on American 
foreign policy. According the Congressional Research Service’s report entitled “Instances of Use 
of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2016,” the United States has only formally 
declared war 11 times in 5 wars while presidents have constitutionally authorized hundreds of 
undeclared international military engagements.148 While most pre-World War II troop 
deployments were “brief Marine Corps or Navy actions to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. 
interests,” since the passage of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which vastly expanded the 
commander-in-chief’s ability to unilaterally commence military action, Presidents have deployed 
troops nearly 200 times in scores of countries over dozens of conflicts.149 
 
Results and Conclusions: 
 
                                                      
147 Calli Ellis, Michael C. Horowitz, and Allan C. Stam, “Technical Appendix for Why Leaders Fight,” pp. 24-25. 
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international- relations/international-relations-and-
international-organisations/why-leaders-fight 
148 Barbara Salazar Torreon, 2016, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798 2016” R42738, 
Congressional Research Service; J. Terry Emerson, 1991, “Making War without a Declaration," Journal of 
Legislation: Vol. 17:1(3). 
149 Torreon, 2016. 
 45 
In an initial test of presidents’ proclivity to use military force abroad, I first coded each 
president’s military experience as no military experience, non-combat service, and combat 
experience. Presidents whose terms do not fall within the MIDs dataset’s timeframe of 1816-
2010 (Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison pre-1816, Obama post-2010, and Trump) and 
those who were not involved in any militarized disputes (W. Harrison, Taylor, and Garfield) are 
excluded from the analysis. 
From the MIDs dataset, I then calculated the proportion of military disputes in a 
president’s tenure that involve troop deployment with the intent to use force and war.150 Figure 1 
plots this proportion for each president grouped by type of military experience. There appears to 
be little difference in a president’s propensity for armed conflict relative to military experience. 
Whereas, 42% of non-serving presidents’ (n=11) military disputes involved the deployment of 
troops to use force, the same was true for 30% of non-combat veterans presidents (n=13), and 
38% combat veteran presidents (n=13). However, none of these differences reach any 
conventional level of statistical significance. 
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Figure 2 provides similarly inconclusive results. Rather than displaying the proportion of 
disputes involving violent force, this figure presents the proportion of “no militarized response” 
to disputes. Whereas the first figure involved the propensity for violence, this figure shows the 
non-violent compliment. Here, 12% of non-serving presidents’ military disputes involved no 
militarized response, the same was true for 20% of non-combat presidents and 11% of combat 
veteran presidents. 
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Discussion:  
This chapter intended to more formally test the impact of combat experience on 
presidents’ propensity to respond to conflict with force. Unlike Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis’s 
results from Why Leaders Fight, the results provide little evidence that non-combat veterans are 
more or less likely to initiate militarized disputes in comparison to combat veterans and non-
serving presidents. This suggests that Sechser’s (2004) finding that civilian and institutional 
oversight of the military might mitigate the potential for executives’ preferences to manifest 
themselves in use of force might be correct. Furthermore, these findings suggest that quantitative 
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analysis might not be ideal for revealing ideational preferences or decisions that are heavily 
reliant on context. 
Additionally, while the MIDs data collection offers a spectrum of options available to 
leaders, the categorization of War, for example, does not match up with conventional American 
standards for what constitutes a war. For example, according to the MIDs dataset the bombing of 
Iraq under the Clinton administration (Operation Desert Fox) is categorized as a War while the 
Mexican-American War, a congressionally declared war initiated under President James K. Polk, 
is not. The Mexican-American War lasted from 1846-1848 and had 13,283 American deaths is 
listed as: 
 
*Downloaded from MIDA_4.01.csv (http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/MIDs) 
 
There is also the possibility of data incongruities exist between data sources. For 
example, the Congressional Research Service’s (Torreon 2016) catalog of Instances of Use of 
United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2016 lists several uses of troops abroad that are not 
counted in the MIDs dataset. Similarly, neither the CRS report nor MIDs comprehensively 
incorporates use of American troops in conflicts with Native Americans—a major source of 
conflict for the early United States. 
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Chapter 3: Somalia (1992-1993) 
 
“United Nations peacekeeping operations are a pretty good buy, and we ought to recognize 
that…we have spent trillions of dollars to win the Cold War, and should be willing to spend 
millions of dollars to secure the peace” 
Secretary of State James Baker151  
 
“Both Presidents Bush and Clinton understood that the UN was not equipped to handle its 
expanding responsibilities. When I first arrived in New York [in January 1993], there were only 
about a dozen people assigned to manage peacekeeping” 
US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright152 
 
 
I. Introduction: From 1988 until late 1992, a series of successive disasters unmade Somalia. 
The small country on the horn of Africa was beset by state and economic collapse, civil war, and 
drought, becoming the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.153  On November 25, 1992, 3 
weeks after losing his reelection bid to Arkansas Governor William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton, 
President George H.W. Bush ordered 28,000 American troops under Operation Restore Hope 
(ORH) to create a secure environment for aid delivery and then relinquish leadership to the 
United Nations’ (UN) parallel mission, United Task Force (UNITAF).154 By Clinton’s first full 
week in office, ORH’s mission had been accomplished. They saved tens of thousands of Somalis 
and the Joints Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told the new President that, “[The] war is over, we won; time 
to come home.”155 
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The Clinton Administration set aside this recommendation. Instead, they chose to support 
an unprecedented UN-led effort to rebuild Somalia into a modern democratic nation state.156 By 
early May 1993, the American presence was reduced to 4,000 troops and the UN assumed 
leadership under the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).157 However, with 
neither American leadership nor its preponderant military presence, a civil war faction led by 
Mohammed Farah Aideed began attacking UN and US troops in country’s capital Mogadishu. 
Violence between American and Aideed’s forces escalated in the months that followed 
culminating on October 3, 1993, when 18 American soldiers were killed in the infamous Black 
Hawk Down incident, “the bloodiest battle of any U.N. peacekeeping operation.”158 On October 
7, 1993, Clinton announced that troops would leave Somalis within 6 months.159 
What explains realist George H.W. Bush’s decision to pursue a humanitarian intervention 
in Somalia when there were no American security or economic interests? What accounts for 
President Clinton’s decision to support an unprecedented United Nations-led (UN) nation-
building endeavor? Existing assessments of these Presidents’ Somalia conflict management has 
yielded a variety of explanations for process and outcomes based on elements of their 
biographies, ideologies, personality traits, and the role public opinion.160 Within these 
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assessments, both the rationalist and psychological approaches, only go so far in their 
explanatory power. I argue, however, that Somalia policy is best explained by the interaction of 
the psychological and rational. Specifically, both Presidents’ Somalia policies emerged out of the 
interaction of their beliefs (the psychological) with their respective administrations’ capacities 
(the rational)— in particular, capacities of policy relevant expertise and ability to learn from the 
policy environment. 
Through the use of process tracing and data drawn from primary documents, media 
reports, secondary sources, and an elite interview, I find that both Presidents shared similar 
beliefs on what US foreign policy in the post-Cold War world should be. Freed from the Cold 
War’s existential threats and bipolar constraints, both saw limitations for unilateral American 
military action and promise in multilateral interventions to ensure the international order. Both 
wanted to help Somalia and then turn over the mission to the United Nations (UN)—Bush in the 
form a UN peacekeeping operation and Clinton by supporting UN-led nation building. I find 
then that the variance in policy aims stems from capacities within their respective 
Administration’s policy-making processes. 
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Presidents Bush and Clinton’s Backgrounds: In this section I briefly discuss both Presidents’ 
foreign policy experience and bona fides.  
President Bush: On the day that George H.W. Bush graduated from high school, he enlisted in 
the navy, becoming its youngest pilot.161 He flew dozens of combat missions in the Pacific 
during World War II, was shot down on one mission, and won the Aid Medal and the 
Distinguished Flying Cross.162 He served as a member of the House of representatives for 2 
terms, President Nixon’s Ambassador to the United Nations (1971-1973), first U.S. liaison office 
in the People’s Republic of China after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations (1974–75), 
and President Ford’s Director of the CIA (1976-1977). From 1980-1989, he served as President 
Ronald Reagan’s Vice President.163 
 
President Clinton: Prior to ascending to the presidency, Clinton, a trained lawyer, had very little 
foreign policy experience. His political career was spent as the Attorney General and then 
Governor of Arkansas.164 During that time he made 4 foreign trade missions: 1 to Japan, Taiwan 
and other East Asian nations, 2 to Western Europe and 1 to the Soviet Union.165 During the 
Vietnam War, Clinton did not serve. During the 1992 campaign allegations emerged that Clinton 
had manipulated the draft process to keep him out of service without appearing to be “dodging 
the draft.”166 While he maintained an objection to the war had influenced his foreign policy 
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outlook and had not dissuaded him from the power of using American force abroad.167 During 
the campaign, Clinton’s foreign policy views did not appear to differ substantially from 
Bush’s.168 Where he did differ, his views were not entirely coherent. For example, he criticized 
Bush for too much internationalism while also criticizing him for not intervening more 
substantially in places like Somalia. Clinton espoused support for fostering democracies but did 
not offer much in the way of explanation for this belief.169  
  
 
The United States and Somalia (1977-1991): After Somalia fell out of favor with the Soviet 
Union in 1977, the United States became its primary benefactor. Over the course of their Cold 
War relationship, the United States offered Barre direct military and economic aid, helped 
Somalia obtain World Bank loans, served as an advocate with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), and dispatched American agricultural experts to address the country’s frequent food 
issues.170 In exchange, the United States gained a significant military presence on the horn of 
Africa, taking over Soviet-built military installations on Gulf of Aden. Across the Cold War 
Presidencies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, the actual function of the 
Somali state was never the primary concern of the United States as Barre was never offered more 
“military aid than was essential to maintain internal security.”171 As Bush’s Assistant Secretary 
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of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen said, “during the Cold War, it was really non-African 
issues that dominated African policy. We wanted a base in Somalia…”172 
As Somalia’s Cold War strategic value ebbed throughout 1980s, so too did American 
support and Barre’s domestic control over the country he had dominated, often brutally, since 
1969. Aid dropped from $80,000,000 in 1982 to $8,700,000 in 1987.173 American arms and 
financial aid were the Barre regime’s lifeblood as he used both to suppress domestic dissent and 
their reduction contributed to instability that exploded into fighting within Somalia in 1988.174 
By Bush’s inauguration in January 1989, fighting had claimed more than 50,000 lives and forced 
400,000 Somalis to seek refuge outside their country.175 Without any foreign intervention to curb 
the violence, fighting continued throughout 1990 and less than a month into 1991, Barre fell 
from power, launching the country into full blown civil war. Bush evacuated the few remaining 
American personnel just weeks earlier.176 By November 1991, under untenable instability, the 
United Nations evacuated most of their staff too, leaving only inexperienced junior staff and no 
relief experts to accurately assess the scope of the bourgeoning humanitarian disaster.177 
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The chaos was further exacerbated by a serious drought in late-1991. With Somalia’s 
politics shattered, its economy stopped and food became the “principle source of wealth and 
currency and exchange” which in turn spurred even greater violence as, “roving gangs of 
gunmen robbed and pillaged farms and villages, taking livestock, crops, and whatever else 
they.”178 As Andrew Natsios, Bush’s overseas relief chief for the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and special coordinator for Somalian relief aid, “When 
relief agencies pass out food, someone shoots them dead on the street and steals the food they 
have. We have seen this repeated over and over again.”179 By November 1991, under untenable 
instability, the United Nations evacuated most of their staff, leaving only inexperienced junior 
staff and no relief experts to accurately assess the scope of the bourgeoning humanitarian 
disaster.180 
Despite regular media coverage of Somalia’s implosion during the course of the first 3 
years of his presidency, Bush’s foreign policy focus was largely elsewhere.181 During this period 
democracies replaced communist regimes throughout central and eastern Europe, the Berlin Wall 
fell, China experienced the Tiananmen Square massacre, the US toppled Noriega in Panama, 
Bush and Gorbachev met several times to discuss arms reduction, Germany reunified, Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, and the entire Gulf War unfolded.182 On Christmas Day 1991, the entire 
orientation of American foreign policy changed with the fall of the Soviet Union. 
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Bush, Intervention, and the Decision-making Environment (1992-1993):  
Belief in a New World Order and UN Peacekeeping: With the Cold War won, Bush stood 
capable influencing the international order as no other American president could. Remarking on 
that unique moment in history, Bush said, “When citizens pulled down the hammer and sickle 10 
days ago and hauled up a new tricolor of freedom over the Kremlin, the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist, and the prospect of a new world opened before us.” 183 Bush used the phrase “new world 
order” in (at least) 92 public statements through the course of his presidency to broadly his vision 
of a post-Cold War world. In his 1991 State of the Union address, he described the new world 
order as an international environment “where diverse nations are drawn together in common 
cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom, and the rule 
of law.”184 According to Frederick McClure, Bush’s Assistant for Legislative Affairs and CEO 
of George Bush Presidential Library Foundation, Bush while fully aware of the uncertainties of 
new world order (emerging issues, diversifying geopolitical power centers, and continuing 
conflict), was confident in American leadership going forward.185  
President Bush sought to use UN peacekeeping as an enforcement mechanism of the new 
world order.186 At that time, United Nations peacekeeping had a positive reputation after its 
successful monitoring of the demilitarized zone in the Gulf War.187 At a 1991 Gulf War press 
conference President Bush said, “…that world order is only going to be enhanced if this newly-
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activated peacekeeping function of the United Nations proves to be effective. That is the only 
way the new world order will be enhanced.”188 Former US Ambassador to Somalia and UN 
Special Envoy to Somalia under Presidents Bush and Clinton said the new world order was, “a 
feeling that maybe now the Security Council can actually do what Franklin Roosevelt thought he 
could do. What Woodrow Wilson thought the League of Nations could do. [To] be sort of the 
guarantor of world order and also do something about these small conflicts. Stop them before 
they get started. Certainly, stop them after they get started”189 
Throughout 1992, this belief was reiterated. In his January 31st 1992 address to the 
United Nations Security Council, Bush lamented how Cold War politics had sidetracked UN 
priorities as “polemics displaced peacekeeping,” adding, “and the end of the Cold War [will] 
breathe new life into the United Nations.” In this address, he explicitly delineated his vision of 
the relationship between the United States and UN peacekeeping operations in the new world 
order: 
For decades, the American military has served as a stabilizing presence around the 
globe. I want to draw on our extensive experience in winning wars and keeping the 
peace to support U.N. peacekeeping. I have directed the United States Secretary of 
Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. Because of peacekeeping's 
growing importance as a mission for the United States military, we will emphasize 
training of combat, engineering, and logistical units for the full range of 
peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. We will work with the United Nations 
to best employ our considerable lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence 
capabilities to support peacekeeping operations. We will offer our capabilities for 
joint simulations and peacekeeping exercises to strengthen our ability to undertake 
joint peacekeeping operations. There is room for all countries, large and small, and 
I hope all will play a part…I have further directed the establishment of a permanent 
peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools…the United States will review 
how we fund peacekeeping and explore new ways to ensure adequate American 
financial support for U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. humanitarian activities. I do 
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believe that we must think differently about how we ensure and pay for our security 
in this new era.190 
 
In September 1992, Bush reiterated his beliefs, this time mentioning Somalia by name at the UN. 
He said, “As we see daily in Bosnia and Somalia and Cambodia, everywhere conflict claims 
innocent lives. The need for enhanced peacekeeping capabilities has never been greater, the 
conflicts we must deal with more intractable, the costs of conflict higher…as much as the United 
Nations has done, it can do much more.”191 3 months later, in a speech at the Oxford Union, 
former President Ronald Reagan argued for putting “weapons behind our words to help get food 
to starving Somalis.”192 He even went so far as to call for a standing United Nations military 
force arguing for “an army of conscience that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human 
sanctuaries through force if necessary.”193 
In ostensibly implementing his beliefs, Bush ordered the American foreign policy 
apparatus to plan greater involvement in and support of UN peacekeeping operations. In the 
summer of 1992, Bush ordered a review of American policy towards UN peacekeeping. That 
November, the review yielded National Security Directive (NSD) 74, a directive providing 
“guidance for U.S. support of United Nations peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief 
activities.”194 NSD 74 touted United Nations future capacities to “…prevent, contain, and resolve 
conflict.” It said: 
The need for enhanced peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian relief 
capabilities has never been greater. Strengthened peacekeeping capabilities can 
help buttress diplomatic efforts. As much as the United Nations has played a central 
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role in preventing conflicts, it can do more. The need for monitoring and preventive 
peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may become 
critical in volatile regions 
 
It argued for the US to be a more active and forceful organizer of international support for UN 
peacekeeping operations without actually obligating the US to further funding or troop pledges 
for those missions.  For example, NSD 74 promised a review of peacekeeping funding, as Bush 
discussed in his September UN speech, and “new ways to ensure adequate American financial 
support for United Nations peacekeeping and United Nations humanitarian activities” but failed 
to make any commitments or plans to do so. 195 Similarly, Bush’s final National Security 
Strategy (NSS-1993) supported UN peacekeeping calling the UN a “key instrument of collective 
security,” arguing for the creation of a “Fund for Peace” for UN peacekeeping missions, “taking 
an active role in the full spectrum of U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and 
support,” and suggesting greater intelligence support, without any specific discussion of 
implementation.196  
 
Bush’s Intervention Reluctance (January 1992-July1992): As Bush raised the UN 
peacekeeping’s public profile, the UN’s new Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
pushed his organization’s efforts to mitigate the Somali Civil War. On January 23, 1992, the UN 
Security Council Resolution 733. It called on Boutros-Ghali to increase humanitarian aid, ask all 
parties in the Somali Civil War to abide by a ceasefire, and seek a political resolution to their 
differences. One week later, in accordance with UNSCR 733, Boutros-Ghali called for all Somali 
civil war factions to participate in peace talks. Those talks, held February 12-14, 1992, resulted 
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in a preliminary ceasefire which Mahdi and Aideed was signed on March 3, 1992. This 
agreement paved the way for United Nations Security Council resolution 746, which sent a team 
to monitor the ceasefire and deliver humanitarian aid from March 23-April 1, 1992. On April 24, 
1992, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 751, creating UNOSOM I which approved the 
assignment 50 UN observers and a 500-person armed peacekeeping force to Somalia.197 Boutros-
Ghali appointed Algerian Mohammed Sahnoun to be his Special Representative in Somalia and 
administer UNSCR 751.198 By May, as UN efforts were slowly implemented, Barre was forced 
into exile in Kenya and Boutros-Ghali approached Bush directly about Somalia asking, “Can't 
we do something about Somalia?” By the end of Spring 1992 however, Bush was not (yet) ready 
to implement his beliefs vis-a-vis Somalia. 199 
Some of Bush’s reluctance might be explained by mixed domestic preferences on 
Somalia and UN peacekeeping. On January 3rd 1992, Senators Nancy Kassebaum (Republican-
Kansas) and Paul Simon (Democrat-Illinois) published a New York Times op-ed entitled, “Save 
Somalia from Itself.” The Senators, both members of the Senate Subcommittee of African 
Affairs, called on Boutros-Ghali to “appoint a full-time special envoy to Somalia,” implored the 
UN Security Council to adopt a cease-fire resolution, and establish a “immediate arms 
embargo.”200 After Kassebaum returned from a July 1992 visit to Somalia, she and Simon 
demanded action from Bush, co-sponsoring Senate resolutions for Somalia action. One 
resolution called for the deployment of UN troops and passed both the House and Senate.201 
However, the Los Angeles Times reported that “if fully implemented, the President’s proposals 
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would profoundly change Washington’s relationship with U.N. peacekeeping forces” and raised 
questions of Bush seriousness given America’s hundreds of millions of dollars in UN arrears.202 
Meanwhile, Congress rejected Bush’s request for a UN peacekeeping assessment contingency 
fund.203 
Kassebaum and Simon’s actions were part of a growing chorus of voices raising the 
Somalia crisis’s American profile in 1992. Throughout the year, Bush’s Somalia relief 
coordinator Andrew Natsios called the Somalia crisis, “the most acute humanitarian tragedy in 
the world today” adding, “It bothers me a lot that these things happen, and I am ultimately 
responsible for this and I sit a lot and say, ‘What could I have done differently over the last year,’ 
because it weighs on me a lot…I don't know what else we could have tried.”204 In March, 
Herman Cohen, Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, declared Somalia to be 
in a state of disaster.205 In April, as UNOSOM I was underway with only 50 troops, Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organizations John Bolton publicly urged Somalia’s Muslim 
neighbors to fit UNOSOM I’s $22,000,000 security bill.206 For its part, The New York Times took 
the Bush Administration to task for what it viewed as Somalia-insufficiency. An April 1992 New 
York Times editorial board op-ed entitled “Uncle Pygmy Pleads Poverty” was found in the files 
of Nancy Bearg Dyke, Bush’s Director of International Programs and Public Diplomacy on the 
NSC.207 
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In May, the Office of U.S. Disaster Assistance began reporting U.N. estimated, “that 4.5 
million people in Somalia are facing the threat of starvation due to the effects of civil strife out of 
a total population of 6.5 million Somalis.”208 On June 30, 1992, dozens of Democratic members 
of Congress sent a letter to Bush to, “urge the Administration to devote the highest priority this 
humanitarian disaster [in Somalia].”209 In July, Cohen reiterated his concerns in House 
subcommittee testimony saying, “experienced humanitarian workers say they have never seen 
worse conditions.”210 The New York Times reported that during the first 7 months of 1992, the 
ICRC and UN together had delivered more than 110,000 tons of food to Somalia (≈15,000 
tons/month); according to Gregoire Tavernier, ICRC head of Somalia operations, Mogadishu’s 
1,000,000 inhabitants alone required 15,000-20,000 tons of food aid per month.211 
During the first 6 months of 1992, Bush’s belief in a new world order and UN 
peacekeeping appear to have been mitigated by rational considerations. Because the UN was 
unprepared to help Somalia in any meaningful way and the overall domestic view was 
ambivalent, the Bush Administration demonstrated good learning from the policy making 
environment and expertise in being restrained in their implementation of his beliefs. 
 
Bush and the Decision to Act in Somalia (July 1992): The same month that Cohen testified 
before Congress, Bush’s thinking on Somalia reached a turning point. On July 10th 1992, Bush’s 
most-trusted foreign policy aid, National Security Advisor and (ret.) Lieutenant General Brent 
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Scowcroft, hand delivered a State Department cable to the President entitled, “A Day in Hell.”212 
It was written by Smith Hempstone, Bush’s Ambassador to Kenya, and it recounted his trip to a 
drought ravaged area of northeastern Kenya, on the border with Somalia.213 While the cable 
should have been a recounting of his delivery of aid to various organizations (including the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations International Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), and a Catholic mission), it became a testimonial on a place struggling to maintain 
life.  
Hempstone recounted a refugee camp’s sole doctor’s somber estimate that, “for every 
10,000 children under [the age of] 5, 10 die every night.” An ICRC worker told him that 2,000 
bags of maize were stolen by armed Somali bandits the previous week to feed their starving clans 
remarking, “hungry people will eat the stolen maize…Clans that have lost too many men to 
fighting and drought, and those that have [too] few guns, will go hungry. In the northeast [of 
Kenya], the Kalashnikov is king.” Ali Amin, a member of Kenyan parliament, told Hempstone 
that within a month there wouldn’t be any more water in the region. Hempstone concluded his 
cable by saying: 
“My one-day visit to hell is over. The U.S. government has allocated $4.17 million 
in humanitarian aid to northeastern Kenya, most of it for children in the drought 
area. That is well and good, but more is needed now and even more will be needed 
in the future…If the world averts its eyes and the rains do not come, the human 
suffering in the northeast will be on a scale unknown in Kenya's history.”214 
 
In the margins of his copy of “A Day in Hell,” Bush wrote, “This is very, very upsetting. I want 
more information” and, “this is a terribly moving situation. Let’s do everything we can to help.” 
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215 After reading it, Bush also reportedly urged Larry Eagleburger, his Deputy Secretary of 
State—the second ranking officer in the Department, to be “‘forward leaning on Somalia,’ with 
an eye to airlifting supplies.”216 
While Bush learned more about Somalia and his views turned, the bureaucracy remained 
conflicted and the UN’s slow-moving disorder vis-à-vis Somalia became increasingly apparent. 
On June 23, 1992, 3 months after their approval, UN Chief Military Observer Brigadier General 
Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan and 45 (of the allotted 50) unarmed UNOSOM I military observers 
finally arrived in Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. A month later, on July 22, Boutros-Ghali 
told the Security Council that UN initiatives were insufficient to remedy Somalia’s crises and 
more support was needed.217 On July 23, 6 months after UNSCR 733, Mohammed Sahnoun 
estimated that “1.5 million Somalis [still] faced imminent starvation.”218 At the same time, 
Andrew Natsios reported that the ICRC was failing in its relief efforts, “because the death rates 
were going up, not down.”219 On July 27, based on Boutros-Ghali’s July 22 report, the UNSC 
approved Resolution 767 which urged greater Somali and international cooperation.220 
Despite this unevenness, Somalia’s purgatory status would not last long as reports of the 
humanitarian crises began mobilizing the US foreign policy apparatus—from the top down. The 
alarm sounded by Sahnoun, Natsios and prominent newspaper reporters like Don Oberdorfer of 
The New York Times included details of clan violence disrupting food distribution. According to 
Baum, Boutros-Ghali’s initiatives and UNSCR 767, “precipitated the first stage of a major U.S. 
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involvement in Somalia, in the form of a 24,000-ton food commitment.”221 The Administration 
also upped its UNOSOM support by “accelerating the delivery of relief supplies, promoting 
national reconciliation, and transporting the 500-man Pakistani security force to Mogadishu.”222 
Soon thereafter, though, the State Department reached consensus that the US, and no one else, 
could help save hundreds of thousands of Somali lives but remained concerned about the costs of 
an airlift.223 In contrast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “considered Somalia, ‘a bottomless pit’ for U.S. 
involvement.”224 
As the machinery warmed up, Smith Hempstone authored a very different cable entitled, 
“Think Three Times Before You Embrace the Somali Tarbaby.”225 In his cable, Hempstone was 
unsympathetic to the prospect of intervention, writing, “I must confess that I have been bemused, 
confused, and alarmed at the Gadarene haste with which USG [US Government] seemingly has 
sought to embrace the Somali tarbaby…Statecraft, it seems to me, is better made with the head 
than the heart…” On the Somali people, he was ruthless: 
Somalis, as the Italians and British discovered to their discomfiture, are natural-
born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. The will lay ambushes. They will launch 
hit and run attacks. They will not be able to stop the convoys from getting through. 
But they will inflict—and take—casualties. Things will be quiet for a day or two, 
and then a Somali kid will roll a grenade into a cafe frequented by American troops. 
There will be an abduction or two. A sniper occasionally will knock off one of our 
sentries. If you liked Beirut, you'll love Mogadishu…The Somali is treacherous. 
The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as tough as his country, and just as 
unforgiving…In the old days, Somalis raided for camels, women, and slaves. Today 
the Somali raids for camels, women, slaves, and food. 
 
On an intervention’s outcomes he was equally tough, but perhaps also prescient:  
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To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali kids from starving to death in 
1993 who, in all probability, will starve in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain 
through 1994)? Just how long are we prepared remain in Somalia and what are we 
prepared to do: Provide food, guard and distribute food, hunt guerillas, establish a 
judicial system, form a police force, create an army, encourage the formation of 
political parties, hold free and fair multi-party elections? I have heard estimates that 
it will take five years to get Somalia not on its feet but just on its knees…The one 
“beneficial” effect a major American intrusion into Somalia is likely to have may 
be to reunite the Somali nation: against us…who may have fed their children but 
also killed their young men…The sad fact is that no outside intervention can 
prevent a people intent on destroying themselves from succeeding if they so 
insist.226 
 
Hempstone’s recommendation for Somalia was equally depressing, writing, “Encourage 
the Somalis who want peace. Leave them alone, in short, to work out their own destiny, 
brutal as it may be…Inshallah, think once, twice and three times before you embrace the 
Somali tarbaby. Regards Hempstone.”227 Frank G. Wisner, Bush’s newly-appointed Under 
Secretary of State for International Security Affairs to whom the cable was sent, rejected 
Hempstone’s advice. In response, Hempstone cabled back, vouching public support of the 
Administration’s Somalia policies but concluded, “Good luck. We’ll need it. Welcome to 
jihad.”228 
 Later in 1992, after “Tarbaby” was published in U.S. News and World Report, the 
Administration disregarded Hempstone’s warnings. Eagleburger, then Secretary of State, told 
The Washington Post that, “most administration officials believe Hempstone ‘probably 
exaggerated things substantially.’” Defense Secretary Cheney claimed (incorrectly) Hempstone 
was even against airlifting aid to Somalis.229 An unnamed Administration regional expert cast 
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aside Hempstone’s warnings in The New York Times, saying, “The warlords will fade away and 
wait us out. Then when we leave, they will go back and the burden will fall on the U.N. 
peacekeepers.”230 It is unclear whether or not Bush every heard of “Tarbaby…” warnings. 
However, Wisner and Cheney’s responses show the Administration’s learning failure.  
Ultimately, Hempstone’s warnings in “Tarbaby” were trumped by appeals in “Day in 
Hell,” as the Administration mobilized to help Somalia with an airlift. The same day (July 30, 
1992) that Wisner received “Tarbaby,” the White House-coordinated Somalia Working Group 
(SWG) convened under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Houdek and 
began weighing airlift cost estimates. Though the National Security Council (NSC) Principals 
did not meet to discuss Somalia until November, President Bush showed policy engagement kept 
abreast of lower level meetings like this one which marked the beginning of movement towards 
intervention. For example, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) present a the next SWG meeting (August 
5, 1992), reported that their concerns about cost and risk were losing out to humanitarian 
interests. 
 In beginning to implement Bush’s beliefs, the Administration demonstrated their 
expertise and generally good learning. While ignoring Hempstone’s second cable shows a failure 
to incorporate contrary information into the policy making process, listening to differing 
perspectives from the State Department and JCS shows a functioning system. 
 
Bush Orders an Airlift and Abandons any Prospect of Somalia Nation Building (August 
1992-September 1992): On August 12, airlift momentum accelerated. That day, at an Oval 
Office meeting attended by Bush, Cheney, and Secretary of State Jim Baker, the three decided in 
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principle to enact an airlift for northern Kenya and areas in Somalia’s interior—not ports nor 
Mogadishu—to push for a UNSCR authorizing more UN aid, and a Somali peace conference to 
be held under UN auspices. At the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) meeting the same day, 
Herman Cohen pushed humanitarian concerns, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global 
Affairs Robert Wolthuis told JCS representatives that, “something would be done [about 
Somalia]; the only question was how much,” and an NSC spokesman informed attendees that the 
White House wanted to be seen as taking the lead on Somali relief. Throughout this process, JCS 
representatives urged restraint on Somalia, frequently quoting Hempstone’s “Tarbaby” in their 
reports. These warnings went unheeded as NSC Deputies decided on August 14 to pursue a 
DoD-operated emergency food airlift. That same day the White House announced the airlift 
under the name Operation Provide Relief (OPR).  The statement said, in part, “"The United 
States will take a leading role with other nations and international organizations to overcome the 
obstacles and ensure that food reaches those who so desperately need it.”231 
Initial responses from those meant to carry out the airlift was confusion. While DoD 
announced that it would airlift 145,000 tons of aid within a month of Bush’s announcement, it 
was unprepared to disclose any mission details as the OPR’s announcement preceded substantive 
logistical planning.232 The Kenyan government was similarly unprepared—troubling as supplies 
meant for Somalians were meant to leave from Kenya.233 American officials in Kenya were 
similarly uniformed, learning about the mission on the news—concerning because USAID in 
Kenya was responsible for organizing relief supplies and the acquisition of planes.234 One 
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American official in Nairobi questioned Bush’s decision in announce an airlift on August 14, 3 
days before the Republican National Convention. The official said, “It was a good week to do 
something. The White House figured they couldn’t gain votes by acting in Somalia but their 
image could be tarnished if they didn't do anything.” Prior to OPR’s launch, JCS staff warned 
that on its current trajectory, “we set ourselves up for a long-term commitment of resources in a 
no-win situation” and “the longer US operations in Somalia continued, the less incentive there 
would be for the UN to implement its own program.”235 The ICRC criticized Bush’s overdue and 
hasty response saying, “We alerted the world community to this eight months ago…To do it in a 
hurry [now] is dangerous from a security point of view. If you drop these things in Somalia, you 
know in whose hands they get.” 236 
 As the ICRC suggested, food security, not aid acquisition or delivery, proved to be 
OPR’s foremost challenge. Supplies from the first airlift were taken by warlords and gangs.237 
Marlin Fitzwater, Bush’s Press Secretary, conceded that food security was OPR’s biggest 
impediment saying, “because armed bands are stealing and hoarding food as well as attacking 
international relief workers, the primary challenge that the international community faces is the 
delivery of relief supplies.”238 The challenge of food security worsened because both NGOs and 
the US government failed to assess the scope of loose arms and the extent to which any group, 
whether warlord, militia or humanitarian organization, needed the protection from local armed 
forces and the economy of food-looting and warlords’ protection rackets.239 To increase aid 
delivery security, NSC Deputies at an August 20 meeting yielded an agreement to increase 
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“points of security” under UN authority and coordination with the UN and private relief 
organizations.240 Despite these challenges, Deputies still aimed to complete Operation Provide 
Relief by December 31, 1992.241  
Still, with US support behind OPR, UN mobilization hastened even as the mission 
faltered. Building upon UNOSOM troop increases from early August, UNSG Boutros-Ghali 
proposed increasing UN troops by another 750 soldiers on August 24. On August 28 as the first 
OPR supplies arrived, the UNSC approved Resolution 775, authorizing 3000 additional 
UNOSOM troops. On September 8, the UNSC approved the deployment of 3 more logistical 
units, bringing UNOSOM’s approved presence to 4219 soldiers. The pace of actual UN troop 
deployment still lagged as the 500 troops approved under UNSCR 751 finally arrived in Somalia 
on September 14—6 months after their initial approval.242 According to Baum, these troop 
increases and further American involvement were driven by the initial ineffectiveness of OPR, in 
particular Administration officials’ frustration with Aideed’s forces. Increasing American 
support continued even though crisis peaked in the Fall of 1992.243  Part of the reason for 
ameliorating conditions may have been, according to Natsios, because warlords began releasing 
food their stockpiles for fear that the airlift would depreciate its value. He also argued that the 
airlift did not increase the amount of aid coming into Somalia, “as it merely replaced an airlift 
being run by the ICRC and World Food Program.244 Despite the dubious effects of the airlift, 
publicly and privately, Bush stood by the UN and their partnership in Somalia. On September 
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before Bush’s UNGA peacekeeping speech, Bush met with Boutros-Ghali and the two had the 
following exchange: 
Boutros-Ghali: Once troops are on the spot in Somalia, the UN will be better able 
to diffuse the complicated disputes among the various feuding factions. Greater 
security for the humanitarian workers will permit wider distribution of food, which 
should in turn further reduce tensions. Then I want to launch international 
negotiations for a political settlement… 
 
The President: …We strongly support UN peacekeeping. (U).245  
 
 However, at the sub-principals-level, there was a different view on the future of Somalia. 
A declassified September 25th memo from John Ordway to Deputy Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs Jonathan T. Howe shows that at deputies were preparing an American 
drawdown in Somalia. The memo, which detailed the agenda items for the September 28th 
NSCD meeting. They were, 1) Confirm interagency consensus on reducing the DoD airlift 
responsibilities by October 15, 2) Agree on an interagency contingency planning process that can 
help improve the UN's efforts and 3) Focus senior level attention on other potential humanitarian 
problems looming in Africa. 246 On the first point the memos added the following caveat 
“…however, the principals and the President must be comfortable with any reduction in USAF 
activity during this particularly sensitive period.” 
A declassified September 28, 1992 NSCD report reveals that American policymakers 
actually had a limited view of the UN’s capabilities and was, in fact, intent on restoring Somalian 
democracy. Entitled “Long Term Political Strategy for Somalia,” the report showed that the 
Bush Administration was fully aware of the challenges in Somalia, the limitations and role of the 
UN in Somalia’s future, and fully intended on nation-building while maintaining the public 
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image of humanitarian assistance. The report delineated 5 phases for a potential Somalia nation-
building project: Phase 1—Cooperation on Relief Efforts, Phase 2—Peace/Reconciliation, Phase 
3—Regional Administration, Phase 4—Interim Administration, and Phase 5—Restoration of 
Democracy. The background section began with this blunt assessment, “No amount of 
emergency aid can succeed in stopping starvation unless it is backed by a political solution that 
will restore order to the totally destroyed Somali society. The only alternative to long term UN 
military presence, which is clearly not a viable option, is to get the Somalis to negotiate peace 
and begin to reconstruct their country.”247 The memo also discussed the UN’s role as vehicle for 
peacemaking while beginning the nation-building process:  
“We must keep the UN at the forefront of the reconciliation process, while 
providing unambiguous, public US support for that process. The re-establishment 
of democracy remains our long-term goal. The difficult steps of (1) garnering 
Somali cooperation for unimpeded relief efforts, (2) achieving peace, (3) restoring 
some semblance of regional administrative structures and (4) installing an interim 
national government put the goal a long way off. We can be most effective by 
ensuring that the US is seen as focused on Somalia, and intent on bringing 
humanitarian relief and peace to that country. Our actions over the past two weeks 
have gone a long way in providing short-term relief and creating the correct visuals. 
As a next step, our special envoy [Robert Oakley] should develop a position of 
confidence and trust with [Mohammed] Sahnoun, so that the UN Special 
Representative will not perceive us as a rival. Indeed, we want to bolster his current 
level of respect among Somali leaders. We want to avoid the problems which have 
arisen with the UN in other areas of the world. 248 
 
The memo concluded with a sanguine, if not underinformed assessment: “Our efforts on peace 
would not be risky or produce costs beyond those already caused by humanitarian assistance 
actions.”249 
The Bush Administration’s diplomatic plans took a severe setback in October 1992 when 
Mohammed Sahnoun resigned his post. Just a few weeks earlier, on September 18, Scowcroft 
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wrote a memo to Bush (Vice President Quayle and Chief of Staff Jim Baker were carbon copied) 
urging the President to write Sahnoun a letter of commendation. Scowcroft wrote, “All our 
people who deal with Somalia describe Sahnoun as the most effective and promising player on 
the scene. He has also been forthright in praising the U.S. humanitarian airlift for turning around 
the situation and galvanizing an international response.”250 Despite American-backing, he 
resigned after Boutros-Ghali undercut his authority and his mission’s neutrality by allowing “a 
Russian plane with UN markings to deliver shipments to Mahdi” and increased UN troops to 
3000 while Sahnoun was still negotiating factional acceptance of the original 500 troops 
mandated under UNSCR 751.251 His departure marked an end to any peaceful political 
settlement without an American intervention.  
Shortly after Sahnoun’ s resignation, UNSC President André Erdös wrote to Bush to tell 
him that Aideed said he would no longer tolerate UNOSOM troops “on the streets of 
Mogadishu” as well as several UN Somalia mission personnel changes.252 Boutros-Ghali 
replaced Sahnoun with an ineffective Ismat Kittani of Iraq as the U.N. Special Representative for 
Somalia; he did not arrive in Somalia until November 3, 1992, the day President Bush lost to 
Governor Clinton in the American elections. 
1 week after Clinton’s victory, on November 10, the Acting National Intelligence Officer 
(within the office of the Director of Central Intelligence) delivered a report to the PCC that 
casted doubt on the UN’s capacity to carry out their humanitarian mission. Entitled, “Can United 
Nations Forces Successfully Carry Out Their Mission in Somalia?” stated unequivocally that the 
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UN needed more than their allotted 3,500 troops; 3,000 soldiers alone would be needed to secure 
Mogadishu’s airport and port. The report also conjectured that Aideed, who outgunned under-
equipped UN troops, was likely to disrupt aid deliveries to his perceived enemies, the UN lacked 
the capacity to even successfully insert their troops, and if somehow successfully inserted, UN 
troops would likely need assistance or even evacuation.253 
Throughout the Fall of 1992, the Administration showed engagement and responsiveness 
to new events and views in the policy making arena. Even though the airlift began in a haphazard 
manor and its effectiveness is debatable, the Bush Administration never strayed far outside the 
mainstream of his experts’ recommendations or the President’s beliefs. Sahnoun’s departure 
from the peace process clearly ended any aspirations for nation building or involvement in a 
Somali political reconciliation—effectively capping the scope of any American intervention in 
Somalia. Again, even though multiple views on Somalia were held within the Administration, 
good learning and expertise were demonstrated through their measured approach to Somalia. 
 
The Decision to Intervene (October 1992-January 1993): With a Presidential campaign 
ongoing throughout 1992, the American public was generally unconcerned with the Somalia 
crisis. According to Baum, 2 weeks before the launch Operation Provide Relief, “11 percent of 
respondents claiming to be following Somalia “very closely,” compared to 33 percent who 
claimed to be following Somalia “not at all closely.” In the same survey, only 2 percent 
identified Somalia as the story they had followed most closely during the past month.” 254 
Despite the substantive internal work on Somalia, Bush made very little mention of the crisis or 
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American actions during the campaign. Clinton, a foreign policy neophyte, campaigned on a 
down-economy stating as late as October that his top foreign policy priority was the American 
economy and that Bush cared more about the well-being of foreigners than Americans.255 
Clinton said, “In this new era our first foreign priority and our domestic priority are one and the 
same: reviving our economy. This has been the Administration's most glaring foreign policy 
failure. An anemic, debt-laden economy undermines our diplomacy, makes it harder for us to 
secure favorable trade agreements and compromises our ability to finance essential military 
actions.”256 This stylistic tack may have proved tactically beneficial as Clinton demonstrated 
little difference from Bush on substantive foreign policy issues.257 
While Clinton’s “America first” foreign policy message may have resonated with the 
American electorate, his victory had the paradoxical ancillary effect of freeing the 
Administration to be more active on Somalia. At a November 21 NSC Deputies meeting, 
Somalia policy reached a “turning point.”258 At this meeting, the JCS J5 representatives offered a 
120-day timeline for American intervention to mission handover to UN Peacekeeping forces.259 
A declassified report from that meeting shows that Deputies presented Scowcroft with 3 Somalia 
interventions options ahead of a November 25 NSC Principals meeting. The 3 options were: 
Option 1 “Expanded UN effort:” A continued airlift with the approved 3,500 UN 
peacekeepers (3000 authorized but not-yet-deployed troops authorized in UNCSR 
Resolution 775 and the 500 troops on the ground authorized under UNSCR 751). 
This option did not have a proposed timeline. Bottom line: $250,000,000 for a 6-
month operation and 3,500 UN troops. 
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Option 2 “Aggressive UN Coalition with Active US Assistance:” The US would 
take a leadership role in building an international coalition of 15,000 or more 
troops that would operate under UN auspices to secure ports and interior 
distribution centers. The coalition wouldn’t require factional approval and could 
use force. The US provide combat troops; those would have to come from 
coalition members, likely other Muslim and African states. The coalition force 
would optimally conclude within 4-6 months and the US would work closely with 
the UN on reconstructing Somalia’s civil administration. Bottom line: 
$250,000,000 for a 6-month operation and 15,000 UN troops. 
  
Option 3 “US-Led Military Coalition:” A new UNSCR would permit the US to 
create, lead, and contribute the bulk of a coalition force of at least 15,000 troops 
(including combat units) that would operate under UN authority, but the US 
would retain command. UN PKO forces would provide security for aid 
operations. This mission envisioned a 6-month timeline and a hand-off to a 
“adequately-sized” UN PKO which would give way to a UN guard force which 
would give way to an indigenous police force. Bottom line: $600,000,000 for a 6-
month operation, $1,000,000,000 for a full year and 15,000 UN troops. 
 
The report was forthright in the necessity of the UN and UNSCRs in all options and pushing UN 
Peacekeepers into unprecedented situations and danger. It said: 
Under all three options, we would urge the UN to take a more aggressive role in 
providing security for delivery of relief aid. At a minimum, this would involve an 
unprecedented UN decision to deploy forces in a non-permissive environment, over 
the objections of local warlords…Each option in the paper envisions an aggressive 
peacemaking effort followed by traditional peacekeeping once stable, secure 
conditions have been established. 260 
 
In evaluating these three options on November 24, ahead of the November 25 NSC Principals 
meeting, the JCS deemed Option 1 was insufficient for Somalia’s “non-permissive 
environment,” Option 2 was “conceptually sound” but practically implausible given its reliance 
on international contributions, and Option 3 was “promising, doable, and could be quick” but 
warned it would be tremendously costly, any violence would play poorly with the public, and 
would likely lead to a longer-term commitment. Further JCS deemed that Option 3 severely 
understated force size, forcing a revised estimate on November 25 of 28,000 to 32,000 troops. 
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JCS’s final recommendation was to continue to more aggressively pursue diplomatic avenues 
rather than increase American military presence; failing this, preparations for Option 3 could be 
made under incoming President Clinton.261 Vice Chairman of the JCS, David E. Jeremiah told 
the Deputies, “if you think U.S. forces are needed [on the ground] we can do the job.”262 
At the November 25 9:00 AM Principals' meeting on Somalia, President Bush selected 
Option 3. Having discussed all options with their advisors and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT), CJCS Powell and General Joseph P. Hoar, 
Commander of US Central Command, said that if the Administration was determined to act in 
Somalia Option 3 was the best option.263 However, General Powell warned Bush that “it would 
be foolish not to anticipate taking on the full spectrum of Somalia’s problems…other 
consequences would follow and getting out would be difficult.”264 In short, President Bush 
selected Option 3 with the understanding that it could lead to violence “confronting the warlords 
and disarming the factions.”265Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney confirmed that he and 
Powell gave Bush and Option 3 their reluctant support. Cheney later said, “I was always 
reluctant. You had to have a damned good reason to commit the force and you always had the 
feeling—I suppose General Powell was even somewhat more conservative than I was…[But] It 
would be very hard for a President to override the advice he was getting from the Secretary and 
the Chairman.”266   
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Principals also discussed mission termination. A meeting preparation memo from John 
Ordway to Brent Scowcroft indicated that transitioning from a US-led peacemaking force to a 
UN peacekeeping force could occur when 3 criteria were met:  
1) Stable security has been established around the ports, warehouses, and feeding 
areas and food convoys are delivering the commodities at the desired level;  
2) We have reasonable expectation that the replacing force will provide adequate 
security for humanitarian operations; 
3) The peacekeeping force has been fully deployed and is operational.267 
 
At that meeting, Scowcroft also pushed for all American troops to be out of Somalia by Clinton’s 
inauguration (January 20, 1993), but Powell and Cheney told him that this was likely not 
possible.268 In his autobiography, Clinton confirmed Scowcroft’s inauguration-Day withdrawal 
claim (made to Sandy Berger, then-Assistant Transition Director for National Security and later-
Clinton’s National Security Advisor). Clinton also said Bush informed of the decision to 
intervene in Somalia in December 1992—at minimum 6 days after Bush and the principals made 
that decision.269 
A December 3 Scowcroft-authored NSC memo for principals’ meeting on the same day 
showed a lack of clarity about potential combat in Somalia. While the memo (found in the 
declassified files of Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Walter H. Kansteiner III) focuses on the mission’s humanitarian parameters and 
projected conclusion within 30-180 days from initiation, it left unclear interactions what to do 
about disarming warlords. Scowcroft wrote: 
We may, however, want to corral and guard some of the heavy weapons. It may be 
possible to do that peacefully through negotiation with faction leaders. If there is 
not cooperation, we may after sufficient warning need to destroy heavy weapons 
within a defined area. Such destruction could provoke a reaction would prolong our 
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stay. On the other hand, if heavy weapons simply disappear from the area of 
operation they could pose a threat to the UN peacekeeping force that takes the place 
of the coalition. Thus, much will depend on our message to the faction leaders, their 
willingness to comply with it, and the parameters of our response. 270 
 
At that December 3 meeting, on the eve of President Bush’s address to the nation on 
Somalia, there was minimal discussion of potential violence in Somalia and the role of UN 
peacekeepers.271 Bush informed the principals that 28,000-30,000 American troops would deploy 
to Somalia under UNSCR 794 (approved later that day) for a “unknown period of time” with the 
hope that withdrawal could begin with 40 days. To Bush’s approval, Attorney General Barr said 
the deployment did not need authorization under the War Powers Act because Somalia was no 
longer a country and “we’re operating against brigands.” However, President Bush and other 
principals were ready to launch the mission without a clear sense of the UN’s role: 
Bush: I wish we were more sure about getting out quickly. If the operation goes 
smoothly, why will we need many peacekeepers?  
Eagleburger: UN Peacekeepers will be needed because there will still be no central 
government. There are juvenile delinquents running the place. The problem is 
manageable, however, we can do it.  
Bush: I feel good about this. It is low risk for us. There is no as clean an ending as 
we'd like to see, though. 
… 
Eagleburger: If we don't have peacekeeping commitments lined up, then we're in 
trouble. We should enlist them now.  
Bush: We need to tell the American people that peacekeepers will step in once a 
secure environment is established.  
Baker: We need to nail down the commitments of the peacekeepers. 
 
Similarly, Principals were unclear about the mission’s fundamental parameters: 
 
Eagleburger: Is our mission statement to establish a secure environment or to feed 
people?  
Baker: It is a secure environment for humanitarian relief.  
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Scowcroft: It should only be a secure environment for humanitarian relief.  
Baker: We need to see the UN Security Council Resolution.  
Quayle: We should say that in 30 days we anticipate beginning the withdrawal of 
US forces.  
Scowcroft: We could say in X weeks, we might be able to anticipate beginning the 
withdrawal.  
Bush: The troops' families need to know that we are thinking of getting the troops 
out. Check on the resolution and check on the status of the peacekeepers. We need 
to say something publicly after the Congressional briefing. 
 
As Bush publicly announced the new mission, Operation Restore Hope (ORH), and gave 
USCENTCOM authorization to take “whatever means necessary” to safeguard American and 
Somali lives, inconsistencies in mission aims amongst key American policymakers emerged.272 
Powell, initially advocated for disarming forces that interfered with the humanitarian mission 
before reversing course and supporting USCINCCENT’s mission was strictly “to secure air and 
seaports, ground routes and major relief centers; provide a secure environment, and protect and 
assist UN and non-government humanitarian and relief organizations.”273 In a December 4 letter 
to Boutros-Ghali, Bush specified the scope of the American mission saying, “...the mission of the 
coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the 
starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping 
force.”274 And in a phone call on the same day, he reiterated the limited scope of the American 
mission saying, “I was asked about restoring order to the country, and I said that is not our 
mission it is in your hands.”275 However, in that same conversation, Bush appeared to contradict 
himself vis-a-vis the geographic scope of the mission to humanitarian disaster areas in the south 
saying, “We are aware of the problems in the north...The initial effort will be in the south, but we 
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will not forget and we will help all areas. I will get some criticism, I know.”276 4 days later, in a 
December 8 follow-up phone call, Boutros-Ghali again readdressed expanding the American 
mission to the north Bush then backtracked, saying such a change in mission scope would be 
kept “under consideration” and changed the subject. Bush raised the possibility of violence 
saying, “I hope there will be no confrontations. We are not going in for a fight, but hope there 
will be understanding in the world community if we do what we have to do to protect the 
mission.” In response, Boutros-Ghali pushed Bush on disarming gangs to which Bush was non-
committal saying, “I agree it is important. But we have not made it part of our mission statement. 
The world may turn on us if we don’t do what we said we would do. We need peacekeepers 
coming in quickly behind us.”277 It is not clear why Bush was insistent on peacekeepers “quick 
arrival” and non-committal on weapons disarming, given Administration officials had agreed on 
a policy. A December 4 memo to Scowcroft, called for a [weapons disarming] strategy of 
“‘remove now, seize later’…to avoid the possibility of a mistaken clash during our landings. 
Later, when we have thought it through better and have more muscle on the ground, we can start 
demanding the surrender of the weapons and seize (or destroy) those that are not surrendered.” 
The “remove now” strategy called for restricting heavy weapons to “cantons” from which 
warlords could not remove them; confining them to cantons would make future removal 
easier.278 This policy, while effective for short term pacification had broader implications for the 
intervention. As Susan Rosegrant wrote in A “Seamless” Transition: United States and United 
Nations Operations in Somalia—1992-1993, “The fact that weapons were cantoned and then not 
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destroyed probably sent quite a message of comfort to the warlords that, well, yeah, we're just 
temporarily on hold while these guys are here.”279 
As ORH’s parameters were debated, successful mission implementation moved far faster 
than American military projections. Before ORH’s launch, USCENTCOM prepared a “slow-
paced” 240-days mission timeline in anticipation of warlord resistance. But, ORH troops moved 
into Somalia without any such opposition from Aideed or other warlords, achieving some 90-
180-day goals within 15 days.280 By December 7, 12 countries had committed 13,650 troops for 
the U.S.-led peacemaking mission, 14 others were negotiating their troop commitments, and 5 
countries had offered 5,653 troops for UNOSOM peacekeeping duties.281 On December 9, troops 
arrived in Somalia, beginning the United Task Force for Somalia (UNITAF).282 On the 
December 11, Robert B. Johnston, Commanding General of the Marine Expeditionary Force, and 
Ambassador Robert Oakley, Bush’s Special Envoy to Somalia, got Mahdi and Aidid to sign a 
formal ceasefire agreement and accept the heavy weapons “cantonment policy.”283 Building on 
these successes, the Administration began planning an even stronger mandate for UNOSOM II, 
considering as many as 15,000 more troops, expanded rules for engaging hostiles and 
corresponding weaponry decided to push Boutros-Ghali for greater UNSC support, the 
destruction of heavy weapons, and the authority to establish a Somali police force as the first 
step towards restoring sovereignty. However, the question of who would do the disarming 
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remained a philosophical one.284 By the end of December, ORH successes were great enough 
that President Bush brought in the new year in Somalia.285 
However, de-classified CIA assessments from Somalia painted a dimmer view. One 
December 7 report projected that Marines would have to withdraw to do excessive monetary 
costs of the mission and that the Somali government would have to be internally decided. It also 
said that, “the Somalian terrorists have rudimentary weaponry, it is effective” and that the 
northern area that Boutros-Ghali and Bush discussed “is the most volatile now. Terrorism and 
gun fire [sic] are high there.”286 A December 18 assessment, 9 days after OPR troops arrived, 
reported “dismal” conditions, that “only the internal government can change conditions… 
Somalia will have [sic] to change their own country,” and that Somalia was a “no win situation 
for the US.287 
In a previously-classified notes from December 9 conversation with Jan Eliasson, 
Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, Scowcroft said that, “the days of unilateralism were 
over.” Scowcroft also suggested that a 4th Option for Somalia “may have been doable under non-
[Presidential-]transition circumstances.” While Scowcroft conceded that the Administration was 
worried about warlords and gangs attacking peacekeepers after American withdrawal, he said 
that the UN needs a “cultural change that allows UN peacekeepers to have a more aggressive 
role.” Scowcroft remained insistent that the United States had no intention of “trying to rearrange 
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Somali power relationships” and the two agreed that the UN should lead the way on seeking a 
diplomatic political resolution in Somalia.288 
The UN’s first post-intervention attempt at diplomatic political reconciliation took place 
during the closing days of the Bush Administration. From January 4-15, representatives from 14 
Somali factions met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for a preliminary political reconciliation 
conference, agreeing that all militias should camp outside cities and disarm by March 1. Factions 
also agreed to cease all hostile propaganda “full and unrestrained cooperation” with international 
relief efforts. These terms were ratified at an UN-held conference in Addis Ababa (March 15-27) 
and factions agreed to end the Civil War, form a new government central by March 1995, full 
disarmament within 90 days, and full cooperation with UNITAF and UNOSOM I troop 
disarmament.289 
Even as the UN ostensibly progressed, actions in Somalia showed that the Civil War, 
particularly between Mahdi and Aideed continued. At a January 5 NSC Deputies meeting, 
Admiral William Studeman, Director of the National Security Agency, told the assembled group 
(which included Ambassador Oakley) that “violent crime remains a serious problem in 
Mogadishu and elsewhere. Aideed has order surveillance of US personnel at the airport, port, 
and Embassy…Mahdi's forces have also placed material in one cantonment, but continue to hold 
back weapons.” He also reported the discovery of a new unmarked mass grave near Kisamayo (a 
port city south of Mogadishu). Oakley spoke with great trepidation at the prospect of disarming 
and disbanding Somali forces saying, “The practical implications are horrendous...It creates a 
confrontation with these people, and it is difficult to do by force of arms.” 290 Oakley preferred 
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working diplomatically within Somalia, encouraging the appointment of governors and women 
in local councils and pushing Bush to allow for the creation of local police forces—expanding 
his mission beyond its mandate. Boutros-Ghali refused to allow UNOSOM troops to engage in 
these police or civic programs, ensuring an even more difficult mission handoff. 291 
The following day saw the first fire fight between General Aideed’s forces when his 
troops, stationed at 2 authorized weapons storage sites, fired on a UNITAF convoy. The next 
day, US Marines attacked Aideed’s troops, taking control of the sites and all of the weapons. On 
January 12, Private First-Class Domingo Arroyo, an American Marine, was killed when his 
security patrol was ambushed near the Mogadishu airport.292 That same day, Oakley pleaded 
with the State Department for the institution of a domestic police force as its absence created 
problems “rapidly reaching crisis proportions” as UNITAF troops and Somali civilians were 
increasingly the victims of street crimes. He also warned the State Department that outside of 
Mogadishu, UN operations were “in a state of catastrophic weakness and disorganization” and 
that without a stronger UN presence with greater nation-building capacity, Somalia revert into 
chaos when American troops departed. 293 
In assessing Bush’s handling of the Somalia intervention, key officials independently and 
unanimously agreed the Bush’s humanitarian motivations and the mission’s intentions and 
parameters. Secretary of State Eagleburger said, “There was no one in the Bush administration 
who thought of this as anything other than fundamentally a humanitarian mission…we were 
prepared to concede that once we fed people and left, it could turn into a mess again. But we 
consciously were unprepared to try to solve the political mess.”294  
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Robert Oakley echoed this view, stressing the humanitarian impetus and UN limitations. 
He said: 
I think President Bush had a strong moral commitment to do something about this 
situation in Somalia. Since television was on to it…you saw hundreds of thousands 
of people dying slowly of starvation disease caused by a combination of famine, 
drought and civil war. The United Nations had been trying to do something about 
it in a very slow, as it turned out, ineffectual way. The time came when [during] 
internal deliberations within the United States government, the Pentagon came 
forward and said to the White House, 'Look if you want to save another 300,000-
500,000 people dying slowly of starvation over the next six months, it's going to 
take a large military operation along with a humanitarian operation, and the United 
States are the only ones to put it together quickly enough to do the job. The United 
Nations just doesn't operate that way. We don't want to do this, but we will do it if 
you deem it advisable.' And the president said 'Let's do it, let's round up some allies 
and see what we can do. Let's have the UN endorse it and let's go,' and so they 
went.295 
 
Bush’s CIA Director Robert (Bob) Gates stressed the humanitarian impetus as well, but added a 
caveat about election pressures. He said, “I don’t think that if it been a non-election year and if 
there had been no CNN pictures, that we would have ever gone into Somalia.”296 Even with 
potential public pressure, Gates stressed strict mission parameters saying: 
 [All senior Administration officials had] strong views about limiting the 
mission…toward the end of the Bush administration there were plans in place to 
begin withdrawing the US forces and having them replaced by UN people who 
would basically continue the anti-famine effort. There was never any illusion, I 
think, in the Bush administration, and we probably helped from CIA, about nation 
building in Somalia, because we knew there was no nation there at that point. 297 
 
According to Admiral David E. Jeremiah, who briefed Clinton and his top national security 
advisors on Somalia during the transition and served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff under Bush (and Clinton) speculated on Bush’s motivations saying, “With 
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someone like President Bush it was just not possible, I don’t think, for him to stand back 
and see people die when we could do something about it.” Jeremiah reiterated that the 
Administration always had a clear exit strategy, saying, “The exit strategy was get out of 
Dodge as quickly as we can so we can handle the transfer to Clinton as a completely 
finished project or nearly so. The way to do that was pass the banana to the United Nations, 
and there was every reason at that stage of the game where you would expect they would 
be happy to take it. Turns out that they weren’t.”298 
 In choosing to intervene as they did, with a militarily preponderant force, clear 
objectives to create a secure environment for aid delivery and then hand over the mission 
to the UN, the Bush Administration effectively implemented the President’s beliefs. Their 
policies show an appropriate understanding of the capabilities. Also, they created a mission 
that left minimal need for new management strategies from the incoming Clinton 
Administration.  
 
 
Clinton and the Road to Withdrawal (1992-1993):  
Clinton’s Multilateral Beliefs and Administration Inexperience (January 1993-March 
1993): During the Presidential campaign, Clinton’s purported foreign policy views were 
strikingly similar to Bush’s. Clinton criticized Bush’s foreign policy for insufficient activism 
while proposing little deviation from either Bush’s Somalia policy or the new world order. For 
example, in the summer of 1992, then-Governor Bill Clinton criticized Bush’s inaction in 
Somalia and accused him of abdicating international leadership.299 However, mirroring Bush’s 
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public statements on UN peacekeeping throughout 1992, Clinton advocated for greater UN 
action saying, “…multilateral action holds promise as never before, and the UN deserves full and 
appropriate contributions from all major powers.” 300 On the UN’s role in Somalia, Clinton said, 
“I think the UN needs to do whatever it can to alleviate the suffering there…I support the 
decision by the United Nations Security Council to expand its relief efforts to reach victims 
throughout Somalia and to provide security for relief workers and supplies.”301 As The 
Washington Post’s Don Oberdorfer, who had been covering Somalia since the 1970s, noted 1 
month before the election,  “The United States is likely to pursue an activist U.S. foreign policy 
in keeping with the alliances and global responsibilities of recent decades whether President 
Bush or Gov. Bill Clinton is elected in November… Rather than define a new role for the United 
States, Clinton charged last month [that] Bush's policy has been ‘rudderless, reactive and 
erratic.’”302 
Ironic as Clinton’s assertion would prove to be, his national security personnel choices 
did little to elicit calm or confidence. During the transition, Secretary of Defense-designate Les 
Aspin, in a moment indicative of coming Administration-discord, disabused the public of a 
unified view on Somalia policy when he said, “there’s more of a national interest at stake in 
Bosnia than there is in Somalia.”303 Many senior national security officials in the new 
Administration had not served in the foreign policy bureaucracy since the Carter administration 
(e.g. Tony Lake), if at all (e.g. Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping Susan 
Rice).304 Those who had prior experience had not served in senior positions and were not fully 
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prepared to inherit a full slate of international crises.305 As James (Jim) Steinberg, who held 
several positions within the Clinton Administration, said of their early personnel challenges: 
The problem is you have…very small number of people, and very few who are 
confirmed, and a bunch of crises on your plate…Somalia wasn’t a big problem 
initially, but it turned into one fairly quickly and in the first six months before you 
had people in place. You want to do some long-term, bigger policy analysis, but 
the reality is that these crises take up all your time.306 
 
As Congress slowly confirmed Clinton’s appointees, many were perceived to prefer the 
State Department’s pro-development arguments on Somalia rather than measured assessments of 
the military.307 Adding to uncertainty was the perception that the new Administration was overly 
idealistic about the United Nations. 308 Ambassador Robert Oakley, US Special Envoy to 
Somalia under both Presidents Bush and Clinton, summed up the fears and uncertainties about 
the new Administration saying:   
The principal officials had not served in the U.S. government or any other 
government position for at least 12 years, if at all. They were full of enthusiasm and 
idealism, which is nice, and Somalia appeared to be going well; therefore, it 
appeared to be sort of the epitome of what they would like to see the United Nations 
do. On the surface it looked like it was going to be success. 
 
An assessment from October 9 1993, 6 days after battle of Mogadishu, found in the files 
of George Tenet, Clinton’s Senior Director for Intelligence at the NSC, shows the Clinton 
Administration’s insufficient understanding of Somalia was constant from the transition all the 
way through Black Hawk Down. That day, Tenet received a report entitled, “Old Wine in New 
Bottles in Somalia and Other Notes” written by Samuel J. Hamrick, a former State Department 
Foreign Service Officer who served in embassies in Lebanon, Congo, Somalia and Ethiopia. In 
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the report, Hamrick warned that any peace making/nation building action in Somalia was 
fundamentally ahistorical and fatalistically doomed. He wrote: 
Clan warfare, murder, too many guns and too few peacekeepers have plagued any 
power or group of powers trying to establish and maintain political order since the 
early 1900s…What should be obvious to anyone who knows anything about 
Somalia is that it was unrealistic from the very beginning to believe the various 
Somali clans or factions could be disarmed or would disarm voluntarily. Yet, 
Boutros-Ghali has insisted on Somali disarmament since November 1992…He 
wanted to guarantee UNOSOM's peacekeeping success, but given Somalia's 
hostility to foreigners, what he was doing was ensuring its failures…To ask Somali 
clans and factions to yield their own security for the sake of an authority yet 
undefined is just as much a fantasy, as alien to Somali tradition as yielding their 
weaponry to foreigners. It simply wouldn't work. 309 
 
Regarding the UN and Boutros-Ghali, he was explicitly condemnatory, writing, “…the 
instrument of change was UNOSOM and the UN or its people, not so much Washington.” In 
“Old Wine…” Hamrick recounted that he had warned of these pitfalls and several others in a 
paper he wrote for Clinton’s transition team. He cautioned that Operation Restore Hope was a 
serious mistake but, because it would become Clinton’s operation, “[the new President should] 
make certain that Bush's original mandate wasn’t altered by one word. Clinton's Somali 
operation should be seen as a continuing humanitarian mission as defined by Bush, a bipartisan 
US effort, nothing more.” Hamrick counselled that any deviation would make Somalia entirely 
his burden and might prove disastrous because, “Somalia was the worst place in the world to first 
test an incoming administration's foreign policy principles.” 310 
 Senior Defense officials held a similar assessment. According to David E. Jeremiah, who 
advised Clinton during the transition and throughout 1993, said: 
I spent the worst week in my life daily in the White House doing foreign policy 101 
in the Roosevelt Room with the newbies in the administration. People would come 
in and offer advice from time to time who knew nothing and then they’d go on 
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about their business and check in on us every three or four days…I believe they 
never really were engaged until…after the Black Hawk Down. They expected to 
kind of muddle through. They had way too much faith in the UN, and that was 
across the board. The new White House staff was way over enthusiastic about what 
they could expect out of the UN. They thought we would all get together and 
kumbaya, and that wasn’t going to happen at all…311 
 
Insufficient Presidential attention comingled with the ill-formed intra-Administration 
desire to bootstrap the UN into the US’s place without sufficient consideration of its 
repercussions. A January 1993 draft of a then-unnamed UN resolution found in the files of 
Richard Clarke, Clinton’s Executive Officer for NSC Global Issues & Multilateral Affairs, 
showed initiatives during the earliest days of the Clinton Administration towards supporting UN 
nation-building in Somalia. The draft called for, among other things, the establishment of an 
indigenous police force, the repatriation of refugees, the reestablishment of public services, the 
rehabilitation of the economy, creation of records of humanitarian violations, and the 
establishment of democratic institutions. This January draft was nearly identical to final 
resolution (UNSCR 814) which was unanimously approved on March 26.312 
Meanwhile in January 1993, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, still operating under their Bush 
mission mandate were ready to leave Somalia. A January 28 JCS report (found in the files of 
Clinton’s NSC African Affairs aide John Ordway) authored by Lieutenant General Robert B. 
Johnston, the commander of the Operation Restore Hope’s First Marine Expeditionary Force, 
said, “[The] war is over, we won; time to come home.” The report, entitled, “Commander's 
Assessment of Operation Restore Hope,” went on to say that:  
“…the Peace Enforcement Mission is completed and UNITAF is ready to 
commence the Peacekeeping Mission by moving into Phase IV, transition of 
command and control to UNOSOM II. Over twenty nations are now participating 
in the operation with more indicating a willingness to join. The vast majority of 
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these will remain for UNOSOM II and those already here are in assigned areas they 
could retain under the UN phase.”  
 
These views were so firm in the eyes of JCS that the report was to be shared with the UN the 
following week. 313 
USAID, for its part, advocated strongly for the American military to remain in Somalia. 
A January 21 report entitled, “Somalia: From Relief to Recovery” forcefully advocated against 
decreasing the US military footprint and pointed to UN inadequacies. It argued that several 
million Somalis remained at risk and that whatever security and aid delivery existed was 
sustained by the American military. The report claimed that pre-intervention security risks were 
dormant (not deterred) and only less visible in major population centers because of their extant 
American military presence. It lamented the lack of support for the establishment an indigenous 
political structure and civil administration—especially a national police force. The report was 
bearish on, “the very slow progress on political reconciliation,” and the lack of, “attention on 
medium-term recovery, let alone long-term development” without a strong American military 
presence. Key to USAID’s appeal to maintain American military presence was its skepticism of 
UN capabilities saying, “Further complicating the current situation—and deeply frustrating the 
international donor community—is the mixed performance of the UN in the whole Somali 
political, military, and relief equation political reconciliation.” In short, USAID supported the 
ORH/UNITAF-status quo in Somalia, not UN-led nation building.314 
Meanwhile, ORH extended beyond its mission parameters. By the end of January, 
Ambassador Oakley, building upon extra-mission initiatives, began creating local councils and 
mediation. Brigadier General Anthony Zinni (UNITAF Deputy for Operations) said, “We did 
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creep outside our mission a lot…I think we went as far as we could go given what we were.” In 
February 1993, newly-formed police forces were operating in dozens of towns and courts were 
being established. 
With 3 policy paths before the Administration: 1) to support nascent nation-building 
through the UN, 2) to fully withdraw troops and turn Somalia over the UN and 3) continue the 
ORH/UNITAF-status quo, the Clinton Administration chose the first option while still 
formalizing it vision for multilateral action in the post-Cold War world. On February 15, NSC 
principals (except the President) reviewed a Lake-authored proposal, Policy Review Document 
(PRD) 13. It called for a, “a zero-based review of the issues involved in the creation of a US 
policy on [multilateral] peacekeeping and to identify options leading to Presidential decisions.” 
315 Using Bush’s NSD 74 as a base, PRD 13 added the possibility of direct U.S. troop 
deployment to support UN actions. Early policy discussion involved the creation of a UN army 
(like Reagan proposed in Oxford). However, this suggestion was nixed by Defense officials 
before the February 15th formal meeting.316 While PRD 13 was in keeping with the post-Cold 
War aspirations of the previous two Administrations, it parted with their view of American troop 
deployment. 
With a clear Somalia policy path emerging, the Administration’s continued scrambling to 
actualize its UN-led Somalia nation building vision. A March 9 strategy paper sent from 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to Marcia L. Hale, President Clinton's Assistant to the 
President and Director of Scheduling and Advance, highlighted 7 aspirational and vague policy 
points: 
1. The UN and the international community, including the US, must work towards 
a realistic objective in Somalia…The goal at the end of three years should be a 
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decentralized and relatively democratic Somalia, which enjoys relative stability 
with limited outside humanitarian and economic intervention.  
2. The UN and the international community must outline the actions to be taken 
for Somalia to reach this goal. 
3. Any strategy to resolve the Somalia situation must combine three inextricably 
linked components of military security operations, humanitarian/rehabilitation 
actions, and political/diplomatic efforts 
4. The USG must energize the UN to take necessary action. The USG has neither 
the resources, nor vital interests at stake to justify unilateral action. 
5. Our purpose in Somalia is to avert further humanitarian catastrophe, make the 
UN peacekeeping effort successful, and facilitate regional stability in the Horn.  
6. UNITAF has provided a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian 
relief in south central Somalia, and mass starvation has subsided. Yet, security 
is fragile, humanitarian needs are great, and faction leaders, who crave personal 
power, continue to vie for political roles.  
7. Progress in security and humanitarian relief is changing the Somali 
environment, put the political "leg" is lagging behind. A "bottom-up" approach 
has worked reasonably well to improve local security conditions and to provide 
emergency relief to those most at risk in Somalia. However, continued progress 
is contingent upon reaching a degree of political consensus at the local, 
regional, and national levels. All three must be worked simultaneously while 
focusing in the short term on local and regional political organization.317 
 
On all three “legs,” Lake’s proposal called for the UN to take over in Somalia by summer 1993.  
Similarly, a March 16 conversation with Vice President Albert (Al) Gore and 
Ambassador Oakley showed his eagerness to hand off the mission to UN. Oakley, now 
corroborating the JCS view, told Gore that the original mission goals, as laid out by Powell and 
Cheney in December 1992, had been achieved. The coming phases, creating an environment for 
national reconstruction and “plucking the warlords feathers,” would be the UN’s responsibility—
and they were lagging. Oakley assured Gore that, “After early May [1993], the UN is in the lead, 
and we are in a supporting role.”318 
 Despite growing Administration unanimity on an UN-handoff, internal Administration 
dysfunction emerged. A March 17 memo from Richard Clarke to Tony Lake and his Deputy 
                                                      
317 Anthony Lake, “Strategy for Somalia,” Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs, OA/ID 1408 
318 Memorandum for the Record on Discussions with Ambassador Oakley, March 16, 1993, Susan Rice, “Somalia, 
1993 [10]” [OA/ID 277] 
 95 
Samuel (Sandy) Berger entitled, “Somalia, State Needs to Pay Attention [sic],” Clarke 
admonished the State Department's disorganization on Somalia. The memo noted that State 
disestablished its Task Force on Somalia and had not made clear who or what group was its 
replacement. As a result, the UN resolution (which would become United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 814) still had not passed the Security Council despite weeks of promises to 
the President otherwise. In short, no one at State appeared to be in charge on Somalia despite a 
shift in policy that would require their involvement and leadership more than ever before.319 
A week later (on March 24), the Administration, coming to terms with UN limitations, 
discussed a curious way to support its nation building efforts in Somalia—the creation of a new 
team of “superstars” that would somehow “expand staff effectiveness by 500% in one month.” In 
an “Eyes Only” memo for Richard Clarke, Susan Rice wrote, “the organization, structure, and 
management of UNOSOM is not adequate to conduct the limited operation of its current 
mandate.” Even though UNOSOM I was slated to be replaced by UNOSOM II with a broader, 
more demanding mission that would cover the entire nation, nation building responsibilities, and 
full responsibilities of national security, Rice suggested the superstar team would “not require a 
lot of people for a long time” because the challenge could be met, “by a handful of innovative, 
creative, quick-study problem solvers (the real super stars of the past or future) [who] can make a 
tremendous difference to this nascent operation.” Needless to say, her memo was long on jargon 
and desperately short on details of actual team responsibilities or structure. 320 
 2 days later, in spite of these internal doubts and disorganization, a nearly identical 
version of the January draft on Somali nation building unanimously passed the Security Council 
(as UNSCR 814) with full-throated American support from Madeleine Albright, the new US 
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Ambassador to the UN. UNSCR 814 called for full disarmament within Somalia within 90 days 
and nation-building including the establishment of police forces. In approbatory speech, Albright 
said, “By adopting this resolution, we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at 
nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member 
of the community of nations.” While Albright sought to signal the end of American leadership in 
Somalia, her speech’s closing words sent a confused signal about American commitment, “…by 
today’s action the Security Council will commit the United Nations to what is probably the 
toughest coordination challenge of its history. It is difficult to overstate the importance of its 
success or the costs of its failure. Let us commit to its success.”321 Albright’s words are even 
more curious when placed in the context of her views of UN capacities. In her autobiography, 
she wrote, “Both Presidents Bush and Clinton understood that the UN was not equipped to 
handle its expanding responsibilities. When I first arrived in New York, there were only about a 
dozen people assigned to manage peacekeeping.”322 
During its first months, the Clinton Administration demonstrated a remarkable adherence 
to a belief in multilateralism and Somalia nation building. However, the beliefs were 
anachronistic vis-à-vis nation building and all of the Bush Administration’s deliberations from 
July 1992 onwards. That they set aside intra- and extra-governmental recommendations that 
were not in keeping with Clinton’s beliefs does not itself demonstrate bad learning. However, 
that they chose a policy path that relied more on the UN without a sense of its capabilities, 
demonstrates bad learning.  However, a focus on long-term multilateral operation planning 
seems prudent and keeping with the post-Cold War status quo and Clinton’s beliefs. 
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Failure to learn and Inaction Lead to Tragedy (April 1993-October 1993): 
Despite the positive public perception of Somalia, internally the Administration made 
moves to limits its involvement in UNOSOM II. In the press, Somalia was largely viewed as a 
successful operation with conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer calling it, “a relatively 
painless relative success” in The Washington Post.323 Clinton under PDD/NSC-6, ordered 
American forces which included 2,600 logistical support troops and (reluctantly) 1,400 ground-
based quick reaction forces (QRF) remain in  Somalia.324 The Administration preferred to offer 
only logistical support but was forced to concede on QRF in order to mollify the French who 
threatened to withdraw their forces if American QRF were removed.325 Additionally, QRF forces 
remained under the operational control of USCENTCOM, not UNOSOM II, under the US 
Forces Somalia (USFORSOM).326 Following Powell’s recommendations for PDD/NSC-6, 
American troop commitment (including QRF) drawdown was to begin on President Clinton’s 
order in August 1993 leveling off at 1,4000 troops by January 31, 1994.327 Despite the light 
footprint, Clinton permitted American troops to assist in heavy weapons collection and the 
creation or regional and national Somali police forces.328  
The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was uneven as troop contributions came in 
slowly. On the takeover date (May 4), UNOSOM II had 57% of its 28,000 troops and 22% of its 
300 logistical personnel in place.329 With UNOSOM II woefully understaffed, “US QRF forces 
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constituted UNOSOM’s teeth and US logistic support units made up its tail.”330 Even though the 
Clinton Administration privately lacked confidence in the UN’s ability to implement UNSCR 
814’s mandate they maintained slivers of hope that it might succeed—especially in public.331 
This hope was ill-placed, as UNOSOM II operations proved disorganized. Troops 
entering Somalia did so without clear chain of command or uniform rules of engagement. As a 
result, troops were accountable to their home governments and sought guidance there instead of 
the UN. The Italian contingency, for example, operated so far outside of UN direction that it 
attempted peace negotiations with Aideed after UNSC ordered his capture. In addition, the US-
led Civilian-Military Operations Center (CMOC), which coordinated security for the dozens of 
aid organizations operating in Somalia, went away with the end of UNITAF. Without CMOC 
coordination and UNOSOM II’s expanding relief map, aid workers became susceptible to 
attack.332 
With American troops out of the way and UN operations in disorder, General Aideed 
began testing UNOSOM II. On May 6, his southern ally Colonel Jess engaged in a 2-day fire 
fight with UNOSOM II forces in an attempt to wrest control of the city of Kismayo.333 
Internecine fighting continued through May and culminated on June 5. The day before, 
UNOSOM II command informed Aideed that the following day Pakistani troops would 
inventory his Mogadishu weapons storage facilities, including one that housed his radio station. 
Fearing that the Pakistanis might attempt to take his transmitter, Aideed’s troops waited until 
after the inspection’s completion before carrying out a “a carefully prepared three-sided 
ambush.” 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed and 57 were injured. At the same time as that 
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ambush, Aideed’s forces carried out several concurrent, coordinated attacks occurred in 
Mogadishu.334 
The response to these attacks was swift and hard, but strategically shortsighted. On June 
6, UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 837 with strong American support. It called on 
UNOSOM forces: 
…to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed 
attacks…including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to 
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to 
secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for 
prosecution, trial and punishment.335 
The following day, following General Hoar’s request, JCS furnished UNOSOM II with air 
support, in part, for strikes against Aideed. Flights over Mogadishu targeted Aideed’s weapons 
storage facilities, vehicle compounds, and radio station.336 The State Department and NSC, over 
JCS objections, agreed that targeting Aideed was the proper strategy and would make “all the 
difference” going forward.337 
UN Special Envoy Jonathan Howe agreed with this view. On June 13, between 8 and 20 
Somali protesters were shot by sniper fire during an otherwise peaceful protest. Howe, who had 
replaced Kittani in March and previously served as a National Security Council Deputy to Bush, 
operating on solid intelligence, believed that Aideed’s forces carried out the attack. He 
concluded that “if this man would kill his own people in order to accomplish his goals, he really 
ought to come off the streets, he ought to be detained. He needed to go through the legal 
process.”338 On June 17, after discussions with Kofi Annan, Assistant Secretary-General for 
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Peacekeeping, Boutros-Ghali, and other Somalia specialists at the UN, Howe issued an arrest 
order for General Aideed along with an $25 million reward.339 
Rather than ameliorate tensions, the moves against Aideed intensified violence, 
increasing intractability and jeopardizing the peace won under ORH/UNITAF. For example, in 
mid-June, Moroccan forces took “heavy casualties in an [otherwise routine] sweep of Aideed’s 
headquarters.”340 Immediately after a July 12 QRF helicopter gunship attack on a major Aideed 
compound, a crowd “near the compound killed 4 western journalists covering the action, 
displaying their bodies for the world to see.”341 The unrest that followed UNSCR 837’s passage 
also had a depressing effect on coalition forces’ willingness to conduct peace keeping operations 
necessary to maintain a secure environment, forcing QRF troops to preserve security around 
American facilities.342 Aideed began distributing propaganda which called for attacks on 
American compounds and Americans all over the world. An-Aideed pamphlet acquired by 
Reuters news service and viewed by the National Security Council entitled, “We Kill 
Americans,” said, “We appeal to all countries of the multinational force to stay far from the 
American sites in Mogadishu. We are going to launch an attack to the American compounds in 
Mogadishu. We also appeal to all Muslim countries in the world to kill Americans in their 
countries.”343 In short, the UN and the United States had become combatants in the Somali Civil 
War.344 
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On the same day the journalists were killed, the CIA gave the NSC a bleak Somalia 
assessment in a report entitled, “Somalia: Dealing with Aideed.” The report said that while 
Aideed had been hurt by UNOSOM’s offensives, his 300-500 fighters in Mogadishu could 
“bleed” UN forces with guerrilla tactics and sniper attacks, functionally stopping UN operations 
in the capital. They warned that successful attacks on the UN diminished its authority among 
other Somali groups and that the anti-Aideed offensive had the unanticipated consequence of 
legitimizing other warlords’ roles in the civil war by “signaling [sic] victory for their quest to 
seize power by force.”345 The report cautioned that while Aideed’s arrest represented the “best 
opportunity to restore credibility to the UN peacemaking mission in Somalia…if UN troops are 
forced into a bloody firefight during detention operations or appear ineffective by allowing him 
to slip through a high-visibility manhunt, popular support for his anti-UN campaign might swell 
significantly.”346 The report’s conclusion, entitled, “UNOSOM: Building the Tower of Babel,” 
further confirmed UN command discontinuity. It said, that despite 2 months of leading 
international efforts in Somalia, the UN still had not yet created a command structure, calling it 
“cumbersome and unwieldy” adding that, “military planning has been hindered by national 
rivalries and recriminations.”347 
Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration began applying long term multilateral 
peacekeeping strategy to missions before such a policy had been finalized. A July 26 State 
Department Memorandum shows that PRD-13, which did not become settled policy until May 
1994 as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), was already being applied to weigh a 
potential American intervention into the Rwandan Civil War. The memorandum shows several 
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criteria for weighing intervention including Rwanda’s threat to international peace and security, 
the viability of an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a 
multilateral basis, potential mission objectives, and means available before ultimately deciding 
not to intervene.348 While no conclusion was reached on Rwanda in July 1993, the memo was 
generally positive on the outlook for intervention and is further evidence of the Clinton 
Administration’s disconnected foreign policy. 
Similarly, the State Department remained committed to the disorganized and increasingly 
dangerous mission in Somalia. A July 26th State Department report written for the NSC argued 
that American troops remained in Somalia after UNITAF specifically to assist in UN nation 
building and that this was in keeping with the new norm of American responses to “a growing 
number of conflicts where a multilateral military response is most appropriate.” 349 However, the 
report could not point to any progress against Aideed, choosing instead to highlight “measurable 
progress toward reconciliation [sic] taking place outside the capital” in the form of district 
council creation.350 Additionally, the report discussed that outside of Democrats Senate Pro 
Tempore Robert Byrd and Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman John Murtha, there 
was little push back on Somalia from Congress and even less from in media because (ironically), 
“most major US news organizations have withdrawn their reporters out of concern for their 
safety.”351 
In August 1993, public inattention broke as the Administration was forced to confront 
Aideed’s strategy: to attack Americans until the will to stay in Somalia was shattered. In early 
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August, a vehicle carrying 2 American contractors was attacked. On August 9, 4 American 
military policemen were killed by remote controlled mine.352 On August 19, another mine attack 
wounded 4 more Americans. On August 22, yet another mine attack wounded 6 more 
Americans.353 As Ambassador Oakley noted, “The United States became public enemy number 
one for all the Somalis who supported Aideed.”354 Ambassador Albright took to the pages of The 
New York Times to defend the Administration in an op-ed entitled “Yes, There Is a Reason to Be 
in Somalia.” She said, “President Clinton has said we have no choice but to protect our soldiers 
and make sure the mission succeeds.”355 She went on to say, “The decision we must make is 
whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or to stay the course and 
help lift the country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an emerging 
democracy. For Somalia's sake, and ours, we must persevere.”356 
With Aideed’s August attacks ongoing, the US upped its Somalia military commitments. 
Powell, in consultation with Lake, Hoar and Aspin, recommended the deployment of 400-450 
US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to assist in the capture of Aideed and his 6 top aids.357 They 
were deployed under the name Task Force Ranger.358 Powell told Aspin, “We have to do 
something or we are going to be nibbled to death.”359 In an August 27 address at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said that these SOF and 
other QRF forces could not be removed until Mogadishu was secure, warlords were disarmed of 
heavy weapons, and credible police forces in major population centers were established. He went 
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on to say, “President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to 
help Somalia again provide for its people. This is what the new world asks of American 
leadership and American partnership.”360 
While the Clinton Administration had unified voice and vision at August’s end, the 
month that followed left a jumble of opinions as domestic support for Somalia cracked. After 
August’s attacks on Americans, Congressional pressure mounted on the Administration to 
withdraw from Somalia. On September 4, Howe proposed a 48-hour ceasefire with Aideed, who 
responded to the offer the following the day with an attack that killed 7 Nigerians. 361 On 
September 8, in preparation for a meeting with a bipartisan group of Congressional Leadership, 
Tony Lake prepared talking points for Clinton. On Somalia, Lake directed him to fully support 
extant nation building objectives and say: 
I'm very concerned about amendments to force our withdrawal from Somalia. US 
forces will remain there only until they have completed their mission. To force a 
premature withdrawal undercuts our ability to achieve our objectives--establishing 
security throughout the country, standing up a credible police force and judicial 
system, and achieving real progress towards political reconciliation.362 
 
On September 11, NSC deputies abruptly changed course, proposing abandonment of nation 
building in favor of the apprehension of Aideed and his lieutenants and making peace amongst 
the other Somali warlords.363 On September 16, NSC principals met to discuss PRD-13 which 
was re-drafted in part because Congressional criticism of peacekeeping policy.364 On September 
18, Clinton defended UN nation building efforts a publicly floated a vague “political initiative” 
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that would help in Somalia without further American troop commitments. The same day, Howe 
contradicted Clinton telling PBS that, “There plainly was never intended to be nor could there be 
some ultimate military solution to Somalia,” that as many as 5,000 more troops were needed, and 
ultimately, “the rebirth of Somalia is in the hands of Somalis.”365 On September 20, Warren 
Christopher gave Boutros-Ghali “a non-paper” telling him that 1) American domestic support 
was crumbling, 2) going forward UNOSOM II should seek a ceasefire with Aideed and persuade 
him to leave Somalia, 3) create a central government, and QRF/SOF would leave Somalia as 
soon Aideed was gone.366 On September 21, Democratic Representative Jack Reed and member 
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and a former Army Ranger, sent the 
George Tenet a 19-page assessment based recounting an August 1993 trip to Somalia which 
concluded that for the US and UN to save face, “[We should] get Aideed and get out.”367 On 
September 27, the State Department sent the White House a memo entitled, “Memorandum of 
Justification for a Presidential Determination to Draw Down DoD Commodities and Services 
and to Set Aside Legal Restrictions on Providing Assistance to Somalia” whose purpose was to 
shift American resources towards the rapid development of a Somali police force so that the US 
could decrease its Somalia military commitments.368 Meanwhile on September 27, Clinton gave 
his full throated supported to UN nation building on the floor of the General Assembly saying: 
In Somalia, the United States and the United Nations have worked together to 
achieve a stunning humanitarian rescue, saving literally hundreds of thousands of 
lives and restoring the conditions of security for almost the entire country. U.N. 
peacekeepers from over two dozen nations remain in Somalia today. And some, 
including brave Americans, have lost their lives to ensure that we complete our 
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mission and to ensure that anarchy and starvation do not return just as quickly as 
they were abolished.369 
 
On September 28, the House of Representatives, mirroring earlier action taken by the Senate, 
passed a resolution (406-26) calling on the Administration to, “justify the Somalia mission by the 
middle of next month, and then, within another month, to seek Congressional authorization for 
continuing the mission.370 On September 29, Clinton publicly retreated from 9 months of his 
Somali policy saying that the United Nations should reconsider its nation building policy and 
consider a policy “that puts the affairs of Somalia back in the hands of Somalis.” He also 
signaled that UN Peacekeepers might be better used elsewhere because, “there's so many other 
peacekeeping operations in the world that have to be considered.” That same day, Boutros-Ghali 
sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher a letter saying that he would travel to Somalia in mid-
October and solicit greater troop commitments from other east African countries.371 Between 
September 22-30, in light of escalating attacks on Americans, Powell asked Aspin 3 times to 
supply QRF with “four M-1 tanks, a mechanized company with fourteen M-2 Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicles, and an artillery battery of six 105 mm howitzers.”372 All three times, Aspin 
declined his request out of for fear of Congressional reprisal saying, “the trend is going the other 
way.”373 
On his retirement day, October 1, 1993—2 days before the battle of Mogadishu, Colin 
Powell urged Clinton to withdraw from Somalia. Powell told Clinton that the US “could not 
substitute our version of democracy for hundreds of years of tribalism” and, “We can't make a 
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country out of that place. We've got to find a way to get out, and soon,” the President conceded 
that he had not focused sufficiently on Somalia and that going along with the UN after it moved 
against Aideed had “complicated the whole nature of our involvement.”374 
On October 3rd 1993, a week after President Clinton’s UN speech, American soldiers 
from Task Force Ranger attempting to apprehend Aideed ended up in “the bloodiest battle of any 
U.N. peacekeeping operation.”375 In total, 18 American soldiers from Task Force Ranger were 
killed, 75 were wounded, and 1 more was taken hostage trying to apprehend Aideed. 376 That 
they went ahead with an apprehension mission after the President had made public statements 
suggesting a mission change and the Administration had begun planning for negotiations with 
Aideed speaks directly to the White House’s dysfunction. 
On October 7, 1993, 5 months after declaring mission accomplished, President Clinton, 
in a very different televised address, announced American withdrawal from Somalia saying: 
…We came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning house. We've 
nearly put the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain. If we leave them 
now, those embers will reignite into flames, and people will die again. If we stay 
a short while longer and do the right things, we've got a reasonable chance of 
cooling off the embers and getting other firefighters to take our place…It is my 
judgment and that of my military advisers that we may need up to 6 months to 
complete these steps and to conduct an orderly withdrawal.377 
Ultimately, American troops remained in Somalia until March 31, 1995—a full year past 
Clinton’s 6-month deadline. 
The Clinton Administration’s insufficient engagement on Somalia is perhaps mostly 
concretely evidenced in October 19, 1993 report written for Tony Lake by Nancy Soderberg, 
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Clinton’s Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Soderberg, who had 
been Clinton’s foreign policy advisor throughout the Presidential campaign, was asked to 
compile a summary of Deputies Committee (DC) and Principals meetings on ongoing foreign 
policy crises (Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, etc.) since the inauguration. Over those 9 months, 
Principals met 30 times and DC met 60 times. On Somalia specifically, the principals never met 
and DC only met 9 times. The closest thing to a Principals meeting on Somalia with the 
President did not occur until after Black Hawk Down (October 5 and 6) and those were informal 
meetings. After the June attacks on Pakistani peacekeepers, DC did not meet until July 14. In 
total, Soderberg said Clinton received 75 memos on Somalia—most of which were from 
“Congressional [members], heads of state and other correspondence, a number of them updated 
the President on Somalia policy”—not the members of the Administration.378 
From its earliest days through Black Hawk Down and beyond, remained committed to 
creating a sweeping, long-term vision of US involvement in UN peacekeeping without a solid 
sense of what it would be before they started implementing it. Throughout 1993, principals 
discussed PRD-13 and what would eventually become PDD-25. While the final version of PDD-
25 shows a measured approach saying that multilateral peacekeeping would be, “a part of our 
national security strategy, not the centerpiece,” early drafts went so far as to consider “a standing 
U.N. army and the placing of U.S. forces under United Nations’ command.”379 While it can be 
argued that coming to a prudent policy, the process by which it arrived shows a profound lack of 
engagement on the part of the Clinton Administration. 380 
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Conclusion: In assessing the interaction of the psychological (beliefs) and rational (expertise and 
learning), I find that variance in policy choices are largely governed by rational elements. In 
implementing President Bush’s beliefs, his administration drew strict humanitarian parameters 
with the intention of relinquishing Somalia-leadership to the UN once a secure environment for 
aid delivery had been established. His advisors, many of whom had served together for several 
presidential administrations, were very experienced. Having overseen American victory in the 
Cold War, they had expertise relevant to their decision-making environment and learned the 
UN’s potential as well as its limitations over the course of their careers.  Clinton and his team 
were, inexperienced and lacked ideological coherence or consistency.  Once in office, lack of 
expertise manifested in dysfunction and disorganization. As a result of this internal disorder, they 
did not show a capacity to learn as dynamics in Somalia changed. In short, they never updated 
their belief in turning Somalia into a fully functioning democratic nation state. President Clinton 
and National Security Council (NSC) principals and deputies appear to have been barely 
attentive to the Somalia policy process.  In this way, the entire venture of assessing Clinton’s 
learning is somewhat negated because he was simply unengaged and did not opt into an 
environment in which his belief in Somalia nation building could be updated. This is consistent 
with the argument that decisions are better when the president is involved in the policy process 
and listens to a variety of views. 
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Chapter 4: Yugoslavia and Bosnia (1989-1995) 
 
 
Introduction: 
While the years surrounding the end of the Cold War saw the births and deaths of several 
European states, Yugoslavia’s dissolution into six new countries stood apart for two reasons. 
First, the scale and brutality of the violence in the breakaway republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was reminiscent of the continent’s World War II atrocities and drew public attention around the 
world.381 Second, the fighting there threatened to extend into North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) countries and thus posed the first serious challenge Western order and institutions that 
had been at the heart of Euro-Atlantic Cold War aims and accomplishments.382 
In the face of these challenges, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both 
voiced strong commitments to preserving European allies’ security and a desire to avoid 
American intervention or troop commitment in the Balkans. To these ends, both presidents 
preferred to support international organizations’ (IOs) like the United Nations (UN), NATO, 
European Commission (EC), Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
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efforts in managing the conflict in the Balkans. However, despite these shared views, the two 
presidents chose different policy paths.383 
Bush made public statements condemnatory of the fighting while refusing to consider or 
forward any moderating policy actions. Even as reports of genocide emerged, Bush chose not to 
employ the consensus and coalition building expertise that he and his skilled advisors 
demonstrated during the Gulf War in 1991.384 Clinton similarly expressed disapproval. However, 
he went further than Bush and voiced intentions to act.385 But, for the first two and a half years of 
his presidency, the Clinton administration waffled and dithered in search of a policy that would 
mitigate intra-Balkan fighting without requiring American troop commitment. Then, in the 
summer of 1995, after a significant escalation in violence in Bosnia, Clinton, with allied support, 
employed NATO airstrikes that halted the fighting and then orchestrated a peace agreement—the 
Dayton Accords which created a durable and lasting peace in Bosnia.386  
Despite their shared views, what then accounts for Bush and Clinton’s policy 
differences? 
Scholars examining presidential actions during this period offer diverse perspectives. 
Historian Carole Rogel argues that Bush’s nonintervention policy was informed by domestic 
politics. She forwards that by the time genocidal acts occurred in Bosnia, Bush was focused on 
trying to win reelection and so he opted to “let the natives kill each other until they were tired of 
the slaughter.”387 Omestad does not consider domestic politics and instead forwards a 
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psychological explanation. He says that Bush’s policy choices flowed from his reactive 
disposition, which ruled out anticipatory actions like preventative diplomacy.388 Mearsheimer 
argues that President Bush acted in line with realist expectations by avoiding intervention in a 
place which held no American interests.389 
James Boys argues that both Bush and Clinton practiced assertive multilateralism, a 
foreign policy that promotes American international engagement should focus on burden sharing 
with agreeable countries parties and multilateral institutions.390 Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues 
that the turning point on American Bosnia policy came with the failure of assertive 
multilateralism.391 Sterling-Folker posits that by August 1995, assertive multilateralism’s 
consistent failure to produce conflict resolution in the Balkans united the congress, military, 
public, and media against which forced Clinton to pursue a new policy path.392 However, 
Charles-Phileppe David disagrees that assertive multilateralism was ever applied to Yugoslavia. 
Instead, he argues that Bush and Clinton both pursued a policy of “circumvention,” which meant 
knowingly deferring to allies and international organizations until the conflict required greater 
American action.393 Following David’s logic, that turning point would have come in the Summer 
of 1995.  
Relatedly, Steven Burg argues that the decision to pursue NATO bombings was born out 
a fear that if conflict in the Balkans escalated, the United States would have to deploy troops. He 
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also argues that domestic politics influenced Clinton’s decision. With the 1996 presidential 
campaign already ongoing, Clinton needed to act decisively on Bosnia in order to improve his 
prospects against his opponent, Senator Bob Dole, who had long advocated for stronger 
American action in the Balkans.394 
While these approaches offer valuable assessments of American presidential decision 
making vis-à-vis Yugoslavia and the subsequent Bosnian civil war, declassified national security 
documents from the Bush and Clinton administrations’ reveal different dynamics at work in the 
policy creation processes. These sources show that policy choices during these periods are best 
explained by and were derived from the coherence of presidential beliefs and his advisors’ 
understanding of how to implement them. The constraining nature of those beliefs dictated 
advisors’ engagement with the conflict which was dictated by their extant foreign policy 
expertise and ability to learn. 
For Bush (1989-1993), his beliefs were clear: throughout the Cold War, the United States 
never intervened in Yugoslavia’s domestic politics because it would not have served American 
interests. Accordingly, even with ongoing state failure and genocide, without clear American 
interests at stake or an exit strategy, Yugoslavia’s dissolution and subsequent civil war were 
problems better left to Europe IOs. Bush’s beliefs were so strong and clearly within his 
administration that it functionally stifled his expert advisors from considering alternative policies 
or meaningfully learning from the conflict as it escalated. 
For Clinton and his administration, the problem was much muddier because the executive 
was driven by a desire to help Muslims in the breakaway republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina but 
was unwilling to act unilaterally. Furthermore, he and his advisors were too inexperienced to 
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lead allies towards an ameliorating policy. Thus, for the first two and a half years of his 
presidency, Clinton and his advisors floundered on Bosnia, seeking half measures to improve 
conditions there. Once these efforts, Clinton was returned to the Bush (1991-1993) status quo: 
deferral to European and IOs’ prerogatives and policy preferences which changed little in the 
Balkans except to contain the conflict within the former Yugoslavia’s borders.  
Paradoxically though, ineffectual action during this time presented both Clinton and his 
inexperienced advisors with sufficient opportunity to learn and eventually lead on a policy of 
successful coercive diplomacy and negotiated peace. Because Clinton and his advisors were able 
to successfully learn from their failures, they could then move the international community to 
coalesce around a policy of NATO bombings and negotiated settlement (the Dayton Accords). In 
further irony, the Clinton administration’s years of Bosnia policy’s failings allowed a conflict 
that was marginal to American foreign policy under Bush to metastasize into a central challenge 
to America’s international leadership and, as a result, demanded decisive executive action. 
Examining presidential decision-making on the Balkans conflict through this rubric 
shows that American posture towards Yugoslavia and its successor states had roughly 4 policy 
phases:  
1) Maintaining the Cold War Status Quo (1989-1990) 
2) Inaction on State Disintegration and Avoiding American Involvement (1991-93)  
3) Chaotic Learning (1993-May 1995) 
4) Abandoning Incrementalism, Embracing Decisive Action (June-December 1995) 
 
American Policy and Yugoslavia (1945-1988): 
Throughout the Cold War, America’s Yugoslavia’s policy was grounded in realpolitik 
considerations.395 Warren Zimmermann, a career officer in US Foreign Service and George H.W. 
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Bush’s Ambassador to Yugoslavia  (1989-1992), summarized the policy as, “independence, 
unity, [and] territorial integrity,” which were “a code for saying that we wanted to see 
Yugoslavia remain free of Soviet control or influence and that preservation of her unity was the 
best way to assure this.”396 In service of these aims, the US furnished Yugoslavia with billions of 
dollars in military and economic aid, practiced “calculated ambiguity” which meant creating the 
impression that it would come to Yugoslavia’s defense in response to Soviet aggression, and did 
not become involved in Yugoslavia’s domestic politics.397 Keeping Yugoslavia extant also 
served the strategic purpose of denying the Soviets access to Yugoslavia’s Adriatic coast—
efforts supported by and for Greece and Italy, both Adriatic NATO nations. Yugoslavia was also 
given access to the Western capital markets, making the ability to accrue debt an economic boon 
denied other eastern bloc communist countries throughout the Cold War.398 
While American and Western support helped maintain Yugoslavia’s independence and 
territorial integrity, its domestic unity ran through its communist autocratic leader, President 
Joseph Broz Tito. Halberstam, recounting Yugoslavia under Tito’s 35-year reign wrote that it 
was, “an uneasy composite of smaller, tribal factions rather than one true nation; it had survived 
as a nation…largely because of its unusual geopolitical location and the unique talents of its 
leader” adding that it, “had six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two 
alphabets, and one political party.”399 Tito maintained domestic order by both suppressing ethnic 
nationalism (often violently) and also institutionalizing ethnic identity through power sharing, 
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overlapping sovereignties, and granting near political autonomy to the republics, each of which 
had a dominant ethnic group.400 However, a 1972 CIA memo noted the “large problem inherent 
in the Tito-ist emphasis on nationalism,” observing that, “there are other kinds of nationalism—
Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian, etc.—which flourish in Yugoslavia, and they are directed 
essentially against one another and against Belgrade.”401 Still, Tito moved to institutionalize 
social and political balance through Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitution which ensured that he would 
not have a dictatorial successor; instead, Yugoslavia would be governed by a collective 
presidency.402 The result, however, was that Yugoslavia would become, “constitutionally the 
weakest in Europe.”403 
After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia’s nationalisms came to the country’s political fore 
and the fragility of its governability were exposed. Throughout the decade that followed, Muslim 
Albanians, dissatisfied with poor living conditions in the Kosovo region, called for their 
republic’s independence.404 The Kosovo independence movement inflamed tensions with 
Orthodox Serbs (the most-populous group in Yugoslavia) who valued Kosovo for its religious 
history and objected to Tito’s suppression of Serb hegemony. Serbs, in turn, began to rally for 
their own independence behind Slobodan Milosevic who used Serbian language media to extol 
national separatism and revanchism.405 Many of his speeches in the late 1980’s featured themes 
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of Serbian suppression under Tito, likened their political status to genocide, and called for 
“ethnic purification” of Kosovo.406 Against this backdrop, a 1986 New York Times report on 
post-Tito Yugoslavia observed that the country had become one defined by expanding social 
cleavages and political dysfunction. It said, “Yugoslavia today is a daunting landscape of 
competing nationalisms, of resurgent religion, of economic disorder, of bureaucratic paralysis, of 
pluralists who would dismantle the one-party state and neo-Stalinists who would suppress 
them.”407 
With domestic tensions increasing, the country’s economy and its polity’s faith in 
Yugoslavian federalism declined.408 Under Tito, the debt Yugoslavia acquired from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) allowed the country to develop faster than its Eastern 
European, Soviet-aligned neighbors. In the 1980s, those debts triggered austerity and market 
privatization reforms. These reforms undermined the central government’s power in managing 
Tito’s redistributive economic policies that were crucial to maintaining order. This pushed both 
wealthy contributor republics (like Slovenia and Croatia) and poor beneficiary republics (like 
Kosovo) alike to move towards independence. As Susan Woodward wrote about Yugoslavia’s 
economic problems of the 1980s and 1990s, “without a stable civil and legal order, the social 
conditions that are created [are]…large-scale unemployment…demobilized soldiers…thriving 
conditions for black market activities and crime” adding that, “a sense of community under these 
circumstances is highly prized.”409 In the face of swelling adversity, Yugoslav Prime Minister 
Branko Mikulic cited the country’s, “$21 billion foreign debt, 15 percent unemployment and 
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annual inflation of 250 percent,” when he and his cabinet resigned their posts on New Year’s 
Eve 1988.410 
Despite growing rifts within Yugoslav society and the unity the United States had helped 
preserve for 40 years, the Reagan Administration did little to change America’s Cold War 
Yugoslavia policy. A senior administration official with expertise in Yugoslav affairs told the 
New York Times in October of 1988, “We don't like what is happening with the nationalist 
elements…” but that “American policy makers are looking to the opponents of Mr. Milosevic to 
‘speak out more and show that there are limits.’” Furthermore, the administration viewed 
Yugoslavia’s problems as “driven primarily by economic factors,” not as political or ethnic 
challenges with existential implications.411 
 
George H.W. Bush and Yugoslavia (1989-1993): 
1989-1990— Maintaining the Cold War status quo:  
George HW Bush ascended to the presidency with little reason to alter American support 
for Yugoslavia’s independence, unity, and territorial integrity. In early 1989, its strategic value 
was unchanged and it was “the most open and liberal society in the region, the socialist country 
with the region's highest per capita income, and deemed most likely to join the European 
Community.”412 In assessing how the United States should treat Yugoslavia, Bush had several 
experienced advisors with expertise in European and Yugoslavian politics and they did not 
advocate for significant policy deviation. Among Bush’s key Yugoslavia advisors were:  
1) Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger who had served eight years in the 
country including four as ambassador and was regarded as one of the foremost 
American Balkan experts; 
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2) National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, who served as an Assistant Air Attaché 
in the embassy in Belgrade;  
3) NSC Director of European Affairs Robert Hutchings, who had extensive knowledge 
of European affairs, having previously served on Reagan’s National Intelligence 
Council as Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Europe (1986-1989) and as the 
Deputy Director for Radio Free Europe in Munich from (1979-1985).  
 
Bush’s Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, also served two foreign service tours 
in Yugoslavia.413 
For the first two years of his presidency, Bush’s advisors monitored Yugoslavia as its 
unity came further and further undone. Slobodan Milosevic, now Serbia’s president, “took 
advantage of the vacuum created by a progressively weakening central state and brutally 
deployed the use of Serbian ultra-nationalism to fan the flames of conflict in the other republics 
and gain legitimacy at home.”414 He used force to incorporate the autonomous regions of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina into Serbia by stripping their political autonomy guaranteed under Tito. While 
Milosevic consolidated Serbian power, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina declared their independence from the central government in Belgrade.415 While 
some members of congress (e.g. Senator Bob Dole, Senator Alphonse D’Amato, Representative 
Tom Lantos, and Representative Joseph Dioguardi) voiced concerns with the White House and 
the public over Milosevic’s machinations as minority rights depravation and human rights issues, 
there was little policy movement.416 
For its part, the central government in Belgrade was more concerned with Yugoslavia’s 
economic woes than its potential disintegration. At a September 9, 1989 meeting with 
Yugoslavia’s President Janez Drnovsek in the Grand Foyer of the Metropolitan Museum of Art 
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in New York City, President Bush, guided by Eagleburger and Scowcroft’s “special desire to 
have strong ties with [Yugoslavia],” asked his counterpart about Yugoslavia’s domestic 
challenges. Bush said, “Are these [problems] on the financial side or the political?” to which 
Drnovsek responded: 
We try to do our best on the economic side but face real difficulties. We want a 
market-oriented economy, but the problem is that inflation is running at 30% per 
month. We are putting more emphasis on the private sector, introducing a stock 
exchange, and completely reforming the financial institutions. It is difficult to do 
everything, especially with so many social problems…Can the Brady Plan be 
applied to Yugoslavia [to reduce the amount of debt and interest owed to 
commercial banks]?417 
 
Shortly after this meeting, against the backdrop of 1989’s anti-communist revolutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Bush administration underwent a strategic policy reassessment 
of the United States’ role in Eastern Europe. In a December 16, 1989 memo from Hutchings to 
Brent Scowcroft entitled, “United States Policy toward Eastern Europe,” Hutchings wrote that, 
“more has changed in Eastern Europe in the last three months than in the preceding three 
decades.”418 He added, “If events continue moving as they have been, there will be an enormous 
vacuum of power and influence in Eastern Europe…It invites a return to the cyclical pattern of 
Russo-German conflict and condominium that bedeviled Europe from 1870 to 1945.”419 In the 
pass-through of Hutching’s memo from Scowcroft to Bush, Scowcroft advocated that American 
Eastern European policy going forward should flow through international institutions and that 
the president’s personal diplomacy would be key. He wrote: 
Agenda for 1990: Within the Alliance, your personal relationship with Kohl, 
Thatcher, Mitterrand, and others will be as important in 1990 as they were in 1989. 
There are several institutions competing to coordinate Western approaches toward 
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Eastern Europe, and your personal ties will be essential in promoting NATO’s 
political role, building on the progress we have made with the EC and ensuring that 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and G-24 evolve in 
ways that strengthen US leadership.420 
 
While Yugoslavia was not mentioned, much less singled out as a potential concern, these 
memos indicated the outlines for an inchoate post-communist Eastern Europe policy: limit direct 
American involvement and work through international organizations (IO). As Daalder noted, in 
choosing to act through and behind IOs, the Bush administration “effectively deferred the design 
of Western policy to the Europeans” who were not easily moved.421 For example, in the summer 
of 1990, the Bush administration attempted to organize a coordinated response with Western 
European allies if intra-Yugoslavian tensions turned violent, but allies “maintained a wait-and-
see attitude.”422 Contributing to Western European hesitance was a lack of concern. As Thomas 
Shreeve observed, “few Western European observers appeared to share the growing sense of 
urgency in Washington regarding the future of Yugoslavia and its implications for Europe, it was 
difficult, according to a number of present and former U.S. policymakers, to figure out what to 
do.”423 
 As Shreeve indicated, American policymakers were more concerned than their European 
allies but, according to Ambassador Zimmermann, this concern was still insufficient to warrant 
actions in anticipation of a post-Yugoslav Balkans. Throughout 1990, Ambassador Zimmermann 
cabled Washington to inform policymakers of the growing nationalism and threats of interethnic 
violence. In April 1990, for example, Zimmermann warned that Yugoslavia would be 
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existentially imperiled if Slovenia and Croatia moved towards or declared independence. By 
September, his warnings grew starker, writing: 
Kosovo may well prove to be the rock on which Yugoslavia founders. It is difficult 
to imagine a way in which Yugoslavia could be reconfigured to allow Serbs, 
Albanians, and Slovenes/Croats to want to live together voluntarily in the same 
country. Serbs are determined to pay any price to keep Kosovo within Serbia, in 
spite of the fact the province’s population is less than 10 percent Serbian. Albanians 
seem equally determined not to remain voluntarily in any form of union with 
Serbia. Slovenes and Croats, for their part, have no interest in a Yugoslavia that 
employs the kinds of repressive measures that Serbia is using to work its will on 
the Kosovo Albanians.424 
 
Zimmermann, however, did not recommend policy deviations in his cables. As the Ambassador 
later recalled, “It was my duty to carry out U.S. policy which was to favor continued unity, 
mainly, through trying to help [Yugoslav President] Marcovic…I foresaw violence if Yugoslavia 
fell apart, so I tried to focus on getting people not to give up on Yugoslavia, even though I know 
that the chances of peaceful transition were dwindling.”425 
Advisors’ desire to maintain the status quo altered only by deference to the Europeans 
gave Bush and his advisors little reason to push for his own change Yugoslavia-policy. In a 
September 9, 1990 memo to Scowcroft, the NSC Director of European Affairs Hutchings 
reiterated a cautious approach, advocating for continued engagement with nationalist leaders in 
Yugoslavia without making any outreach official. He wrote: 
While it is important to develop high-level contacts with the democratically elected 
leaderships in Croatia and Slovenia, a[n American] Presidential meeting with 
Tudjman, an ardent Croatian nationalist, would be seen in Belgrade as a sign of 
diminished U.S. support for Yugoslav unity and could hasten the country’s 
disintegration.426 
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An October 1, 1990 meeting with Bush and Yugoslav President Borisav Jovic at the Waldorf 
Astoria Hotel in New York City further demonstrated commitment to non-involvement: 
Bush: “Our position is for free elections and democracy in the republics and 
autonomous regions as well as at the federal level…But there is increasing concern 
about the violations of individual human rights. We are not talking about one group 
over another; that is not the business of the U.S…Is there more you would like us 
to do in supporting a united Yugoslavia? Have we been too quiet? 
 
Jovic: The U.S. spoke clearly about a unified Yugoslavia but didn’t distinguish 
democratic processes and disintegrative processes. For example, in Kosovo, there 
is a distinction between human right and secession. We say yes to human rights, no 
to secession. In Slovenia, we say yes to democracy but not to secession. 
 
Bush: I don’t want you to think we are riding two different horses.  
 
Jovic: One more thing: we do not believe in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, because 
national groups are intermingled and it would be virtually impossible to delineate 
borders. It could lead to civil war in the Balkans, which no one wants. This is not 
in the interest of the Balkans, Europe, or the world.427 
 
On October 12, 1990, NSC Deputies meeting presented a hands-off dual-track approach to 
maintaining Yugoslav unity: Track 1) urge republic-level democratization—especially in Serbia 
and Track 2) encourage all “groups within Yugoslavia to arrange their affairs within the context 
of a single state.”428 The specifics of these arrangements would remain “for the peoples of 
Yugoslavia to determine.” Deputies argued that Western aid should be tied to republics 
remaining in Yugoslavia and that force should only be used to preserve public safety. Any 
intervention or discussion of intervention into Yugoslavia would flow through the CSCE and 
only after consultation with NATO, the Soviets, and other key regional players.429  
 Meanwhile, on October 18, 1990, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Yugoslavia Transformed (NIE 15-90), a stark assessment 
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that indicated that there was little the US or its allies could do to stop Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution.430 The report had four key findings: 
1. Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year, and will 
probably dissolve within two.  
2. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup—Serbia will block Slovene and 
Croat attempts to form an all-Yugoslav confederation.  
3. There will be a protracted armed uprising by Albanians in Kosovo. A full-scale, 
interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercommunal conflict will accompany 
the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. 
4. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav 
unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to advocacy of democracy 
and self-determination.431 
 
While NIE 15-90 can be viewed retroactively as prescient, it had flaws that inhibited its uptake 
by policymakers. US officials, like Zimmermann and David Gompert (a senior member of 
Bush’s National Security Staff), were already aware of Yugoslavia’s problems the NIE cited and, 
given the constraints of Bush’s non-intervention beliefs, they most they could do was hope that 
pulling levers of economic aid would slow the country’s internal conflict. Second, senior 
policymakers hoped that slowing the disintegration would allow for an outcome beyond state 
failure—like a looser confederation of Yugoslav republics or extant Yugoslav leadership to 
regain control over the country as Tito had demonstrated was possible.432 As Gompert recalled, 
“The NIE didn’t electrify the policy world. It didn’t affect the judgment of senior policymakers 
who were already concerned or of those at the cabinet level whose attitude was ‘we don’t want 
any of this right now.’”433 
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Treverton and Miles level several criticisms against the Bush administration for not 
acting on NIE-15-90. They argue that its experienced “Yugoslav hands” were “loath to hear that 
the country was falling apart” and that they discounted, “the new information presented in the 
NIE and the drastic policy changes it suggested were easier than modifying long-held 
convictions and beliefs about Yugoslavia and its stability.” 434 This assessment speaks to 
policymakers’ flawed learning process: they sought and gained relevant information (as 
experienced policy makers would) but were never going to consider intervention. 
Some administration officials pushed back against such criticisms saying intelligence 
assessments were neither compelling nor communicated properly. Hutchings, for example, 
argued that NIE-90 was not convincing. He said: 
“should have been an additional analytical thrust…to get people to accept the that 
the US couldn’t keep Humpty Dumpty together any longer. This was a hard-enough 
sell, but might have been easier if followed by a second step…First, say Yugoslavia 
is going to fall apart. Second, present some scenarios for managing dissolution.”435  
 
Similarly, Gompert argued that there was simply no action the United States could have taken. 
He said, “the Administration was stuck with an irresolvable dilemma: we couldn’t favor a 
breakup, and we couldn’t favor forced unity. We know that the status quo was unacceptable to 
the Slovenes and the Croats, and we told them, ‘If you declare independence unilaterally, you 
will start a war.’ Their response was, ‘So what?’”436 Again, such a defense is only viable in light 
of the executive’s beliefs in non-intervention. 
Treverton and Miles also argue that the administration may have been blinded to 
Yugoslavia’s problems by their preoccupation with Cold War aims. Their position being that 
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with the status of Eastern Europe in flux, advisors relied on Cold War expertise and could not 
recommend policy deviation from the status quo because any such deviation would not advance 
the American Cold War interests.437 However, such arguments forward a dynamic in which 
policymakers had neither responsibility nor agency for doing anything to mitigate the violence in 
Balkans and potential state failure. Senior officials could have suggested (at least to Scowcroft) 
that he study military intervention options. Furthermore, such a position does not explain why 
passively allowing Yugoslavia’s disintegration would possibly help American Cold War aims. 
 
Analysis 1989-1990: 
Through its first two years, the Bush administration’s policy on Yugoslavia purportedly 
contained an interest in maintaining the country’s unity. Yet, as that unity crumbled, policy was 
instead dictated by Bush’s beliefs in nonintervention. Bush’s advisors had substantial expertise 
but had little agency in expanding the field of policies considered as they were limited by the 
executive’s beliefs. This dynamic, in a sense, forced all policymakers into becoming passive 
observers of the learning process instead of active participants who might test new information 
against extant policies. For example, in the case of the NIE, whatever its ostensible 
shortcomings, advisors could not change either policy discussions or actions to more actively 
maintain Yugoslav unity and/or mitigate the burgeoning civil war in the Balkans. Instead, the 
administration publicly claimed commitment to Yugoslav unity while internally deliberations 
only showed discussion of half-measures that very likely exacerbated the state’s dissolution. 
Commitment to nonintervention also explains why the president and his advisors maintained 
antiquated, inapplicable Tito-era policies. Even with the status of Eastern Europe in flux, 
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advisors could not allow for the possibility that any diplomacy (coercive or otherwise) might 
abate tensions in the Balkans. Similarly, opting to work through the IOs (which functioned on 
consensus from numerous European states) essentially promised Western and American inaction 
on Yugoslavia. 
Ultimately, the Bush administration’s treatment of Yugoslavia during its first two years 
was one of informed inaction. That the administration never truly examined the possibility that 
their one Yugoslavia policy innovation (deferral to European-leadership) might increase the 
likelihood of intra-Balkan violence demonstrates a lack of learning which likely negated their 
substantial expertise. Furthermore, the administration chose a path that was insufficient to tamper 
growing intra-ethnic tensions. It is possible that nonintervention was the wisest policy choice 
because 1) the administration did not necessarily have any real policy alternatives; 2) there was 
inadequate political will amongst the republics’ leaders to maintain the federation; and 3) there 
was a very real desire among the republics for independence and war. However, that the 
administration treated such realities as immutable (if not fatalistically determined) whilst also 
ostensibly hoping for some unexpected and unlikely conflict mitigation shows that the 
executive’s beliefs dictated policy considerations at senior levels of policy considerations.  
 
1991-1993—Inaction on State Disintegration and Avoiding American Involvement: 
 At the outset of Bush’s third year in office, the CIA and popular press regularly reported 
on Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Throughout the late Winter and Spring of 1991 Slovenia and 
Croatia moved to separate themselves from the central government’s authority.438 By mid-
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March, President Borisov resigned his post after the collective presidency refused to impose 
martial law—an action he and the military argued were necessary to maintain the federation—
and Serbia and Croatia mobilized their police and military reservists for potential civil war.439 
Croatia even acquired 10,000 Hungarian-made Kalashnikovs rifles.440 By April, the most 
optimistic assessment the CIA could offer was to hope that the military would remain loyal to 
Prime Minister Ante Markovic.441 The following month, the agency predicted that if Slovenia 
and Croatia were to declare independence, Serbs in every Yugoslav republic would react 
violently.442 This came to pass and by early June Markovic lost control of the army, leaving the 
federation in tatters.443 
During this same time, the Bush administration’s inaction on Yugoslavia attracted 
increased attention from the public and congress. Early in 1991, Bush had to defend his 
administration’s uneven approach to Yugoslavia in the press saying, “I have not lost interest; we 
have not lost interest in what's going on in Eastern Europe.”444 In May, Congress, under the 
Nickels-Bentley amendment, briefly cut off American aid to Yugoslavia over Serbs’ oppression 
of ethnic Albanians, which only served to inflame tensions there. The administration was 
unprepared for this congressional action and had to reinstate aid the following month even 
though Bush’s advisors were no longer hopeful of Yugoslavia’s prospects for survival nor was it 
optimistic the short supply of political will to steer republics away from violence. A senior 
                                                      
439 Engle, Jane. 1991. "In Review: The Week Gone By," Los Angeles Times (1923-1995), Mar 19, 1991. 
440 Peter, Maass. 1991. "Arms Sale to Croatia Causes Stir in Hungary; Opposition Accuses Budapest Government of 
Helping to Promote Breakup of Yugoslavia." The Washington Post, Mar 02, 1991.  
441 Central Intelligence Agency, “YUGOSLAVIA: IMPASSE OVER PRESIDENT CONTINUING,” (FOIA) 
/ESDN (CREST): 0000372449 Publication Date: April 5, 1991 
442 Central Intelligence Agency, “YUGOSLAVIA: PROSPECTS FOR VIOLENCE (DELETED),” (FOIA) /ESDN 
(CREST): 0000372452 Publication Date: May 2, 1991 
443 Central Intelligence Agency, “YUGOSLAVIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE CONFLICT” (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
0000372454, Publication Date: June 2, 1991 
444 David Binder, Special to The New York Times. "U.S. Management Program for East Europe." New York 
Times, Feb 28, 1991, Late Edition (East Coast). https://search.proquest.com/docview/427967761?accountid=14512. 
 129 
administration official summed up their approach to The Christian Science Monitor saying, “We 
have been urging the Yugoslavs to deal with their problems peacefully, and to be mindful of the 
benefits of integration. But it's a situation so mired in virulent nationalism it's hard for anyone 
else to influence.”445 
Still, the administration made a last-ditch effort to try and maintain the federation while 
continuing to remain skeptical internally about the country’s prospects. On June 22nd, Secretary 
of State James Baker went to Yugoslavia to try and broker a peace. He told the New York Times, 
“Everyone is interested in finding a way through dialogue to craft a new basis for unity of 
Yugoslavia and to find a way to see the devolution of additional authority and responsibility and 
sovereignty to the republics of Yugoslavia.”446 In a June 25 memo from Scowcroft to Bush, the 
NSA wrote, “Formulas exist for a new Yugoslavia…the situation is precarious but not yet 
hopeless. Our aim is continue working with our European partners to head off major violence or 
precipitous actions that would preclude dialogue.”447 However, a report that month from the 
Director of National Intelligence entitled “Slobodan Milosevic: Out for Himself and Serbia—
And No One Else” warned (again) that Yugoslavia was existentially imperiled and that 
Milosevic would seek to “maximize his power and to create a greater Serbia at all costs…will 
use any means at his disposal, including manipulation, repression, and intimidation, to maintain 
control” and that “Milosevic perceives no reason to moderate his policy of tearing the federation 
apart.”448 Perhaps, Bush felt compelled to try some diplomatic measure because Prime Minister 
Markovic told Bush that Yugoslavia was still salvageable. Markovic said, “The situation is 
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difficult, but it is under control. The Parliament is still working, and the Government is 
functioning. We have control over all movements in the country. The Minister of Defense has 
complete control.”449  
 The administration’s hopes for a unified Western response and a slow-moving conflict in 
Yugoslavia were further dashed after Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence declarations on 
June 25, 1991.450 Shortly thereafter, German and Austrian leaders said they were considering 
recognizing the two new countries and that they expected the remaining Yugoslav republics to 
similarly declare independence.451 At a meeting the following day, the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), of which the United States was a member, agreed to send a 
diplomatic mission to Belgrade in hopes of abating tensions there and the European Commission 
(EC) followed with threats to cease all aid to Yugoslavia.452 On July 6th, Eagleburger told CNN 
that “I think there is a real danger of a civil war with a lot of people—innocent people—being 
killed, and we must do everything we can to prevent that,” adding that the use of force by the 
Yugoslav national army (JNA) in Slovenia last week, “is reprehensible and must be 
condemned.”453 By mid-July, the administration began planning American and NATO responses 
to escalating violence.454 By August, incipient European efforts at peacemaking and 
peacekeeping faltered as Serbian violence spread throughout the country and the Bush 
administration again sought new policy options that would continue to keep the United States out 
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of direct intervention in Yugoslavia. For example, Gompert, in an August 5 memo to Scowcroft, 
gave the National Security Advisor 2 policy options: 1) internationalize Yugoslavia through the 
introduction of a large peacekeeping force either through the CSCE or the British, French, and 
Dutch; or 2) to let the conflict play out and leave its fallout to the Europeans. However, Gompert 
warned that the latter would certainly damage American standing the administration’s plans for 
post-Cold War Europe.455 
Throughout 1991’s remainder, conditions worsened in Yugoslavia and international 
organizations’ incremental actions were insufficient to stem the growing tide of violence in the 
Balkans and may have allowed further escalation. Western governments and IOs tolerated the 
bombing of Dubrovnik and Vukovar which emboldened Milosevic to pursue a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing in furtherance of a Serbian state. At the same time, Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegovic's repeated pleas for preventative troop deployments to deter Milosevic and the 
JNA’s aggression went unheeded by those same western governments and IOs.456 Meanwhile, in 
early September, the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence, an international 
monitoring force was dispatched to its border with Serbia to report on the fighting and JNA 
aggression.457 On September 25, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713, enacting an arms embargo on Yugoslavia 
and declaring support for EC peacekeeping efforts.458 On November 27th, the UNSC approved 
UNSCR 721, which reaffirmed UNSCR 713 but also pointed out that any UN peacekeeping 
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operation required the unanimous consent of all parties—something that the Serbs and Milosevic 
would not approve.459 On December 15, UNSCR 724 passed unanimously; it reinforced 713 and 
721 and called for humanitarian aid delivery into Yugoslavia. During this time, UN special 
envoy Cyrus Vance and EU envoy Lord Carrington’s respective efforts to secure ceasefire 
agreements and consent for peacekeeping were regularly undermined by Serbs’ reactions 
European states’ (discussion of) recognizing breakaway republics.460 
Even as IOs mobilized and put public pressure on Yugoslavs to stop fighting, the 
administration spent the last months of 1991 focused on reassessing its Yugoslavia policy 
position, but still undertook no significant change. A September 27th memo from Hutchings to 
Scowcroft finally conceded that the administration had misread Yugoslavian tensions. He wrote, 
“In retrospect, we underestimated the strength and persistence of national independence 
movements in Yugoslavia…we should avoid clinging rigidly to a status quo that may no longer 
be viable and pay more attention to conditions under which new arrangements can be made 
stable.”461 In late-October, Hutchings and Gompert proposed that the US respond to criticism of 
its inactivity in Yugoslavia by increasing American pressure for a more aggressive EC action.462 
In early November, the EC imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia which were matched by 
the administration. However, Bush’s public comments showed that the administration was still 
unwilling to change its stance on Yugoslavia. He said, “I don't think anybody can predict with 
any accuracy that sanctions alone will solve the problems…we're not talking about force, we're 
talking about economic sanctions…We see in Yugoslavia how the proud name of nationalism 
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can splinter a country into bloody civil war.”463 During a November 7th conversation at a NATO 
summit, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his senior foreign policy advisors agreed with 
Bush and his counterparts that western forces should continue cautiously on recognition of 
breakaway Yugoslav republics but not do so until after holding a pan-Yugoslav peace summit.464  
The Cold War’s end on December 26, 1991, had little effect on Yugoslavia’s trajectory or 
the United States’ approach to it. On January 1, 1992, Cyrus Vance gained agreement between 
the Serbs and Yugoslavs for a ceasefire, the deployment of UN peacekeepers, and withdrawal of 
Serb forces from Croatia.465 Vance’s ceasefire, however, did not hold as soldiers were killed in 
Croatia within two weeks. Tensions worsened still as Serbs declared their own republic and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina considered doing the same as did ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, who 
sought to form their own state with Kosovo.466 By mid-January 1992, NSC deputies began to 
“brainstorm” the extent to which the US should engage in UN peacekeeping (vis-à-vis logistical 
support, intelligence sharing, communications, and cost sharing), recognize breakaway republics, 
and alter extant sanctions policies. 467 Despite the violence and mounting European recognition 
of breakaway republics, on January 16, Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Howe 
recommended to NSC Deputies that the United States back Vance, Carrington, and the CSCE’s 
initiatives with a human rights focus on supporting safeguards for minorities’ rights—without a 
definitive direction on how to do so effectively.468 On February 1, 1992 with American support, 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a protective force (1,200 troops which 
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eventually arrived in Yugoslavia on April 4th).469 A memo on the same day from NSC member 
Jane Holl through Gompert to Scowcroft argued that supporting UN peacekeeping actions would 
provide the United States with the best path towards recognizing breakaway republics’ 
independence.470 The administration’s approach was buoyed by their accounting of 
congressional mail regarding over the previous several months—most of which was neutral and 
the most-prominent examples (e.g. a December 1991 bipartisan congressional letter) supported 
American action through international organizations.471 However, as deaths mounted in 
Yugoslavia, the most UNSC could do it did through the issuance of Resolutions (UNSCRs 727, 
740, 743, and 749) calling for less violence, Lord Carrington's and Vance’s efforts to calm intra-
Yugoslav tensions moved along without much sense that there was political will to stop 
fighting.472 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the administration’s muddling continued throughout the 
Spring of 1992. In April, with 1,200 UN peacekeepers deployed, the EC recognized Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Scowcroft advised Bush to recognize Bosnia as well as Croatia and Slovenia but 
that the President postpone recognizing Macedonia (even though the two nations operated as if 
were independent) until they were able to resolve their issues with the Greeks—who feared 
fighting there might spill over into Greece—and to lift sanctions on all breakaway republics after 
recognition.473 On April 7, the United States and EU recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
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independence.474 Soon afterwards, Milosevic sent the JNA to seize Muslim areas in Croatia and 
Bosnia which, according to a cable from the American mission at the UN in New York, “make 
the Vance effort to arrange a ceasefire and stem the slide into dissolution futile and irrelevant 
without greater EC-US-CSCE support.”475 On April 27, the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia formally ended with Serbia’s merger with Montenegro and was replaced by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.476 By April’s end, widespread fighting had functionally 
invalidated all existing ceasefires and violence was growing into a full civil war.477 In May, the 
UN recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia and passed UNSCR 757 which 
imposed sanctions against the new state of Serbia and Montenegro.478 
 Throughout the summer and fall of 1992, the former Yugoslav republics slid further and 
further into civil war and the administration still maintained its position of working through IOs. 
By early June, the Directorate of National Intelligence reported that more than 1.7 million 
Yugoslavs had been displaced by fighting—only 300,000 of whom were able to leave the 
country.479 Another cease fire was erased in late June when UNPROFOR retreated after taking 
Serb fire while protecting the Sarajevo airport. Meanwhile, Croats continued to take territory 
claimed by the Serbs to the dismay and anger of Democratic Party president Radovan Karadzic. 
Croatia’s leader, Franjo Tudjman and his Bosnian counterpart, Alia Izetbegovic, signed a 
military agreement accord which further strengthened Croatia’s position.480 According to a 
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Directorate of National Intelligence report sent the White House, Bosnia’s prospects were still 
not improving. The stark assessment entitled, “Bosnia-Hercegovina: Outlook for Survival Poor” 
said, “Barring a significant, long-term commitment for peacekeeping forces, however, the region 
almost certainly will remain unstable for years to come” and concluded that “Washington, 
therefore, would be certain to face pressure to contribute both money and manpower to any 
force.”481  
Deliberations with allies similarly produced little hope of a policy advancement. During a 
July 5 conversation with France’s President Francois Mitterrand, Bush and his counterpart 
argued over the role of NATO and CSCE in Yugoslavia for the better part of two hours without 
coming to any definitive conclusions, much less options to consider going forward.482 A July 
CSCE summit in Helsinki also produced no measure to stop the mounting casualties which had 
already reached 22,000; instead, delegates compared the composition, purposes, and 
effectiveness of CSCE and NATO troops.483 For the UN’s part, it moved forward with more 
resolutions granting automatic UN membership to former Yugoslav states and affirming their 
support for peacekeeping in Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR.484 Even as there were increasingly 
dire reports of ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims, the administration’s position was summed 
in a Strategic Studies Institute report entitled, “Containing Serbia: An Indirect Approach.” It 
said: 
An independent Bosnia-Herzegovina has nothing to do with U.S. national 
interests…Fighting for Bosnian independence would mean a wrong-headed and 
nasty war that would merely bring greater instability to the region and more civilian 
casualties. An indirect approach of constraining the Serbs by putting political and 
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military pressure on Serbia's borders, on the other hand, would set an example of 
multilateral European and American commitment to security and stability.485 
 
 By the Winter of 1992-93, Bush, now a lame duck president, finally began to move more 
on Yugoslavia even though the conflict there was increasingly intractable and the indirect 
approach was not working. A December 16, 1992 report from the Directorate of Intelligence 
predicted that Serbia’s, “domestic instability is likely to grow over time as economic sanctions 
and continued war weariness again begin to erode support for the Milosevic regime.”486 In spite 
of that warning sanctions’ potentially disruptive consequences, Bush and British Prime Minister 
John Major threatened Milosevic and Serbia with even more sanctions and called for the UN to 
further enforce its no-fly zone over Bosnia.487 Bush also included the US troops amongst a UN 
preventative force for Macedonia and suggested that US might use military force if Serbia 
pursued new attacks on Kosovo.488 However, still determined to keep the US out of direct 
military involvement and unwilling to lead any IO on more forceful diplomacy or intervention, 
Bush and his administration backed a plan forwarded by Vance and Lord Owen which would 
divide Bosnia into ten provinces in order to separate Serbs from Muslim Bosnians. As Bush 
prepared to leave office, Vance and Owen (V-O) were able to get Milosevic to agree (in 
principle) to their plan.489 
 
Analysis 1989-1993: 
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If the policy options an administration will consider vis-à-vis a potential intervention, are 
initially limited by a president’s beliefs, Bush’s nonintervention beliefs in Yugoslavia limited his 
administration to 2 options: 1) “let them fight it out” and 2) rhetorical support for IO action. With 
the former politically inviable, the latter became the policy he and his administration pursued. 
What he had (perhaps) not anticipated was that in practice his beliefs would functionally negate 
his administration’s abundant expertise by precluding their engagement with and ability to learn 
from the conflict as it unfolded. 
Despite taking a more active posture during his final months in office, Bush’s beliefs in 
nonintervention dominated policy considerations throughout his presidency. In practice, that 
beliefs constrained the administration to rhetorical concerns and tepid action. Additionally, 
commitment to nonintervention may have had an unanticipated limiting effect on his advisors 
vis-à-vis the learning process and engagement with the possibilities of what the Yugoslav 
conflict might become. As Dr. John Gannon, President Clinton CIA’s Director of European 
Analysis (1992-1995) wrote, “The Bush Administration was determined to not intervene in the 
Balkans… [and so they] didn't really look at alternatives in any serious way.” 490 Acting in this 
way, they operated on the underlying (and perhaps unconsidered) assumption that the conflict 
there would remain within the failed state’s former borders. As Gannon further observed, “There 
were issues of spillover that [the intelligence community] didn't look at. If we had left 
Yugoslavia alone, it would have had impact on the [rest of the region] …at a time while we were 
dealing with the whole restructuring of the security architecture of Europe.”491 As another 
example, take Eagleburger’s views of Milosevic. Eagleburger had known Milosevic for years 
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and were he not constrained by Bush’s policy beliefs, he might have made some action to curb 
the Serb’s burgeoning nationalist inclinations and willingness to commit acts of genocide.492 
Similarly, Zimmermann later questioned Bush’s approach writing that, “the best time for the 
United States to have made its mark on the Bosnian war was during the Bush administration. By 
the time Clinton took office, the Serbs had consolidated their hold on some 70% of the country 
and had put Sarajevo under siege.”493 
The policy limiting-effect of Bush’s beliefs are further evidenced by the ineffectiveness 
of IOs to quell ethnic tensions and violence in Yugoslavia. As R. Craig Nation wrote, “the 
Yugoslav disaster provided a convenient opportunity to test long dormant mechanisms for 
international conflict management.”494 Those mechanisms were the international organizations 
that the United States helped create during the Cold War. When it was clear early on in the 
Yugoslav conflict that there was greater political will to fight than seek peaceful resolution, those 
IOs were unable to meaningfully mitigate the tensions or violence and clearly required American 
support and leadership to function as they were intended. By the time Yugoslavia had dissolved 
into several conflicts and the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions showed that they were 
“woefully unprepared” for this post-Cold War problem, the Bush administration could have, at a 
minimum, pushed European leaders to take more aggressive action.495 Failing to more fully 
support and engage with the CSCE, EC, NATO, and even the UN, could not possibly have 
enhanced these organizations’ legitimacy going into the post-Cold War world.496 As Daalder 
wrote of the Bush approach and subsequent IO shortcomings, “In the end, it was a failure of the 
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United States, first in deferring to the Europeans while failing to back them up, and then in trying 
to intervene with half-measures designed more to limit risks than have any impact on the 
ground.”497 Thus, Bush’s beliefs in non-intervention was born out. But adherence to his beliefs 
served no other policy or political benefit and functionally forestalled his experienced advisors 
from learning from the conflict and, perhaps, crafting policies that might strengthen European 
and Euro-Atlantic IOs and abate civil war and genocide. 
 
1993-1994—Chaotic Learning: 
In December 1992, during the presidential transition, Leslie Gelb penned an op-ed in the 
New York Times in which he lauded the President-elect for “trying to replace the old hawk-dove 
divide by exploring new standards for U.S. military intervention” and “[searching] for a new 
American internationalism for a messy new world where threats are largely economic and 
foreign and domestic matters have become inseparable.”498 Later on in the piece, Gelb addressed 
the state of American policy towards Bosnia, writing, “President Bush will not order U.S. forces 
to the rescue. Forget it. Second, President-elect Clinton won't either—at least not for months. He 
shows little disposition to walk economics and chew foreign policy gum at the same time. He has 
barely begun to select his national security team.”499 Gelb’s disparate assessment—in which 
Clinton was somehow both shaping a new post-Cold War American grand strategy while 
operating without the requisite inclinations and capabilities to send troops into a dire but 
discretionary humanitarian crisis—spoke to both the unknown and predictable aspects of an 
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initial Clinton foreign policy. Clinton was long on inspiration and short on international 
experience. 
Because the Governor had scant foreign policy experience, advisors and their deliberative 
process would be more important to policy outcomes than in the previous administration. 
However, when advisors were selected, the most influential ones lacked expertise as they had not 
served in the foreign policy bureaucracy since the Carter administration (e.g. Samuel (Sandy) R. 
Berger, the deputy national security adviser-designate; Warren M. Christopher, the Secretary of 
State-designate; W. Anthony (Tony) Lake, the national security adviser-designate; the Secretary 
of Defense-designate; Congressman Les Aspin; and Madeleine Albright, the nominee for chief 
delegate to the United Nations) if at all (Vice President-elect Al Gore’s chief foreign policy aide 
Leon Fuerth).500 Those who had prior foreign policy experience had never served in senior 
positions and were not fully prepared to guide a neophyte president on judging and shaping the 
shifting realities of the post-Cold War world.501  
This group of under-experienced advisors was also immediately thrust into managing 
several optional Bush-era foreign policy crises—ethnic cleansing in the Balkans chief amongst 
them.502 His three primary national security advisors (Christopher, Lake, and Aspin) each had 
differing views on how to handle Bosnia: Christopher wanted nothing to do with it, Lake wanted 
to take strong action, and Christopher’s stance evolved along with the conflict.503 Disparate 
views led to conflicting advice that created a chaotic decision making process that was described 
by one senior official as “group therapy ” and “contributed to a division in the mind of a 
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President who had few strong instincts on foreign policy questions.”504 Thus, that the incoming 
administration lacked both the drivers of extant executive foreign policy beliefs and intervention-
relevant expertise essentially ensured that Clinton and his foreign policy team would have to 
develop those missing elements by learning from the policymaking environment as it evolved. 
The incipiency of Clinton’s Bosnia-beliefs was well-known from the outset of his 
presidency. During the campaign, he spoke out against the ongoing acts of violence but did not 
put forward any policy innovations that would significantly change extant IO or American 
actions. When he discussed the ongoing V-O talks, he did so in a confused and confusing way.505 
A week before taking office, Clinton told the New York Times, “I am somewhat hopeful about 
the [Vance-Owen] peace conference even though I know some of it could just be maneuvering. 
Even if it is just maneuvering, there is something going on there, and there is a chance, just a 
chance that it will take on a life of its own and bring some resolution.”506 He added that if talks 
collapse, “there are some other things we can do if this process breaks down. There may be some 
things we can do militarily, short of the introduction of a large ground force, that would change 
the dynamics. I don't want to rule any of those things out.”507 On the Serbs’ culpability, he said, 
“[The Serbs] are and should be getting concerned about being held responsible for a massive loss 
of life. The world community is outraged about the press reports of the rapes and cutting and 
torture.”508 On whether or not there should be formal institutional adjudication of Serbian war 
crimes, he said, “I think what has gone on there certainly constitutes a war crime under 
international law. I don't think it is something we can let go. I think it is something that ought to 
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be looked into. I think there needs to be an investigation of violations of international law.”509 He 
added, “Somehow the West really has got to say something and do something about the idea of 
ethnic cleansing.”510 In sum, it was clear at the outset of his presidency, that Clinton believed in 
doing something about Bosnia but did not know what that would be. He did not believe in a large 
American military intervention. He also did not fully support Vance-Owen but could not clearly 
express why or propose a better alternative. 
However, once in office, the Clinton administration operated as if V-O was still very 
much a viable policy option. On February 1, the EU had placed its full support behind the 
Vance-Owen initiative.511 The administration’s first foreign policy act was a comprehensive 
Bosnia policy review (Presidential Review Directive-1:  U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in 
the Former Yugoslavia) and it showed that no new policy path was imminent—neither was there 
a favored one that necessarily had to function apart from Vance-Owen.512 Similarly, a 
declassified February 1 CIA report showed a lack of policy direction as intelligence analysts 
prepared for every possible policy option and did not preclude support for Vance-Owen.513 And, 
a declassified summary of the February 3, 1993 Principals Committee (PC) meeting (that 
included Lake, Christopher, Aspin, Albright, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell) 
showed that the Principals still considered V-O but had eliminated unilateral action or 
abandonment of Bosnia.514 Importantly, Powell dismissed the viability of airstrikes and Albright 
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told the group that European allies would pull out their peacekeeping troops if the 1991 arms 
embargo was abandoned.  
Yet, the next day, the administration announced that they would not push Izetbegovic and 
the Bosnians to accept Vance-Owen. George Stephanopoulos, Clinton’s spokesperson, told the 
New York Times that, “The President continues to work for a diplomatic solution and he does not 
specifically embrace or reject the Vance plan” and that a new “Clinton plan” would be 
announced “relatively soon.”515 In creating further confusion, the administration also said they 
would not object if Bosnian Muslims accepted Vance-Owen and that Clinton was open to 
working with Vance and Owen on a new plan. However, Izetbegovic resisted Vance-Owen 
because, in part, it lacked American support and he believed Clinton might offer him a better 
deal.516 Curiously, in 2013, Clinton said that he abandoned Vance-Owen in February 1993 
because the initiatives had myriad flaws, singling out his view that the plan empowered Serbs 
and punished Bosnians, and that other western leaders, like Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of 
Canada, shared the same view.517  
Yet, at a February 5th PC meeting, Clinton made his first change to the US Bosnia policy; 
the President decided to increase American involvement in the V-O peace process. He told his 
advisors, “If the United States doesn’t act in situations like this nothing will happen. A failure to 
do so would be to give up American leadership.”518 As a result, the administration decided that 
the United States would: 
1. Become directly involved in humanitarian aid delivery (this led to U.S. airdrops 
of food into Muslim-held areas of Bosnia); 
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2. Ask the UN for authorization of enforcement of the no-fly zone; 
3. Seek a tightening of the economic sanctions;  
4. Appoint an envoy (Reginald Bartholomew) to the talks being conducted by 
Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen; 
5. Reiterate the Bush administration’s warning to Serbia not to cause trouble in 
Kosovo; 
6. Help enforce an agreement among the parties to stop fighting—provided all 
parties willingly signed the agreement.519 
 
Christopher, acting without coordinating with the other Principals, sowed confusion with his 
incorrect public statement that the United States was “prepared to use our military power.”520 
Throughout the Winter of 1993, confusion and lack of consensus or executive direction 
(all derived from Clinton’s lack of beliefs) dominated uneven administration actions. After much 
internal deliberation about their viability, Clinton announced Bosnia aid airdrops on February 
26.521 However, on March 2, Secretary Aspin told the press that airdrops had ceased because of 
their success and diminishing tensions in Bosnia. This was not true as Serb attacks had actually 
increased, airdrops never stopped, and both Clinton and Gore had to make corrective public 
statements.522 Meanwhile, the administration had changed its position on Vance-Owen again and 
was now urging Izetbegovic to sign on. Bosnian Serbs, fearing that their opportunity to form a 
Serbian state was endangered by greater American involvement, were now resistant to V-O and 
escalated their attacks on Bosnian-Muslim enclaves like Srebrenica. Images of the Balkan 
tragedy were broadcast on American news outlets like CNN and spurred greater calls for Clinton 
to act from Congress (e.g. Senator Joseph Biden) and within the press.523  
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As the American public became increasingly aware of the Bosnian tragedy throughout 
the Spring of 1993, the Clinton Principals held several meetings each week before settling on a 
new policy: “lift and strike.” This policy meant lifting the 1991 arms embargo, supplying 
Bosnians with arms for self-defense, and threatening air strikes that would deter further Serb 
aggression. On May 1, Clinton sent Warren Christopher to several European capitals to try and 
convince their governments to support lift and strike but he was expectedly rebuffed as most of 
the peacekeeping troops were British and French. In fact, allies told the administration they 
would never accept lifting the arms embargo unless the US was also willing to commit ground 
troops. The administration also hoped that the threat of airstrikes would pressure Milosevic to 
accept V-O but the Serb negated this maneuver by deferring acceptance of the UN’s terms to the 
Serbian parliament. While Christopher was still in Europe, Clinton, having read more about the 
centuries of interethnic Balkan violence began to soften his support for lift and strike. When 
Christopher returned, he told Clinton and the Principals that neither lift nor strike was ever likely 
to gain allied support unless it was accompanied by a large American military commitment.  
Christopher then moved to change the policy to containing the Bosnia conflict. The UN 
supplied him with an opportunity to do just that on May 6 when it passed a Security Council 
resolution which created six “safe areas.” France, Russia, and Britain, supported the UNSCR 
under a Joint Action Plan (JAP) which called for the safe areas’ military defense (the US would 
only supply air support if necessary), UN monitors on the border to report on Serb aggression, 
greater international presence in Macedonia and Kosovo, and the establishment of a war crimes 
tribunal. In the shuffle of shifting policies, the administration had also abandoned Vance-
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Owen.524 While these measures ostensibly helped bring the US and allies together, it changed 
little on the ground for the Bosnians. 
The failures of lift and strike and JAP in the Winter and Spring of 1993 to change 
Bosnian realities also portended eighteen uneven and ineffectual months of Clinton’s Bosnia 
policy. In the summer of 1993, Clinton’s anger at the Serbs’ bombing of Sarajevo led to further 
deliberations with allies and an agreement to use NATO airstrikes contingent upon an UN 
process functionally controlled by the French and British—which prevented the implementation 
of airstrikes. In response, the Serbs pulled back temporarily; but by the end of 1993 they again 
attacked UN-protected “safe areas,” humanitarian aid convoys, and Sarajevo. The trend 
continued throughout the following year. In early 1994, as principals and allies still debated 
airstrikes’ terms, the Serbs shelled a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing dozens and injuring 
hundreds. The marketplace attack led to the creation of an UN-controlled “safe zone” around 
Sarajevo in which Serbs had to turn over heavy weapons or face NATO airstrikes—which again 
would not be used because of allies’ objections. In March, the administration successfully 
reached an agreement between the Croats and Bosnians to stop their fighting—this was the 
administration’s first victory on Bosnia. Through the summer of 1994, the Russians convinced 
the Serbs to withdraw light weapons from Sarajevo and to cease attacks on the safe area of 
Gorazde. 
A new negotiating block called the Contact Group (consisting of Russia, Germany, 
France, Great Britain, and the United States), gave the Serbs two weeks to accept a new map 
derived from the Vance-Owen initiatives—which the Serbs deliberated before (predictably) 
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rejecting it. In response, the Contact Group tightened economic sanctions on Milosevic and the 
Serbs but would still not arm the Bosnians.  
In the fall of 1994, Clinton under pressure from an incoming Republican congress, 
pushed through some limited NATO airstrikes, only to reverse course shortly thereafter, under 
pressure from Lake, who told the president that continuing on this path might lead to the end of 
the NATO alliance. The administration then tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a 6-month ceasefire 
with the Serbs who preferred to talk to former President Jimmy Carter. He successfully 
negotiated a four-month ceasefire January 1 through April 30, 1995. By the end of 1994, Clinton, 
Lake, and principals because of 2 years of diplomatic and strategic blunders, again found 
themselves locked into the European position: contain the conflict to the Balkans and hope that it 
burns itself out.525 
 
Analysis 1993-1994: 
During the first two years of the Clinton administration, Bosnia policy was marked by 
cycles of the same internal dysfunction and ineffectual action. Reports of Serbs’ violence 
shocked the President, who would urge his inexperienced advisors to “do something.” The 
Principals would engage in numerous extensive policy discussions, sometimes with the 
President, that never yielded the one escalatory policy action that was acceptable to European 
allies: the introduction of American ground troops. Instead, advisors functionally deferred to 
allies and IOs prerogatives and preferences, which led to persistent and largely pointless 
discussions about arming the Bosnians, potential terms of airstrikes, and little real action to stop 
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violence and save lives. The Serbs, fully understanding that no forceful Western action was 
imminent, would engage in performative and temporary acts of cessation of aggression whilst 
never actually relenting from their goal of creating a Serbian state at the expense of Bosnian 
Muslims. In the shuffle, Clinton and his advisors would make public statements that were not 
always reflective of policy, deliberations, or aims, and frequently sowed confusion both 
domestically and abroad. As Daalder succinctly summarized the Clinton approach during these 
two years: 
In early 1993 it rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; in May 1993 it tried to sell a 
policy to lift the arms embargo and conduct air strikes while the Muslims were 
being armed; and in 1994 it had sought repeatedly to convince the allies to support 
strategic air strikes. Each time, the new policy was rejected or shelved, and an 
incremental, crisis management approach was once again substituted for a viable 
approach to end the war.526 
 
The central problem and driver of ineffective action was the interaction between 
Clinton’s half-formed belief in “doing something” to help Bosnia and lack of administration 
expertise to generate and enact a policy that stop civil war in the Balkans. As Zimmerman wrote, 
“strong presidential views were needed. But they were never forthcoming. Clinton himself 
seemed torn about what to do. His and his aides’ rhetoric reflected the absence of strategy.”527 
Without the guidance and the agency derived from clear and consistent presidential beliefs, his 
advisors were never able to meaningfully carry out the best of Clinton’s intentions for Bosnia. 
Instead, they were left with partial measures that did little to help the Bosnians and did much to 
create tension with allies.  
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 For all of their failures during the first two years in office, Clinton and his advisors 
showed signs of learning. The March 1994 ceasefire between Croatia and Bosnia showed the 
administration that it had diplomatic options beyond working with and through European allies. 
Similarly, the limited air strikes in autumn of 1994, while unsuccessful on all fronts and 
ultimately undone because of the tensions with allies, demonstrated that European resistance to 
their use was neither permanent nor unconditional. Also, the JAP agreement in May 1993, which 
established the war crimes tribunal, showed that the administration was capable of gaining allied 
support to extend attention to the Balkan conflict beyond containment. These indicators along 
with the overwhelming evidence that what Daalder called the failure of, “the day-to-day crisis 
management approach [of 1993-1994]” represented an opportunity for Clinton and his 
administration to use their experience gained over the previous two years to seek a path apart 
from “muddling through.”528  
 
1995—Abandoning Incrementalism, Embracing Decisive Action:  
During the four months that Carter’s ceasefire was in effect, internal deliberations 
showed that the Clinton administration had abandoned hope of improving dynamics in the 
Balkans and began formulating post-conflict policies. In February, the CIA raised concerns that 
Serbia would face tremendous financial difficulties because of its lack of access to Western 
markets and financial institutions.529 A week later, principals and the Contact Group (separately) 
planned sanctions relief for Serbia in return for Milosevic’s recognition of Bosnia, Croatia and 
other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders—an offer which Milosevic 
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refused.530 On March 12, the administration gained some measure of relief when Croatia agreed 
to extend the UN’s presence there.531  
But, by the March 16, after months of discussion, the Principals agreed that the best 
policy path forward was the one they had been on since coming into office—defer to Europeans 
and work incrementally through IOs. If policy direction going forward had changed at all, it was 
even less ambitious. A March 17 summary of the Principals’ “new” approach from Lake to 
Clinton said: 
Principals agreed that we should continue to support the Bosnian Government’s 
goal of a political settlement consistent with the Contact Group proposal, but that 
we should seek to lower public expectations of immediate success; we should also 
avoid nurturing any illusions on the part of the Bosnian Government that we can 
deliver a settlement or that the U.S. or NATO will intervene militarily on their 
behalf.532 
 
However, a month later, the State Department had given up hope that Contact Group 
might produce any results or merit American support. A declassified department memo said, “we 
should not portray the Group as alive and well and working on ideas to bring the conflict to an 
end. This would only damage our credibility, both in the region and with our public and press.” 
At April’s end, the State Department was ready to give up any new diplomatic efforts on Bosnia 
as officials saw little chance of extending the ceasefire.533 
With no signs of increased intervention coming from the West, Bosnia saw a return to 
fighting and limited Western response to it. Throughout the month, the JNA shelled Bosnian 
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cities and attacked UN-protected safe areas, killing hundreds of civilians.534 Initially, rather than 
consider coercive responses as they had previously, the UN, Contact Group, and Clinton 
administration undertook various forms of policy review, including debating the terms of Serbian 
sanctions relief. Similarly, there were few consequences for Serbs after they seized weapons 
from the Sarajevo safe zone beyond the Americans agreeing to arm and train Bosnians if 
UNPROFOR troops withdrew.535 
However, there were some signs of discontent within the Western senior leadership over 
maintaining this policy trajectory. After Serbs took several dozen UN peacekeepers hostage, 
French President Jacques Chirac approached Clinton about the creation of a Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF), a heavily-armed land unit which, unlike UNPROFOR, could take offensive action 
against Serb aggression.536 On May 28th, a cable from the American embassy in Sarajevo 
reported that UNPROFOR commander’s General Rupert Smith believed that the UN mission no 
longer functioned and that the Western position was at a point in which, “We either fight or we 
don’t.”537 On June 3, NATO approved the Chirac-Clinton RRF proposal which would be 
commanded by General Smith. The UNSC, under UNSCR 998, followed suit on June 16.538 
During the last the two weeks of June 1995, the Principals met (sometimes with Clinton) to 
discuss how to balance UN and NATO considerations with domestic political concerns, 
prospects for overhauling diplomatic talks with Milosevic, and various long-term strategies.539  
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At the same time, Albright wrote a memo to the president which advocated forcefully for 
the using airstrikes against the Serbs. Clinton, having seen more than two years of UN-
ineffectiveness, agreed with his UN Ambassador.  Lake, who was now “strengthened in this 
determination by the president’s evident desire for a new direction,” worked with the NSC to 
create a new strategy. It had three components: 1) Support RRF over UNPROFOR, 2) Accept a 
diplomatic solution that was kind to Serbs’ gains during the civil war—no matter how ill-gotten, 
and 3) No diplomatic solution was possible without a significant military threat on the Serbs. 
When Lake presented Clinton with this approach, the president agreed.540 
Then, between July 6th and 16th, Serbs launched a series of attacks on the “safe zone” of 
Srebrenica, killing 7,079 Bosnians.541 This would prove to be the turning point. As Daalder 
observed, the Srebrenica massacres made clear Milosevic’s strategy. After taking Srebrenica, 
Serbs would attack other lightly-guarded UN safe zones (Gorazde, Zepa, and Bihac) before 
moving on Sarajevo which would “conclude the war before the onset of the next winter.” 542 
 In the days that followed the Srebrenica attacks, Western leaders moved to create a plan 
to finally stop Serb aggression in Bosnia. On July 14, the Principals met to discuss a Chirac 
proposal to fortify the UN presence and protect Gorazde and, once again, seek a path forward 
that would not necessitate the deployment of American ground troops. They decided to send 
General John Shalikashvili, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to an allies’ conference in 
London to represent American interests on new allied action.543 At the conference, allies decided 
to make a strong defense of Gorazde with air strikes—a position that Clinton was able to 
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persuade Chirac to accept just prior to the conference’s start.544 After the conference’s 
conclusion, at a July 21 press briefing, Secretary of State Christopher announced that going 
forward the administration would commit to the following steps: 
1) Support UNPROFOR—even with all its shortcomings; 
2) Defend Gorazde; 
3) Stabilize the humanitarian challenges in Sarajevo; 
4) Urge other nations to increase their humanitarian contributions; 
5) Push for a Bosnia-wide ceasefire followed by a negotiated political settlement; 
6) Hold Bosnian Serb leaders responsible for the safety of all UN hostages. 
 
He said:  
 
We face a very simple and stark choice: either the international community rapidly takes 
firm steps to fulfill its mission in Bosnia or its mission will collapse…There’ll be no 
more pin-prick strikes…We do not seek to make the international community a 
participant in the war in Bosnia, but we're determined to make another, perhaps final 
effort to fulfill the world's responsibilities in Bosnia. Today's meeting was a necessary 
first step toward that goal. Now we must act… President Clinton is committed to working 
with our partners, all of them—especially France and Britain—to see that the decisions 
we take today are translated into reality. 545 
 
A declassified July 20 NSC discussion paper entitled, “Bosnia Endgame Strategy” showed that 
the administration’s support for June’s “endgame” discussions had grown even stronger. The 
paper called for, “more aggressive use of NATO air power…to halt Serb artillery attacks on the 
exclusion zones.” It concluded that if air power did not lead to a political settlement, the 
Principals would, “let UNPROFOR collapse this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military 
capabilities needed to level the playing field.” Principals defined “leveling the playing field” as 
giving Bosnians one year of air support after which, “the Bosnians would be on their own.”546 
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With the President and his administration finally coalesced around a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy through bombing, NATO fell in line and the end of the war in Bosnia came quickly. 
Throughout August, the United States and its allies ramped up preparation as NATO and the UN 
approved the air strikes and their projected targets. Clinton gave final approval to the endgame 
strategy and Christopher appointed Assistant Secretary of State Richard (Dick) Holbrooke to be 
the lead Balkan negotiator.547 Between August 30 and September 14, NATO conducted pinpoint 
bombing on Serbian targets (over Russian objections), which led to a ceasefire in early 
October.548 By  the end of 1995, Holbrooke’s skillful diplomacy led to the signing of the Dayton 
Accords and the formal end of the war in Bosnia.549 
 
Final Analysis:  
 
 When George H.W. Bush ascended to the presidency, Yugoslavia was starting to come 
undone. Bush believed in non-intervention and even though he had several advisors with relevant 
expertise, the president’s beliefs dominated policy considerations and actions throughout his 
presidency. He never discussed intervention until he was a lame duck president and, even then, 
intervention was used purely as a threat to discourage continued violence. Instead, his 
administration chose to defer to international organizations and hope that economic aid and 
reform might keep the country together even though there was little indication that such actions 
might stop the violence. As the death toll mounted into the tens of thousands and it was evident 
that Bush’s approach was designed to keep the United States out of the Balkans and not to curb 
violence there, he still maintained his beliefs in non-intervention because, as Leslie Gelb put it, 
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“He just sees too many land mines in Bosnia and no way to get out.”550 For Bush, reasons for 
and means of keeping the United States out of the Balkans was clear and, for better or worse, 
effective. 
As Zimmermann wrote, “As with Bush, the issue with Clinton was not who was guilty, 
but what could the United States do about it.”551 For Clinton, the inability to support his beliefs 
in “doing something” with tangible policy perplexed and froze his administration until the 
summer of 1995. Reflective of overall administration inexperience and Clinton’s inchoate beliefs 
on Bosnia, it took two years of learning from the conflict before he and his advisors were finally 
able to effectively act. As Jane Sharp wrote, “Only after almost four years of war, more than 
200,000 dead, and 2 million displaced did the United States exert leadership and, together with 
France and Britain, take the kind of military action that could have prevented war in the first 
place.”552 Clinton, looking back on the indecisive period, gave himself a pass, attributing his 
inability to act on Bosnia as preferred to extant constraints. He wrote: 
My own opinions were constrained by the dug-in positions I found when I took 
office. For example, I was reluctant to go along with…unilaterally lifting the arms 
embargo, for fear of weakening the United Nations (though we later did so in effect, 
by declining to enforce it.) I also didn’t want to divide the NATO alliance by 
unilaterally bombing Serb military positions, especially since there were European, 
but no American, soldiers on the ground with the UN mission. And I didn’t want to 
send American troops there, putting them in harm’s way under a UN mandate I 
thought was bound to fail.553 
  
“Dug-in positions,” however were not the cause of waffling or even a lack of understanding of 
the multiparty dynamics that created the conflict and conflict mitigation’s intractability. The 
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problem for Clinton was, that until the summer of 1995, he lacked the resolve to translate his 
beliefs into policy.554 
 Years of stating a desire to do something and not doing enough had created an 
unanticipated and unforeseen dynamic: the United States had functionally sleepwalked into 
having to act Bosnia. An August 3 memo from Ambassador Albright to NSA Lake encapsulated 
this dynamic and the process that led to it. She wrote:  
Our previous strategy—give primary responsibility to the Europeans, help the 
Bosnians rhetorically and hope the parties will choose peace—is no longer 
sustainable…I strongly believe that the issue has become bigger than Bosnia. 
Although we may have been correct to limit our role in the past—on the grounds 
that the former Yugoslavia was primarily a European responsibility—the 
circumstances and our interests have now changed. Our interest in resolving this 
conflict has broadened…The failure of our European allies to resolve the Bosnia 
crisis has not only exposed the bankruptcy of their polity, but it has also caused 
serious erosion in the credibility of the NATO alliance and the United Nations. 
Worse, our continued reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis in the 
heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership of the post-Cold War world.555 
 
The unspoken part of Albright’s assessment was that years of failing to lead were necessary for 
both Clinton and his advisors to learn and gain the expertise necessary to lead. 
 
Alternative explanations:  
Scholars investigating questions of presidential management of violence in the Balkans 
put forth varied assessments. Realists, for example offer mixed views of Bush and Clinton’s 
performance. Mearsheimer, for example, argues in favor of the Bush approach saying that 
Yugoslavia, like much of Eastern Europe, was historically a morass for great powers and, unlike 
Germany and Russia, the United States had no real interests there.556 Similarly, Mearsheimer and 
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Pape argue that because the United States had no real interests in the Balkans, it should have 
supported a partition of Bosnia and granted the fledgling country a NATO security guarantee.557 
Even after Dayton’s success, Mearsheimer and Van Evra argue in favor of partition out of fear 
that the peace accords would eventually draw in American troops—which it did.558 Walt, 
however, also taking a realist approach, is more sympathetic to Clinton arguing that managing 
NATO was more difficult after the end of Cold War because it had to become an organization of 
action instead of largely symbolic deterrent. Even though Clinton was slow to learn this, he was 
able to correct course, lead the West towards a lasting peace, and strengthen NATO in the 
process. Walt, like Mearsheimer, believes that Clinton should have favored ethnic partition 
because, “insisting that the long-term goal be a democratic and multiethnic Bosnia, the United 
States has committed outside forces to Bosnia for years to come.559 
 
Conclusion: 
 
From 1989-1995, American presidential approaches towards Yugoslavia and Bosnia had 
4 distinct policy phases: 
1) Maintaining the Cold War Status Quo (1989-1990) 
2) Inaction on State Disintegration and Avoiding American Involvement (1991-93)  
3) Chaotic Learning (1993-May 1995) 
4) Abandoning Incrementalism, Embracing Decisive Action (June-December 1995) 
 
Each policy phase was foremost dictated by the relevant president’s beliefs on how the United 
States should act. The clarity and steadfastness of the president’s beliefs translated directly in 
advisors’ ability to actualize those beliefs. 
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In the first phase, the Bush administration was united behind the president’s beliefs in 
trying to maintain Yugoslav unity without directly intervening. However, after the state 
dissolved and acts of genocide were being reported, Bush maintained his nonintervention beliefs 
(the second phase). Adherence to these beliefs functionally negated his administration’s 
considerable expertise and any reason for advisors to consider policies that might challenge those 
beliefs. For example, his senior advisors were unreceptive to new information (e.g. NIE 15-90) 
that warned that maintaining the Cold War status quo would be insufficient to either stopping the 
fighting or keep Yugoslavia whole.  
Even Ambassador Zimmermann, who justified ignoring the NIE report, recognized that 
the Bush administration’s commitment to nonintervention meant missing the best opportunity to 
intervene in Yugoslavia and handicapped his Bush’s successor. He wrote, “There is no doubt that 
Bill Clinton was dealt a bad hand in Bosnia. The best time for the United States to have made its 
mark on the Bosnian war was during the Bush administration.”560 Zimmermann’s argument 
tracks with the argument forwarded in this chapter because Bush had a more experienced set of 
advisors and the conflict was more tractable during his presidency. Had Bush, who considered 
himself a champion of human rights, been open to having his beliefs challenged or afforded his 
advisors greater latitude on policy considerations, they might have at least considered 
interventionist policies as they did for the Gulf War or the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.561 
Bush’s rigid beliefs functionally precluded his advisors’ expertise from influencing the policy 
making process and removed any motivation they have had to learn from and adapt to the 
Yugoslavia conflict as it transformed from an economic crisis into a civil war in which acts of 
ethnic cleansing took place.   
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Inheriting a “bad hand,” as Zimmermann called it, was not Clinton’s fault. However, 
voicing his beliefs in “doing something” in the Balkans before linking those beliefs to a tangible 
policy action made that hand worse as it forced inexperienced advisors to seek policy acts the 
president was unprepared to fully support. Because he was also not settled in his beliefs (as Bush 
was), Clinton routinely backtracked on policy. Clinton’s insufficient resolve grew out the 
president’s lack of foreign policy experience. That there was a similar disjoint between his 
advisors’ public statements and policy actions similarly speaks to their inexperience. 
Furthermore, these incongruities appeared to incentivize Milosevic and the Serbs to gain as much 
ground as possible before the West and/or the Americans could organize behind a cohesive 
strategy. 
The two and a half years of failing to change Bosnia policy were crucial for Clinton and 
his administration. The lessons they learned during that time provided the president and his 
advisors with the necessary experience they would need to lead an international coalition. For 
example, small successes like the ceasefire in March 1994 or airstrikes in the autumn of 1994, 
portended the administration’s learning how to lead instead of simply deferring to European 
allies. By the time Serbs escalated the violence during the summer of 1995, the Clinton 
administration was prepared to lead through a policy of coercive diplomacy. At that time, 
Clinton’s policy beliefs became clear and so his then experienced advisors were able to actualize 
them. Declassified documents show that this endgame policy, NATO airstrikes in order to drive 
Milosevic into peace negotiations, was never considered until the late-summer of 1995 and is 
evidence of the Clinton administration’s learning and experience. 
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Conclusion: 
 
Introduction: 
 
The body of this dissertation forwarded a new theory of American presidential decision-
making and developed its empirical groundings. In the sections that follow, I will reflect on the 
study’s theory and findings and consider their implications for future inquiry. 
The environment in which American presidents make intervention decisions is complex. 
It is influenced by domestic and international political considerations as well as intra-
administration dynamics. Presidents are affected by extant policies and lessons from history 
(including their own experiences and must attempt to predict the repercussions of their (in-) 
actions. All the while, they are reliant upon their advisors for emotional, logistical, and 
informational support. 
While I set out to argue that intervention decisions emerge from the interactions between 
a president’s beliefs about a particular intervention and a foreign policy team’s relevant 
capacities, findings from this dissertation’s case studies reveal that the commander in chief’s 
beliefs actually animate a team’s capacities. When the leader’s beliefs were coherent and he was 
resolved in those beliefs, advisors actively sought to realize them. When the leader’s beliefs were 
incoherent or he demonstrated a lack of resolve, advisors floundered. Viewing intervention 
decisions through this lens, the coherence and strength of a leader’s beliefs, raises several issues 
that may warrant further investigation. 
 
Somalia discussion: 
 In the Somalia case study, I explored the American historical relationship with that 
country. Under Reagan and Bush, the United States scaled back its longstanding support 
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commensurate with Somalia’s diminishing Cold War strategic value. They did so without 
concern for Barre reliance on American aid. 
As Somalia fell apart, Bush continued this trend and maintained noninterventionist 
beliefs until he was a lame duck. Then, with the humanitarian situation deteriorating rapidly, he 
changed his beliefs. Bush’s team supported this change with an intervention policy that was 
narrowly defined to provide humanitarian aid and avoid armed conflict. By these standards it 
was an effective intervention as thousands of Somalis’ lives were saved and conflict was limited. 
When Clinton took office, neither he nor his foreign policy team were prepared to 
implement his ill-defined beliefs in “helping Somalis.” Clinton never meaningfully voiced one 
single policy preference as shown when he publicly backed several policies in the month before 
the Black Hawk Down incident. Following the executive, his inexperienced team did not 
effectively engage with the Somalia intervention and thus deferred to the UN’s prerogative.562 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, there were no senior level NSC meetings on Somalia before Black Hawk 
Down. This left troops on the ground without clear mission parameters or action plans. Over 
time, all of these factors contributed to the Black Hawk Down disaster and Clinton’s rapid 
withdrawal from the country. Ultimately, Clinton’s incoherent beliefs are demonstrative of his 
inexperience. 
In both cases, deliberations and policies flowed from the executive’s beliefs. Bush’s team 
was animated by his beliefs in avoiding intervention and then pursuing it once his beliefs 
changed. The ability to quickly and successfully change policies showed an adeptness steeped in 
expertise. Furthermore, declassified national security files, showed that Bush’s advisors learned 
throughout Somalia’s decline by consistently monitoring events there. At the point when Bush’s 
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beliefs changed, his advisors, who had practiced good learning, forwarded what they considered 
to be a tenable intervention plan. 
Likewise, Clinton’s foreign policy team’s poor Somalia management flowed directly 
from the executive’s unformed beliefs. As James (Jim) Steinberg, who held several positions 
within the Clinton administration, said of the team’s early foreign policy challenges, “The 
problem is you have…very small number of people, and very few who are confirmed, and a 
bunch of crises on your plate…Somalia wasn’t a big problem initially, but it turned into one 
fairly quickly and in the first six months before you had people in place.”563 Perhaps a more 
experienced President or set of advisors might have been more prepared to handle Somalia, as 
Bush’s team did. Which is to say, in examining Somalia intervention management, advisors’ 
capacities were amplified, for better and worse, by the strength of the president’s beliefs. 
 
Bosnia discussion: 
 The Bosnia case reveals a similar dynamic vis-à-vis presidential intervention beliefs. 
Bush maintained resolute nonintervention beliefs throughout Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the 
ensuing conflict and ethnic cleansing.564 Because of this steadfastness, his experienced advisors 
did little and had little reason to discuss any alternative policy options. Even though his foreign 
policy team monitored ongoing events in the Balkans, the clarity of Bush’s beliefs and strength 
of his conviction functionally negated their expertise. Given the adeptness they demonstrated in 
changing Somalia intervention policy late in Bush’s final weeks in office, I wonder if Bush had 
                                                      
563 National Security Council Project. 2000. "The Clinton Administration." University of Maryland—Center for 
International and Security Studies at Maryland. National Security Council Project. September 27, 2000, 
http://www.cissmdev.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/default/files/papers/clinton.pdf 
564 While realists might laud his restraint from intervening in a country/region where there were ostensibly no vital 
American interests, his noninterventionism did little demonstrate the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations that 
were an important part of the Cold War and his vision for the post-Cold War order. 
 164 
similarly changed his beliefs and allowed his expert team to pursue tough diplomatic actions 
against Milosevic, the ethnic cleansing might have been halted and the greater genocide and 
killings avoided or at least lessened. 
 For Clinton, his Balkans’ management started like his Somalia management. He stated 
unformed beliefs in “doing something.” Unlike with Somalia, his advisors were engaged with the 
conflict. Through two and half years of flailing and failing, they learned from the conflict. 
Importantly, they learned that the Serbs would not be deterred by conventional diplomacy and 
their reluctant allies would, under the right circumstances and American leadership, support 
airstrikes. In the summer of 1995, Clinton’s foreign policy team coalesced behind support for 
coercive diplomatic action. 
That Clinton and his team needed experience to respectively clarify beliefs and pursue a 
corresponding policy raises counterfactual questions about the Somalia case. If Clinton had not 
abandoned Somalia and his team had time to gain greater experience, might they too have found 
success there? More broadly, if Clinton had more foreign policy experience prior and stronger 
intervention beliefs to ascending to the presidency, might his advisors have been more effective 
in their dealings with the Serbs and European allies? 
 
Military Experience and Militarized Dispute Initiation: 
While the quantitative portion of this study did not show a clear relationship between 
presidents’ individual experiences of wars and predilections for initiating militarized disputes, 
there are further avenues of potential inquiry. For example, foundational definitions might be 
clarified. The definition of combat forwarded by Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis is: 
Deployment as part of a national military in what would generally be considered a 
war zone (absent evidence of nonparticipation), deployment/general participation 
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in a battle, or affirmative evidence of direct combat. Note that this does not require 
affirmative evidence of a given person firing a weapon, but instead adopts a 
definition requiring the soldier to be deployed in a war zone facing the risk of death 
in general. In general, combat was coded 0 in the absence of affirmative evidence 
that a leader who served in the military had combat experience.565 
 
This definition may be overly broad in that “facing the risk of death in general” is open to 
subjective interpretation when actually coding. Put another way, they define combat by a soldier 
serving in the field, not which part of the field and so a soldier on the frontlines is treated as 
having as much combat experience as a soldier in the backlines. Also, “risk of death” is self-
determined and may not be real. For example, a combat pilot may take fire and not know it. 
While the pilot’s experience would be coded as “combat” experience, he/she was unaware of 
“facing the risk of death in general” and so the psychological impact might be muted. 
Similarly, war’s psychological impact might be better determined (but harder to define) 
by a soldier’s experiences with death. For example, drone pilot’s do not face the risk of death but 
hit enemy targets and are shown to suffer from PTSD. 566 Likewise, one can foresee how a 
soldier who serves in a medical facility and witnessed death routinely would be rightly classified 
as ‘non-combat’ while having seen more of war’s horrors than the aforementioned pilot might 
have.567 
 In terms of empirical study, it is possible that MIDs is not the proper dataset to use. The 
mis-categorization problems raised in Chapter 3 speak to this issue. Perhaps future studies might 
consider using other dataset like the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s dataset.568 
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Limitations and Implications for Future Work: 
 There are limitations to the qualitative empirical work in this study. It does not give full 
treatment to domestic political considerations or other interventions under considerations. In 
light of the latter limitation, the qualitative study done here lends itself to examination of Bush 
and Clinton’s approaches towards Rwanda and Haiti. Also, it is difficult to generalize the theory 
forwarded in this study based on 2 relatively low stakes interventions and 2 foreign policy teams 
with vastly differing experience levels. Further study might investigate variation on both the 
foreign policy teams’ expertise and stakes involved in interventions. Another area of future 
inquiry might examine an inexperienced foreign policy president with experienced advisors (e.g. 
Barack Obama or Jimmy Carter) or a president who eliminated the variable of experienced 
advisors (e.g. Nixon) as grounds for theory testing.569 Another approach might include the full 
qualitative examination of all interventions considered by a president to see how lower profile 
cases and nonintervention decisions were made. 
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Appendix A: 
 
Table 1: US Presidents and Military Experience: 
 
Order President 
Military 
Service 
Combat 
Type of 
Service 
Highest 
Rank 
Conflict 
1 Washington 1 1 
Virginia 
Regiment, 
Continental 
Army, 
United 
States Army 
General 
French and 
Indian War, 
Revolutionary 
War 
2 J. Adams 0 0 None None None 
3 Jefferson* 1 0 
Virginia 
Militia 
Colonel None 
4 Madison* 1 0 
Virginia 
Militia 
Colonel None 
5 Monroe 1 1 
Continental 
Army 
Major 
Revolutionary 
War 
6 
J. Q. 
Adams 
0 0 None None None 
7 Jackson 1 1 
Tennessee 
State Militia, 
United 
States Army 
Major 
General   
Revolutionary 
War, War of 
1812, Creek 
War, First 
Seminole 
War 
8 Van Buren 0 0 None None None 
9 Harrison 1 1 
United 
States Army 
Major 
General   
Northwest 
Indian War, 
War of 1812 
10 Tyler 1 0 
Virginia 
Militia  
Captain  War of 1812 
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11 Polk 1 0 
Tennessee 
State Militia 
Colonel None 
12 Taylor 1 1 
United 
States Army 
Major 
General 
War of 1812, 
Black Hawk 
War, Second 
Seminole 
War, 
Mexican–
American 
War 
13 Fillmore 1 0 
New York 
State Militia 
Major None 
14 Pierce 1 1 
New 
Hampshire 
State Militia, 
United 
States Army 
Brigadier 
General 
Mexican–
American 
War 
15 Buchanan 1 0 
Pennsylvania 
State Militia 
Private War of 1812 
16 Lincoln  1 0 
Illinois State 
Militia 
Captain 
Black Hawk 
War 
17 Johnson 1 0 
Tennessee 
State Militia, 
Union Army 
Brigadier 
General 
Civil War 
18 Grant 1 1 
United 
States Army, 
Union Army 
General of 
the Army 
Mexican–
American 
War 
American 
Civil War 
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19 Hayes 1 1 
Union Army, 
United 
States Army 
Major 
General 
Civil War 
20 Garfield 1 1 Union Army 
Major 
General 
Civil War 
Order President 
Military 
Service 
Combat 
Type of 
Service 
Highest 
Rank 
Conflict 
21 C. Arthur 1 0 
New York 
State Militia, 
United 
States Army, 
Union Army 
Brigadier 
General 
Civil War 
22 Cleveland 0 0 None None None 
23 B. Harrison 1 1 Union Army 
Brigadier 
General 
Civil War 
24 Cleveland 0 0 None None None 
25 McKinley 1 1 Union Army Major Civil War 
26 
Roosevelt, 
T. 
1 1 
United 
States Army 
Colonel 
Spanish-
American 
War 
27 Taft 0 0 None None None 
28 Wilson 0 0 None None None 
29 Harding 0 0 None None None 
30 Coolidge 0 0 None None None 
31 Hoover 0 0 None None None 
32 
Roosevelt, 
F. 
0 0 None None None 
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33 Truman 1 1 
Missouri 
National 
Guard, 
United 
States Army, 
United 
States Army 
Reserve 
Colonel World War I 
34 Eisenhower 1 1 
United 
States Army 
General of 
the Army 
World War I, 
World War II 
35 Kennedy 1 1 
United 
States Navy 
Lieutenant World War II 
36 Johnson 1 1 
U.S. Naval 
Reserve 
Commander World War II 
37 Nixon 1 0 
United 
States Navy 
Reserve 
Commander World War II 
38 Ford 1 1 
United 
States Navy 
Reserve 
Lieutenant 
Commander 
World War II 
39 Carter 1 0 
United 
States Navy 
Lieutenant 
World War II, 
Korean War 
40 Reagan 1 0 
US Army 
Reserve 
Captain World War II 
41 
G. H.W. 
Bush 
1 1 
United 
States Naval 
Reserve 
Lieutenant 
(Junior 
Grade) 
World War II 
42 Clinton 0 0 None None None 
43 G.W. Bush 1 0 
Texas Air 
National 
Guard  
First 
Lieutenant 
Vietnam War 
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44 Obama 0 0 None None None 
45 Trump 0 0 None None None 
* Indicates conflicting historical accounts of a president’s military history. 
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